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ABSTRACT
Campaign managers and political consultants speculate that late night political 
comedy affects candidate image and the citizenry’s political behavioral intentions, and 
recent political science and communication scholarship supports these assumptions. The 
results of this study confirm that late night comedy does influence candidate image and 
behavioral intentions, but in ways that often refute conventional wisdom. While 
candidate appearances on late night talk shows enhance candidate image and monologue 
jokes derogate feelings toward candidates, late night political parodies actually enhance 
rather than worsen candidate image. 
Additionally, this study assessed the viability of using inoculation treatments to 
protect against late night political ridicule (monologues and parodies). Previous research 
beginning in the late 1980s has revealed inoculation to be a successful strategy to combat 
political attack messages, and in many ways, superior to conventional strategies of 
bolstering and refuting. Results of the current investigation indicated that inoculation 
failed to confer resistance to late night political content, and in some respects, backfired 
by derogating as opposed to enhancing candidate image and political behavioral 
intentions. Results also revealed that candidate appearances boosted inoculative effects 
against conventional attacks, and inoculation messages designed to refute the channel of 
late night comedy failed to confer resistance to late night comedy, but were minimally 
successful in conferring resistance to conventional political attack messages. Results also 
examined the potential role of irritation in the inoculation process. There was no evidence 
that inoculation treatments elicited more irritation, but results did indicate that sources 
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using humor decrease expectations of experiencing irritation upon encountering 
counterattitudinal messages. 
Finally, the research reconfirmed inoculation’s efficacy against conventional 
political attacks. Results revealed that inoculation treatments enhance candidate image 
and behavioral intentions, including voting for candidates and contributing time or money 
to campaigns. The study also examined effects of forewarning on elicited threat. Results 
revealed that adding an additional forewarning to inoculation treatment messages, after 
counterarguments have been raised and refuted, elicits more threat throughout the process 
of inoculation, but there was no evidence that additional threat enhanced resistance. The 
current study also assessed effects of inoculation on perceived generalized self-efficacy. 
Contrary to prediction, inoculation treatments did not enhance perceived generalized self-
efficacy. Instead, those inoculated indicated lower levels of perceived generalized self-
efficacy after encountering conventional attack messages, possibly due to elicited threat. 
In summary, results offer a more nuanced understanding of late night political 
comedy’s effects on candidate image and political behavioral intentions; indicate that 
inoculation is ineffective against late night political content and may instead backfire; and 
enhances our understanding of forewarnings, elicited threat, and perceived generalized 
self-efficacy. 
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Pfau and Burgoon’s (1988) finding that inoculation was not only a viable, but in 
many cases, superior strategy in political campaigning laid the theoretical groundwork for 
more extensions of inoculation in the context of politics. Inoculation has proved a 
workable strategy in both state (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988) and 
national campaigns (Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990; Pfau, Park, Holbert, & Cho, 
2001b), protecting against attacks concerning character and issues (An & Pfau, 2004a, 
2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 2001b). Yet, to date, political 
inoculation research has looked extensively at protection against explicit and direct 
conventional attacks, like those launched in televised political advertising (An & Pfau, 
2004a; Pfau et al., 2001b), direct mail campaigns (Pfau et al., 1990), print messages (Pfau 
& Burgoon, 1988), and televised debates (An & Pfau, 2004b), using word-based printed 
inoculation treatment messages (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau 
et al., 1990) or emails (Pfau et al., 2001b).
One goal of this study is to explore inoculation’s efficacy in conferring resistance 
to a political attack that is less direct and explicit, and instead, cloaked in humor. 
Specifically, this study takes inoculation into the context of late night television talk and 
variety shows, like The Tonight Show and Saturday Night Live. Matthew Felling, media 
director for the Center for Media and Public Affairs, argued, “These types of programs
are becoming the most important leg of the campaign triathlon—there’s campaign stops, 
debates and these TV appearances” (cited in Kloer, 2002, p. 1C). Moy, Xenos, and Hess 
(2004) remarked, “In preparing ourselves to research and understand the…2004 
2campaign, we would do well to attend to the growing presence of political messages in 
entertainment-based media” (p. 12). 
But this study looks beyond inoculation’s efficacy in the face of political attacks 
that use humor and also assesses whether candidates can use these same channels of 
political ridicule for a boost to the inoculative effect of conventional inoculation 
messages. Levin (2000) articulates the contrast in two types of late-night humor: “While 
late-night comedians mercilessly mock the candidates in nightly monologues, [candidates 
and politicians] get the kid-gloves treatment once they arrive in the studio” (p. 4D). 
Candidates are appearing on these late night comedy shows at unprecedented levels, but 
what are the effects to the candidates’ images? Could a candidate appearance, in 
conjunction with a conventional inoculation treatment, boost the efficiency of the 
conferred resistance? In reviewing investigations using various pretreatment strategies, 
Miller and Burgoon (1979) conclude, “any message may affect the persuasive efficacy of 
a subsequent persuasive attack” (p. 312, italics added). This study assesses whether an 
appearance on a late night comedy show has such effects.
Beyond looking at whether inoculation pretreatments can protect against political 
humor attacks (e.g., monologues) and benefit from humor boosts (e.g., candidate 
appearances), the study also explores whether encountering a counterattitudinal attack in 
the form of late night comedy enhances resistance to conventional political attacks. 
Additionally, the study investigates the broad blanket of protection afforded by 
inoculation in two ways. First, the study explores whether the same inoculation treatment 
message that protects against late night comedy ridicule can also protect against 
conventional political attack advertising. Second, the study assesses whether an 
3inoculation treatment message can be constructed to protect against an entire channel of 
counterattitudinal messages—in this case, late night comedy shows in general—by 
refuting the channel’s legitimacy instead of the conventional approach of raising and 
refuting specific counterarguments. 
This study also takes a closer look at both the process and the effects of 
inoculation treatment messages. In terms of process, the study explores the potential role 
of irritation in the process of resistance, particularly when the argumentation is mixed 
with the positive affect generated by humor. The study also explores ways of eliciting 
greater threat by incorporating a double forewarning instead of the conventional single 
forewarning. In terms of effects, this study considers further inoculation pretreatment 
effects on perceived generalized self-efficacy.  
In summary, this research explores three broad areas: expanding our 
understanding of late night comedy television’s effects on political attitudes and 
behavioral intentions; extending inoculation to a new context in the political domain; and 
adding nuance to our understanding of how inoculation confers resistance and effects of 
inoculation pretreatments. There have been many calls for more research in each of these 
areas.
First, Lumsdaine and Janis’ (1953) study, often referenced in inoculation research 
as the precursor to McGuire’s work, long ago called for more resistance research in 
different contexts, and McGuire (1961b) noted that resistance research would benefit 
from looking at situations where the exposure to the attack messages was voluntary, not 
forced. Additionally, McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) called for further exploration of 
potential effects on the inoculation process when the messages come from different 
4sources than the “authoritative-sounding sources” (p. 34) used in most inoculation 
research. More recently, Pfau, Holbert, et al. (2000) have called for more research on 
video-based inoculation messages. 
In terms of late night comedy research, research into the blend of entertainment 
and politics has taken on new legitimacy and urgency in recent years, as political 
scientists and communication scholars have placed these entertainment programs under 
academic scrutiny. As Delli Carpini and Williams (2001) argue, “to the extent that 
researchers have ignored or downplayed entertainment media, popular culture, art, and so 
forth, in the construction of both news and public opinion, we have missed a critical 
component of this process” (p. 161), an argument echoed by Mutz (2001) who observed, 
“the traditional distinctions between news and entertainment content are no longer very 
helpful” (p. 231). Cooper and Bates (2003) call for research that more accurately assesses 
the causal impacts of political content on entertainment television programs like late 
night comedy, while Niven, Lichter, and Amundson (2003) “suggest the great potential 
value of future research into the effects of late night comedy on perceptions of 
presidential candidates” (p. 131).
Finally, this research also fills a significant void in attention to attack messages in 
inoculation research, something previously acknowledge by Lee and Pfau (1997). While 
research has explored inoculation’s efficacy in terms of same- versus novel-
counterarguments in the attack message, attack messages have received scant attention in 
inoculation research (for exceptions, see Lee & Pfau, 1997; Pfau, 1992; Pfau et al., 
2001a), and all political inoculation studies have looked at inoculation’s efficacy in the 
face of traditional attacks—like television advertising and debates.
5This study is a response to these calls for further insight and clarification into new 
media influences on politics and the inoculation process of resistance to influence. 
Former President Gerald Ford, when asked about the ridicule he received on late night 
comedy, responded, “There’s really nothing you can do in that situation” (cited in Sella, 
2000, p. 72). Similarly, David Ginsberg, research director for Al Gore’s 2000 bid for the 
presidency, lamented:
Once something makes the leap from news to the late night shows, it’s completely 
out of your hands, and no amount of argumentation, of documentation, of proof, 
of pleading with reporters to write the real story behind the Internet matters, 
because it’s already in the public psyche. (as cited in Jamieson & Waldman, 2003, 
p. 48)
This study takes a different stance on these two positions and offers inoculation as a 
defense to this prevalent type of political attack.
6Chapter 2
Humor in Politics
Humor is, after all, a basic form of communication through which the press, entertainers, 
and the candidates themselves convey their skepticism, anger, and arguments.
-Gerald Gardner, The Mocking of the President (1988, p. 14)
Even at banquets held in his honor—surrounded by revelers, entertainers, and 
jesters—Emperor Louis the Pious, heir to Charlemagne in 814, “never … allowed his 
white teeth to be bared in laughter” (as cited in Innes, 2002, p. 133). This observation, 
noted in Thegan’s account of the Carolingian king, reflects a careful management of 
public image, a conscious effort of the ruler “to behave in a distinctly imperial manner” 
(Innes, 2002, p. 142). Much later, in the nineteenth century, Senator Thomas Corwin of 
Ohio advised President Garfield to emulate a similar strategy: “Never make people laugh. 
If you would succeed in life, you must be solemn, solemn as an ass” (as cited in Schutz, 
1977, p. 24). 
Management of political image remains a requisite for twenty-first century 
politics as well, yet how image is negotiated—and specifically, how political image is 
managed in the potentially volatile intersection of humor and politics—offers a stark 
contrast to Louis the Pious’ tactic of masking his merriment or Corwin’s advise of 
solemnity. Expectations of the ideal modern political leader, affected by a media- and 
entertainment-dominated political landscape, have necessitated that politicians not only 
reveal a sense of humor, but also master its dual defensive and offensive functions, to 
promote an admirable political image. Events like the annual White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner—where politicians are not only expected to be funny, but also to 
7respond graciously and publicly to the ridicule of others—preclude a stoic approach to 
political endeavors. Contemporary politics demand both appreciation for and mastery of 
political humor.
In his seminal essay on wit and politics, Speier (1998) describes how political 
humor can be used both to attack and defend, to derogate or bolster a politician’s image. 
As an offensive measure, political humor is a weapon that makes one’s attacks against 
others harder to resist, an observed power of political humor tracing back to Cicero 
(Speier, 1998). Because politicians are limited in the severity of their personal attacks 
against others by expectations of “fair play” (Bennett, 1977, p. 227), politicians couch 
their attacks in humor (Whaley & Holloway, 1997). What might “cross the line” if stated 
directly is often considered acceptable when under the veneer of the joke (Combs & 
Nimmo, 1996). In this way, political humor contains sharp attacks against other 
politicians’ images, while remaining “protected” against the backlash often prompted by 
political attack messages. Sella (2000) refers to this as political humor’s “hidden power” 
(p. 72). 
This “hidden power” of political humor has not been lost on contemporary 
political players. “If your speeches have a humorous slant,” observed former state senator 
Morris Udall, “it is less likely that their substance will be rejected out of hand” (Udall, 
Neuman, & Udall, 1988, p. xvi). Similarly, Don Sipple, former senior strategist for 
Dole’s 1996 presidential campaign, observed, “Humor is a very effective way of 
delivering a message. With deep-throated, snarly narratives of negative ads, people have 
their defenses up” (cited in Kurtz, 1996, p. D1). More palatable to a public growing 
increasingly frustrated by political attack messages, political humor can be a powerful 
8and effective vehicle for delivering political punches. “The political joke as a weapon is 
pragmatic: it inflicts wounds” (Speier, 1998, p. 1358). 
While political humor can be used to attack, political humor can also be used to 
defend. Politicians who use humor are often viewed as more personable (Nilsen, 1990), 
and thus, bolstered against political attacks launched against them. A politician can 
connect with an audience by employing humor, as “political witticisms can…serve as a 
symbolic means of the candidates’ socializing with them” (Schutz, 1977, p. 7). 
Additionally, politicians use humorous remarks to “disarm” (Nilsen, 1990) an opponent. 
Then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan effectively demonstrated this power of 
political humor during a nationally televised debate with challenger Walter Mondale. 
Aware that his age was a potential liability, Reagan remarked, “I want you to know that I 
will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit for political 
purposes my opponent’s youth and inexperience” (as cited in Schroeder, 2000, p. 41). 
The audience erupted in laughter, as did his opponent.
While much evidence for humor’s protective function is anecdotal or affirmed by 
experiences of politicians, staffers and others, empirical research also supports humor’s 
ability to defend. Powell (1975) found political satire is not very effective in changing 
attitudes of highly involved subjects, but is effective in bolstering attitudes against 
counter-persuasion. In a follow-up study, using videotaped speeches by humorist Art 
Buchwald, Powell (1977) once again found satirical messages effectively “inoculated” 
subjects against serious attack messages. Powell reasoned that non-humorous attack 
messages were viewed as inappropriate, treating the issue too seriously, when they 
followed humorous political messages. While this research did not operationalize or 
9measure threat, a requisite for attitudinal inoculation (Pfau, 1997), results support 
political satire’s defensive function. 
Political humor has a number of other attributes that magnify its power to both 
attack and defend. First, political humor is attention getting (Young, 2003b), a “cognitive 
‘bucket-of-water-in-the-face” (Stark, 2003, p. 306). Centuries ago, Quintilian noted the 
attention-getting power of political humor (Speier, 1998), and the arresting nature of 
humor is confirmed in contemporary empirical research (e.g., Duncan & Nelson, 1985; 
Powell, 1977). Duncan and Nelson found humorous advertisements commanded more 
attention than serious, no or low-humor advertisements. Powell’s research ascertained 
that low-salience recipients of political satire (recipients who considered the issue 
discussed as being of low importance) were more influenced by satirical messages than 
high-salience listeners. He posited that low-salience recipients, who would otherwise 
ignore messages about an issue they consider unimportant, would find political satire 
entertaining and meriting their attention. Humorous political messages “boost public 
interest in a subject about which many Americans are not deeply absorbed” (West & 
Orman, 2003, p. 98).  Additionally, political humor may be more memorable. Empirical 
evidence suggests that humor can increase association memory. For example, humor can 
connect a name of a product to the product itself in potential consumers’ minds (Berg & 
Lippman, 2001). Political humor, then, may not only function in the moment, but also 
manifest future effects by enhancing associative connections. Finally, political humor is 
often more persuasive than non-humorous messages. Lyttle’s (2001) research sheds light 
on how humor functions in persuasive appeals. Lyttle grounded his research and analysis 
in persuasion theory, including source credibility and Elaboration Likelihood Model 
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(ELM), and found that humor enhances persuasiveness, primarily by enhancing 
perceptions of the source’s credibility. Those who use humor are often perceived as more 
competent and trustworthy. Finally, “[h]umor weakens an audience’s defenses and makes 
it more amenable to persuasion” (Speier, 1998, p. 1356).
Theory and empirical research support political humor’s persuasive efficacy—as 
both a means of attack and a means of defense. When used as a means of attack, political 
humor targets another’s image; when used as a means of defense, political humor shields 
politicians from potentially damaging image attacks. In both cases, the politician’s image 
is the focus—either degraded or enhanced by the “hidden power” of political humor. The 
next section examines this common thread.
Humor and Political Image
Image has always played a pivotal role in political success, including perceptions 
of politicians’ competence, character, and sociability. Kendall and Paine (1995) argue, 
“Image is a shorthand criterion for evaluating, compiling, storing, and retrieving 
information” (p. 31), and Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) ELM posits that heuristic cues 
(such as image) are most impacting under conditions of low-involvement with the issue. 
Voters use perceptions of candidate image as bases for political behaviors, including 
voting (Popkin, 1991). Funk (1997) found perceived competence to be paramount in 
influencing voters’ perceptions of politicians. Furthermore, for participants of more 
political knowledge, competence was considered more important than candidates’ 
perceived warmth, while for people of lower political knowledge, competence and 
warmth were considered equally important. Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon (1992) offer, 
“Character is important because it is often the first judgment that voters make about 
11
candidates. We tend to judge candidates as people before we turn our attention to their 
specific stands on issues” (p. 109). Additionally, Pfau, Diedrich, Larson and Van Winkle 
(1993) provide a more nuanced analysis of candidate image by looking at candidate 
perceived traits at specific periods of time in a campaign. The researchers found that 
during the New Hampshire primary in 1992, relational perceptions had the greatest 
impact on a candidate’s image, but closer to the election, perceptions of competence were 
more important in terms of how the perception manifested in global attitudes toward the 
candidate. Pfau and colleagues attribute the importance of relational cues to the power of 
television to suggest intimacy during the early phase of the campaign, when voters are 
first forming their impressions. 
Image plays a vital role in Popkin’s theorizing about voter decision-making. 
Popkin (1991) reasons, “Voters care about the competence of the character…because 
they do not follow most government activity…And they worry about the character of the 
candidate…because they cannot easily read ‘true’ preferences” (p. 61). Consequently, 
voters use perceptions of candidates’ competence and character as shortcuts in political 
decision-making. 
The media have played a significant role in the focus on candidate images, 
particularly since the well-publicized character flaws of Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Nixon. Then, the media “willingly adopted the role of scrutinizer of candidates” (Davis &
Owen, 1998, p. 213). This trend of focusing on politicians’ image has not only continued 
but also magnified in recent years. Davis and Owen (1998) observe:
[P]ersonality always has constituted a portion of reporting about politicians. The 
difference is that by the 1980s, personality, as defined by journalists and not by 
12
the politicians themselves, had become a central component of political news. (p. 
33)
Clearly, image is an important commodity in politics. Consequently, as Meyrowitz 
(1985) offers, “All politicians must be concerned with style and image” (p. 279). 
Additionally, image can be both threatened and enhanced by political humor. 
When political humor is used to attack, politician’s images are sullied; when politicians 
use humor as defense, image is bolstered. A candidate’s competence, character and 
sociability can be both threatened and enhanced by political humor. 
One contemporary and increasingly prevalent forum for political humor is the late 
night comedy television program. The next section draws the preceding overview of 
political humor together, including its dual attack and defense functions regarding 
candidate image, in the context of late night television comedy. In these forums, political 
attacks are launched and candidates take proactive measures to protect against potentially 
damaging barbs—all with jokes, parodies, satire, and ridicule.
Late Night Political Comedy
Late night television shows are popular, with about 7-million people watching 
The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and about 4.5-million viewers of The Late Show with 
David Letterman each night (Baum, 2003a). The ratings increase when well-known 
political candidates appear on the programs. For example, when Hillary Clinton appeared 
on The Late Show in January of 2000, Letterman pulled in 11.2 million viewers—almost 
three times the season average (Sella, 2000). When comparing viewers of conventional 
news programs, viewers of late night comedy programs are less educated (Davis & 
Owen, 1998), less politically attentive (Baum, 2003b; Davis & Owen, 1998) and younger 
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(Hamilton, 2003). While young adults are for the most part disinterested in conventional 
news (Patterson, 2000), they are interested in late night comedy. For some viewers, these 
shows substitute for conventional news (Baum, 2002a; Davis & Owen, 1998; Smith & 
Voth, 2002).
Until recently, most of the academic community ignored late night comedy 
television shows and other forms classified as “soft news” (Baum, 2002a; Simons, 2001). 
But late night talk shows have received renewed attention from political scientists (e.g., 
Baum, 2002b; Cooper & Bates, 2003; Davis & Owen, 1998; Niven et al., 2003) and 
communication scholars (e.g., Fernando, 2003; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003; Moy et al., 
2004; Pfau, 2002; Pfau, Cho, & Chong, 2001; Pfau & Eveland, 1996; Smith & Voth, 
2002; Young, 2003a, 2003b). Gardner (1986) once observed, “Humor is an unexamined 
form of debate. One does not dig too deeply into the logic of a Johnny Carson 
monologue” (p. 46). However, recent scholarship suggests that this dearth in late night 
comedy research is ending. 
Two factors have played a role in the increased scholarly attention paid to late 
night comedy. First, late night comedy has become increasingly political (Davis, 1997, 
Davis & Owen, 1998; Kerbel, 1998; Pfau, 2002), raising questions about its potential 
impact on public policy and elections. According to the Center for Media and Public 
Affairs (CMPA), in the month following the presidential election of 2000, 88 percent of 
all jokes told on The Tonight Show, The Late Show with David Letterman, and Late Night 
with Conan O’Brien were about the election aftermath (“Media Feeding Frenzy in 
Florida,” 2000). The CMPA also reported that Jay Leno and David Letterman told 31,543 
political jokes between May 25, 1992, and April 15, 2002 (“Jay Leno’s Greatest Hits,” 
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2002). Though the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted a pause in late night political joking 
(Nacos, 2003), by February 2002, the CMPA reported that Jay Leno, David Letterman, 
and Conan O’Brien were telling an average of nine political jokes during per show (“Late 
Night Humor Bounces Back,” 2002). Pfau (2002) notes the increasing prevalence of 
presidential debate content appearing on late night comedy—a phenomenon that 
mushroomed during the 2000 presidential campaign. 
Additionally, during the 2000 campaign, candidates themselves used late night 
comedy programs as outlets for their messages at unprecedented levels. The campaign 
“obliterated…the line that once separated pure campaign discourse and parody” (Pfau, 
2002, p. 256). During this campaign
[p]oliticking in the entertainment media moved from occasional oddity to political 
center stage, as the major party candidates competed aggressively for the millions 
of voters…who depend on Jay Leno’s late-night monologues for their daily 
update on national affairs. (Baum, 2002b, p. 1)
While the 1992 presidential election campaign saw candidates employing non-traditional 
news strategies “as a prevalent form of campaign communication by the candidates” 
(Pfau & Eveland, 1996, p. 214), the use of non-traditional news in the 2000 campaign 
was even greater in terms of number of appearances and scope, including Oprah, Late 
Night with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Late Night with Conan 
O’Brien, Larry King Live, Live with Regis and Kathy Lee, among others. “The 2000 
presidential campaign may be remembered not just for producing one of the closest 
outcomes in history, but for once and for all trampling the boundaries that once separated 
serious campaign discourse and parody” (Pfau et al., 2001, p. 89).
15
Late night political humor is also making its way into conventional news 
programs. Whaley and Holloway’s (1997) analysis of the political rebuttal analogy—a 
stylistic device that often uses humor to ridicule another—argues that media are drawn to 
quote short, witty sayings as sound bites. Late night talk shows are fertile ground for such 
content, and the political barbs are often picked up and rebroadcast during conventional 
news programming. Davis and Owen (1998) argue that more people saw Bill Clinton’s 
famous saxophone-playing appearance on Arsenio Hall when the clip was featured on 
conventional news programs than those who saw the performance as part of the talk 
show. The blurring distinction and “channel-hopping” works both ways. For example, 
Pfau (2002) notes that televised presidential debates are parodied on popular late night 
comedy shows, like Saturday Night Live. Political late night humor is not confined to the 
programs themselves, and conventional political rhetoric, like presidential debates, is fair 
game for political late night humor. 
The second reason scholars and practitioners call for more research in the context 
of late night comedy is that some viewers seem to be giving considerable weight to what 
they are viewing. The Pew Research Center for People and the Press found 47% of 
viewers aged 18 to 29 reported gaining political information from late-night 
entertainment television shows, like The Tonight Show and Saturday Night Live (Kloer & 
Jubera, 2000). In early 2004, The Pew Research Center for People and the Press released 
its finding that one out of two people aged 18-29 reported learning political information 
from late night comedy shows, like Saturday Night Live and The Daily Show, and 61% 
reported learning political information from late night talk shows, like Late Night with 
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David Letterman and Jay Leno’s The Tonight Show (“Cable and Internet Loom Large,” 
2004).
While evidence supports the claim that many people watch and glean political 
information from non-traditional news outlets, less is known as to what effects this type 
of political information have on viewers’ political attitudes and behaviors. Some analysts 
and scholars argue that viewers make conscience efforts to learn political information 
from late night comedy programs. For example, Robert Thompson of the Center for the 
Study of Popular TV at the University of Syracuse, argues, “Deep down, people feel 
they’re getting something closer to the truth from the comedians…It’s like a Reader’s 
Digest version of the news. You listen to the five-minute monologue and you get what 
you need” (as cited in Goodale, 1998, p. 1).  CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer offers, “There’s 
no doubt that all this comedy has an impact. Elections are won and lost on public 
perceptions…” (cited in Sella, 2000, p. 72). 
Though some journalists dismiss the idea that late night comedians’ monologues 
can influence political attitudes and voting decisions—Boehlert (2000) calls the idea 
“silly and misleading” (p. E4)—other journalists, and more convincingly, systematic 
study by the academic community, paints a decisively different picture. The prevailing 
argument from the academic community is that political effects of watching late night 
comedy are largely incidental (Baum, 2000, 2002a, 2003a; Cooper & Bates, 2003; Prior, 
2003). Most viewers tune into soft news programs, like late night talk shows, to be 
entertained. Considering Patterson’s (2000) findings that 84% of television viewers find 
the news “depressing,” and over half consider the news “not enjoyable,” the fact that 
viewers go to late night comedy shows to be entertained, and not informed, is not 
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surprising. “In the long run, entertainment programming is more entertaining than news 
for those who desire to be entertained” (Patterson, 2000, p. 15).
Baum (2003a) argues that the most significant impacts of these programs are on 
attitudes and in providing heuristic cues, which in turn, may affect voting behavior. 
Additionally, Baum’s (2003a) study indicates that some viewers do gain factual political 
knowledge from soft news, particularly those who are less educated. Cooper and Bates 
(2003) report similar conclusions from their analysis of political knowledge, soft news 
consumers, and the 2000 presidential election, as did Young (2003a, in press) in her 
studies of effects of late night comedy on politicians’ images. Pfau, Cho and Chong 
(2001) found evidence that less traditional media, like entertainment talk shows, may 
have substantial effects on the way people view candidates—more so than traditional 
media, including television news and newspapers. Their research indicates positive 
association between watching entertainment talk shows and perceptions of then-candidate 
Al Gore. 
Simply, late night comedians are now “unconventional political commentators” 
(West, 2001, p. 99) in “the strangely intertwined world of politics and comedy” (Kloer, 
2002, p. 1C). Scholars call for more scrutiny of these channels of political information 
(Baum, 2003a; Cooper & Bates, 2003; Davis & Owen, 1998; Smith & Voth, 2002; 
Zaller, 2003), as this “blend of politics and entertainment is likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future” (Baum, 2002b, p. 27). Both conventional wisdom and insight from 
the scholarly community suggest late night entertainment shows—a unique and popular 
form of non-traditional news, or “new media”—likely play significant roles in political 
perceptions, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors. 
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The next section offers a closer look at the late night talk show, returning to the 
“double-edged sword” (Davis & Owen, 1998, p. 43) of political humor, and specifically, 
of late-night comedy programs. These programs provide forums where the functions of 
political humor as a weapon and as a defense are manifested nightly.
Humor as Attack: The Monologue and Parody
Late night comedy programs often feature political humor as a weapon, 
commonly found in comedians’ monologues that begin each show (Berke, 2000; Davis & 
Owen, 1998). Davis and Owen (1998) point out that, particularly beginning in 1996, late 
night comedians’ monologues took on a “nasty tone” (p. 5). The researchers observe:
Traditional media, governed by standards of ethics including a credo of 
objectivity, generally eschew [inflammatory rhetoric] as nonprofessional. The 
new media, however, are not so restricted. Sitting politicians, especially 
incumbent presidents, are the most common victims. (Davis & Owen, 1998, p. 
19)
This type of political humor is classified as invective by Schutz (1977), or 
the abuse, ridiculing, or insulting of someone or something. In its comic or 
humorous guise, the aggressiveness of invective is cushioned by wordplay, 
metaphor, and analogical narrative. Yet, the direct insult is always close to the 
surface, and comic invective is the most aggressive of all humor. (p. 45)
The most common target of political invective is a candidate’s image (Schutz, 1977), 
questioning a candidate’s competence, character, and sociability. Late-night political 
humor is pointed, condensing candidates into caricatures and highlighting their 
weaknesses. “A comic’s take on politics is nimble, bite-size and utterly clear” (Sella, 
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2000, p. 72). One writer for The Late Show stated, “We’re not trying to catch 
complexities” (cited in Sella, 2000, p. 72). Instead, the late night jokesters “turn the 
candidates into walking punchlines” (Vejnoska, 2004, p. 1A).
The prevalence and potential impacts of character-driven invective have the 
attention of political scientists (e.g., Baum, 2002b; Cooper & Bates, 2003; Davis & 
Owen, 1998; Niven et al., 2003) and communication scholars (e.g., Fernando, 2003; 
Jamieson & Waldman, 2003; Pfau, 2002; Pfau & Eveland, 1996; Pfau et al., 2001; Smith 
& Voth, 2002; Young, 2003a, 2003b), but also the attention of campaign managers and 
politicians. Dan Schur, John McCain’s director of communications during his 
Presidential campaign, commented, “During the campaign season, you’re often cowering 
at 11:30—what are these guys going to say?” (cited in Weintraub, 2000). As Mandy 
Grunwald, former Clinton media adviser in the 1992 campaign, acknowledged, when the 
late night comics are making fun of a candidate, “you have a serious political problem. 
Whatever take they have on you is likely to stick much more solidly than what is in 
political ads or in papers like the Washington Post” (cited in Kurtz, 1999, p. B1). 
Additionally, candidates and their staffers use late night comedy monologues as litmus 
tests of public opinion, discerning what weaknesses are more prevalent and obvious. 
According to Chris Lehane, Gore’s former campaign’s press secretary, “The monologues 
are evidence of when a certain story really breaks through. If it makes it onto Leno or 
Letterman, it means something” (cited in Sella, 2000, p. 72). 
Research confirms many of the political players’ concerns. Pfau and Eveland’s 
(1996) analysis of traditional and non-traditional news media during the 1992 election 
campaign found considerable influence of non-traditional news media, like entertainment 
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talk shows, on perceptions of candidates, particularly in terms of relational cues and 
competence. These effects were found to be remarkably persistent, enduring from early 
September right up until the election. 
Pfau, Moy, Radler and Bridgeman (1998) conducted an extensive content analysis 
of content and tone of individual communication modalities in conjunction with a 
systematic survey of the public’s use and motivation. Their investigation looked at 
television programs, radio, and print, and they included entertainment talk shows. The 
researchers sampled 177 segments of Oprah Winfrey, Donahue, Late Night with David 
Letterman and The Tonight Show with Jay Leno. Entertainment talk shows revealed 
negative coverage of the Presidency, Congress, and public schools. The researchers were 
the first to document the negative tone of entertainment talk shows toward government 
and confirmed “a communication modality’s coverage of an institution parallels the 
relationship of people’s use of the modality and their perceptions of the institution” (Pfau 
et al., 1998, p. 108). 
Niven and colleagues (2003) conducted an analysis of 13,301 late night comedy 
jokes told by Jay Leno, David Letterman, Bill Maher, and Conan O’Brien about U.S. 
political figures from 1996 to 2000. They found the most common targets of political 
jokes are the president, the president’s circle, and candidates for the presidency, with the 
president and presidential candidates at the top of the list. Primary topics were candidate 
images, with similar attributes singled out for ridicule among the four shows. As the 
authors surmise, “On the whole, there is little room for issue positions in late night 
comedy” (Niven, et al., 2003, p. 126). As evidence, in the year 2000, only 9.3 percent of 
the political jokes referenced public policy—318 jokes out of 3,437. Their research 
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supports previous findings by Dye, Zeigler and Lichter (1992) and Amundson and 
Lichter (1988) who found emphases on image over issues in late night comedy. Niven 
and colleagues (2003) conclude:
The nature of late night humor is determinedly non-issue oriented. In most years, 
nine out of ten political jokes are not directed toward a political issue but more 
likely to a personal foible of a political leader. According to late night shows, 
presidents and presidential candidates are incredibly old, fat, dumb, lecherous, or 
prone to lie. (p. 130)
In their review of late night comedy during the 2000 presidential campaign, Jamieson and 
Waldman (2003) suggest that the effects of such political invective may be significant:
In 2000, late-night comedy telegraphed substantive information as it reinforced a 
limited range of candidate traits, introduced into public discussion some 
assumptions unwarranted by existing evidence, and invited cynicism about the 
quality of those who seek public office. (p. 68)
Late night comedians are telling a lot of political jokes, and most of the jokes present 
politicians and candidates in a negative light. 
Another place that we find political satire ridiculing politicians is the late night 
comedy variety show. This type of late night programming often has elements of satire, 
parody, and mimicry. “The word satire is of Latin origin and meant a mélange or 
[hodgepodge], something like a variety show” (Schutz, 1977, p. 49), and satire often 
employs parody (Highet, 1962), or “the imitation [mimicry] and transformation of 
another’s words” (Dentith, 2000, p. 3).  The most popular of this type of television 
program is Saturday Night Live. When SNL featured a politically themed special program 
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days before the 2000 presidential election, over 16 million viewers watched (De Moraes, 
2001). Saturday Night Live may offer more memorable lines and images than other forms 
of television entertainment (Strope, 2001). In 2000, Pew Research Center for People and 
the Press found 37 percent of people aged 18-29 got most of their political information 
from Saturday Night Live (Holloway, 2001), and in 2004, one out of two people aged 18-
29 reported learning political information from late night comedy shows, like Saturday 
Night Live (“Cable and Internet loom large,” 2004). One high school student stated, “My 
best resource has been Saturday Night Live. Sometimes, the show gets ridiculous, but it 
goes further than the news shows in showing the faults of Al Gore and George Bush” (as 
cited in Downey & Earle, 2000, p. 1F). 
Saturday Night Live does not often have the blistering attacks found in comedian 
monologues, but does ridicule and poke fun at political leaders (Smith & Voth, 2002). 
Smith and Voth (2002) analyzed SNL’s political content, focusing not only on how 
portrayals of George Bush and Al Gore by SNL actors Will Ferrell and Darrell Hammond 
affected perceptions of the candidates by magnifying their traits, but also on how the 
candidates were able to deflect the criticism of their faults by accepting their roles as 
“comic clowns” by appearing on these same shows. Ultimately, Smith and Voth (2002) 
conclude, Bush accepted the role as “comic clown” more readily, whereas Gore resisted, 
giving Bush the edge in the political satire realm. 
More common than actual appearances, though, are satiric parodies, or mimicries, 
of the candidates. “No one has provided more dead-on, devastating satire than SNL” 
(Peyser, 2000, p. 38). James Downey, the SNL writer who wrote the sketches of the now 
famous political debate parody (featuring Gore trying to take all the air-time and Bush 
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pronouncing foreign names just to prove that he could), offered, “I don’t enjoy fake 
comedy, which just basically restates the audience’s own political prejudices” (cited in 
Peyser, 2000, p. 38). Lorne Michaels, SNL’s executive producer, stated, “Jim’s pieces are 
gentle, not vicious. They are the silly take, which in my opinion is also the smart take” 
(cited in Peyser, 2000, p. 38). 
In summary, late night comedy offers a forum for political humor. With 
comedian’s monologues and parodies, attacks are made against politicians’ images. 
Based on the prevalence and negative tone of late night comedian’s jokes about 
candidates and politicians and the ridiculing nature of political parody, this study posits:
H1: Participants who view late night comedic content targeting a politician 
(monologues and parodies) manifest more negative perceptions of that politician 
in terms of (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitude toward the candidate, (c) 
perceptions of competence, (d) perceptions of character, and (e) perceptions of 
sociability.
Humor as Defense: Candidate Appearances
Much has changed with candidate appearances in political campaigns since the 
days William Jennings Bryan traveled 18,000 miles, personally appearing before 5-
million people (as cited in Althaus, Nardulli, & Shaw, 2002). Althaus and his colleagues 
(2002) analysis of personal appearances by candidates—like the traditional whistle-stop 
campaign tours—have increased since 1972, and we find a similar trend in the venue of 
mediated candidate appearances on late night comedy programming. Yet the impacts of 
personal appearances on political image, until this study, are supported only anecdotally.
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Politicians increasingly understand that while humor can undermine image, 
humor can also bolster image. One way that a candidate can use humor-as-defense is to 
make personal appearances on the very shows that often ridicule them. Instead of 
avoiding the appearance of merriment—the protocol of Emperor Louis the Pious and 
Senator Corwin—successful contemporary rulers join in the ridicule. As former producer 
and political consultant Raymond Strother asserted, “It takes somebody brave now to say 
'no' to one of those shows. Taking a chance now is not being on [late-night] television” 
(Vejnoska, 2004, p. 1A, emphasis added). Politicians increasingly acknowledge the 
potential benefits of joining in the fun; “comic self-deprecation counters potential 
hostility at apparent superiority by humorous exposure of one’s common human plight” 
(Schutz, 1977, p. 267).
Candidate appearances on late night comedy talk shows are becoming more and 
more common, as “candidates are seeking out late-night comedy shows…even after 
enduring unwanted ridicule on them” (Levin, 2000, p. 4D). “Appearances on Jay Leno 
and David Letterman are now nearly as important to a political campaign as taking on the 
gauntlet of Sunday morning political talk shows” (Cooper & Bates, 2003, p. 14). 
Matthew Felling, media director for the Center for Media and Public Affairs, argued,
“These types of programs are becoming the most important leg of the campaign 
triathlon—there’s campaign stops, debates and these TV appearances” (cited in Kloer, 
2002, p. 1C). 
Candidate appearances on such shows are not unique to the 1990s and 2000s. 
Richard Nixon played piano on The Tonight Show during the 1960 presidential campaign 
(Rosenberg, 2000). Jeff Greenfield, CNN’s senior political analyst, traces the practice of 
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candidates appearing on television late night talk shows to Senator John Kennedy’s 
appearance on The Tonight Show with Jack Parr in 1960 (“Candid Candidates,” 2003). 
As Greenfield points out, then President Richard Nixon appeared on the popular comedy 
show Laugh-In in 1968, the same year that Hubert Humphrey appeared on Dinah Shore’s 
Kitchen (“Candid Candidates,” 2003). 
But the 1990s and 2000s featured an unprecedented number of candidate 
appearances. Sella (2000) posits, “The Late-Night Candidate Visit has never been more 
crucial to politics” (p. 72). Smith and Voth (2002) observe:
Rather than the traditional one-sided relationship of late- night comedians using 
political officials as a comedic tool, the relationship between comedians and 
entertainers is increasingly more reciprocal where politics now strategically uses 
humor for maneuvering as much as humor uses politics for comic antics. (p. 110)
Candidates are not only ridiculed in late night comedy, but are also personally appearing 
on these programs. 
But are these appearances affecting candidate images? Research suggests that 
they are. Baum’s (2002b) study suggests that late night television programs provide 
forums where candidates are presented to large viewing audiences in a positive, 
humorous context. Baum found that when candidates appear on soft news talk shows, 
including daytime talk shows like Oprah Winfrey and late night shows like Leno and 
Letterman, the questions asked by the interviewer are seldom critical or partisan and 
instead, promote more positive images of the candidate when compared to conventional 
political interview programs. Additionally, Baum’s content analysis of entertainment talk 
show interviews of Al Gore and George W. Bush during the 2000 campaign indicated 
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100% of the valence cues (explicit positive and negative references to the candidate) 
toward Gore were positive, as were 95% of the valence cues toward Bush. These 
interviews were so positive, in fact, that Baum posits an image boost for candidates 
appearing on these shows, even with viewers who are apolitical. Though there is a danger 
of coming across as lacking appropriate decorum (Davis & Owen, 1998), for most 
candidates, these potential costs are outweighed by the potential benefits. 
Additionally, Moy and colleagues (2004) investigated effects of candidate 
appearances on late night comedy shows. Their results suggest that appearances on late 
night talk shows impact character traits of politicians, possibly due to a priming effect.
Practitioners recognize and capitalize on this positive tone as well. “It’s political 
cotton candy,” offers Matthew Felling, media director for the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs. “They get the exposure without being grilled” (cited in Kloer, 2002, p. 
1C). CNN analyst Wolf Blitzer observes, “Letterman and Leno talk a big game, but when 
the candidate actually makes an appearance, it’s a big wet kiss. After all the grief they 
give for months on end, the hosts become puppy dogs” (cited in Sella, 2000, p. 72). Jay 
Leno readily acknowledges this treatment: “I admit to being easy on them” (Levin, 2000, 
p. 4D). 
Consequently, Baum (2002b) found that politically inattentive soft news viewers 
were the most likely to switch parties during the campaign after viewing candidate 
appearances on talk shows. Baum posits that by presenting the candidates in a positive 
way, talk shows “sell” the candidate to viewers, and viewers, lacking political knowledge 
to the contrary, are less likely to counterargue against the image-promoting messages. 
Instead, consistent with Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock’s (1991) findings, viewers use the 
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“likeability heuristic,” voting for a candidate they feel they can relate to after seeing the 
appearance on an entertainment talk show. Patterson’s (2000) analysis revealed that 
politicians receive more negative coverage than positive coverage in the news, rising 
from about 25% in 1960 to over 60% in 2000, suggesting that these soft news forums 
provide a decidedly unique outlet for communicating campaign messages—and an 
attractive option for candidates (Baum, 2002b).
Ridout’s (1993) analysis of Bill Clinton’s use of talk show appearances, including 
Arsenio Hall and Good Morning America, during the 1992 presidential campaign offers a 
slightly different perspective, yet reaches the same conclusion that candidate appearances 
on talk shows boost images. Appearances on call-in talk shows, like CNN’s Larry King 
Live, gave Clinton the opportunity to speak on policy issues, including health care and 
education. In contrast, conventional news outlets were primarily focused on “the horse 
race.” Ridout concludes, “The emergence of talk shows means that candidates can deliver 
their messages and voters can decide their fates” (p. 715). 
These forums also provide the opportunity for candidates to connect with viewers, 
fostering “an impression of personal intimacy” (Davis & Owen, 1998, p. 230). 
Entertainment talk show appearances give candidate an opportunity to show they can 
laugh at themselves, suggesting their good-natured and “human” qualities, as “[l]aughter 
forges ties between people, binding those who laugh together with one another” (Speier, 
1998, p. 1357). 
Research exploring source considerations in the inoculation process of resistance 
has also yielded insight into how television can promote politicians’ images. Pfau and 
colleagues (2000) found that video-based inoculation messages work predominantly 
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through source considerations, immediately generating positive perceptions of sources 
and bolstering attitudes in support of the source. Consequently, when someone attacks 
this source, further derogating the source of the attack message enhances resistance. This 
finding is consistent with Pfau’s (1990) previous conclusion that television emphasizes 
source cues more so than print, providing evidence for Davis and Owen’s (1998) 
assertion that “television talk provides a visual advantage” (p. 12) for the candidate. 
Because of the nature and tone of the candidate appearance and the implications of the 
visual medium, “candidates [appearing on these talk shows] speak to the mass public on a 
more personal, ‘intimate,’ informal, and direct level” (Davis & Owen, 1998, p. 211). 
In summary, candidate appearances afford a positive environment for reaching 
viewers in the context of good-natured fun. This positive atmosphere, coupled with the 
warmth of the visual medium, bolsters relational perceptions, with humor strengthening 
the perceived bond between politician and citizen. This rationale leads to the following 
predictions:
H2: Candidate appearances on late night talk shows enhance perceptions of 
candidates in terms of (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitude toward the 
candidate, (c) perceptions of candidate competence, (d) perceptions of candidate 
character, and (e) perceptions of candidate sociability.
H3: Candidate appearances on late night talk shows strengthen attitude 
confidence.
Some viewers are likely affected more than others by late night comedy political 
content. Viewers with lower interest and knowledge will be more impacted by late night 
political humor (Baum, 2003a; Cooper & Bates, 2003; Young, 2003a, in press), as 
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viewers with lower political interest find the context of late night comedy entertaining, 
and consequently, warranting of their attention (West & Orman, 2003), and viewers with 
lower political knowledge will be less likely to have the content to counterargue against
messages that are incongruent with their attitudes or with their best interests (Zaller, 
1992). 
These resources, or considerations, are fundamental to Zaller’s (1992) theory 
about responding to political messages. Zaller argues that mass mediated messages are 
profoundly influential, as media determine the extent of political information the 
citizenry possesses. When viewers are lacking in knowledge, they rely solely on whatever 
position is touted by mass media, as they lack “the resources to resist” (Zaller, 1992, p. 
19). Simply, without political knowledge, viewers are not motivated, or even cognizant of 
the need, to resist influence.
Popkin (1991) posits that, because most citizens lack the interest or ability to 
follow politics closely, they instead rely on heuristic cues in political behaviors and 
decision-making. Without a solid basis of political knowledge, the citizen uses peripheral 
cues as the basis of decision-making, and is more influenced by heuristic cues, including 
image. 
In a more general sense, early inoculation research was based on a purported role 
of knowledge as well. McGuire (1964) posited that counterarguing was dependent on 
knowledge, and those without the knowledge to refute claims would be influenced by 
persuasive messages. Contemporary research tested this fundamental proposition and 
found empirical support for the role of counterarguing in resisting the influence of 
counterattitudinal messages (e.g., Pfau et al., 1997a, 2004a; but see Pfau et al., 2001a). 
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Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) ELM also addresses the role of knowledge in resisting 
persuasive messages. Existing theory and existing empirical evidence suggests that those 
with lower political knowledge are more likely to be influenced by persuasive messages.
Additionally, relational cues can function as heuristics, with research suggesting 
that female viewers are more impacted by relational variables, such as image, when 
compared to male viewers, a finding further supported by two meta-analyses (Cooper, 
1979; Eagly & Carli, 1981). Additionally, three resistance studies found women to be 
more influenced by source considerations during the persuasive process when compared 
to males (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Stone, 1969). Notable for this 
current investigation, Pfau and Burgoon (1988) and Pfau and Kenski’s (1990) study 
involved political contexts. 
Existing empirical evidence, coupled with evidence that television highlights 
source cues more than other mediums (Pfau, 1990) and that late night comedy shows 
highlight relational cues, is the basis of the next hypothesis:
H4: Political late night comedic content exerts the greatest influence on a) viewers 
with lower political knowledge and b) viewers who have lower political interest, 
and c) female viewers.
Schutz (1977) argues that political humor is Janus-headed; it is both negative and 
positive toward promoting democracy and political involvement, ridiculing leaders but 
also allowing a safe release for frustration and aggression of the citizenry. But political 
humor is also Janus-headed in more pragmatic terms, as it can function both to attack 
(through invective, as in monologue jokes) and to defend (through bolstering, as in 
candidate appearances), functioning as a “double-edged sword” (Davis & Owen, 1998, p. 
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43). The next chapter introduces a potential theoretical bridge between the two functions: 
inoculation theory. Can inoculation both protect against political humor when it is used to 
attack (e.g., monologues and parodies) and boost the defensive effects of political humor 
when it is used to defend (e.g., candidate appearances)?
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Chapter 3
Inoculation, Politics, and Humor
Do politicians have any options in protecting themselves against political humor 
when it attacks their image? When asked about ridicule on television comedy programs, 
former president Gerald Ford lamented, “There’s really nothing you can do in that 
situation” (cited in Sella, 2000, p. 72), a surrender echoed by David Ginsberg, research 
director for Al Gore’s 2000 campaign: “Once something makes the leap from news to the 
late night shows, it’s completely out of your hands” (as cited in Jamieson & Waldman, 
2003, p. 48). In reference to humorous political attacks, Gardner (1986) warns, “It is not 
easy to fight ridicule with reality,” (p. 126). But maybe it is possible to fight ridicule 
preemptively, with inoculation. Furthermore, politicians may be able to use the same 
channel that ridicules them to their own benefit, when used in conjunction with 
inoculation strategy.
Late night comedy television programs are forums for both kinds of political 
humor: humor-as-attack and humor-as-defense. This section proposes how both kinds of 
humor in late night comedy can be either thwarted by (in the case of humor-as-attack), or 
utilized (in the case of humor-as-defense) with the inoculation process of resistance. 
Inoculation Process of Resistance to Influence
Inoculation theory offers a notable contrast to conventional theories of persuasion 
and influence. Most persuasion research from the early 1920s to the late 1950s focused 
on ways of honing persuasion tactics (Miller & Burgoon, 1973; Pfau, 1997), with 
scholars focusing their efforts on developing more efficient and powerful ways of 
influencing attitudes and beliefs. Recognizing this void, specifically alarmed by “the
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disconcerting vulnerability of people’s convictions in forced exposure situations” 
(McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, p. 327). This vulnerability was dramatically illustrated 
by the decisions of some American POWs to remain with their captors at the conclusion
of the Korean War. Thus, McGuire turned his attention to resistance to the very strategies 
he had previously worked to refine.
But McGuire was not the first to discover some persuasive messages protected 
beliefs from counterattitudinal argumentation. Lumsdaine and Janis’ (1953) comparative 
investigation of one- and two-sided persuasive messages found that while both messages 
were similarly effective in influencing attitudes, the two-sided message had the 
unexpected benefit of conferring resistance to a subsequent counterattitudinal message. 
Somehow, the authors concluded, the two-sided message approach rendered the 
recipients “inoculated” (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953, p. 318), with their beliefs shielded 
from a subsequent persuasive attempt.
Two-sided messages worked to confer resistance, but how? Lumsdaine and Janis 
(1953) surmised recipients of two-sided messages were given “an advance basis for 
ignoring or discounting the opposing communication” (p. 318), but until McGuire turned 
his attention to understanding this effect, no research either confirmed or discounted their 
explanation. McGuire’s research program, in a series of studies spanning several years, 
shed more light on this “advance basis.”
McGuire (1964) used a medical analogy as the basis for explaining inoculation 
theory. A medical vaccination confers resistance by injecting a weakened form of a virus 
or other offending agent into an otherwise healthy body. The offending agent is strong 
enough to stimulate the immunity defenses of the body (e.g., the production of 
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antibodies), but not so strong as to overwhelm the body’s defenses and initiate a full-
blown case of the disease. McGuire posited attitudinal inoculation works in a similar 
manner: Subjecting people to weakened counterattitudinal argumentation motivates them 
to bolster their attitude toward a specific issue or object, conferring resistance to 
persuasive attempts of subsequent, stronger persuasive attempts. 
This analogic explanation would be offered in a series of studies that further 
refined the theory (e.g., Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire, 1961a, 1961b, 1964; 
McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962), and McGuire and his 
colleagues would recommend returning to the medical analogy to guide inoculation 
research (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962). The biological 
analogy serves as both an explanatory and as a guide. It is, in the words of Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993), both “clever and valid.”
From the first inoculation studies, McGuire surmised that elicited threat, or 
recognition of attitude vulnerability, played a pivotal role in how inoculation treatments 
conferred resistance (McGuire, 1962; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961). McGuire posited 
that the realization that there were counterarguments to one’s position would initiate the 
process of bolstering the attitude (McGuire, 1961a; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961; 
Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961), or be “defense-stimulating” (McGuire, 1964, p. 202). 
Later inoculation research also incorporated an explicit forewarning of an impending 
attitude challenge to further enhance threat, and subsequently, the efficacy of inoculation 
(McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962). Forewarnings warned that an existing attitude would be 
challenged by potentially persuasive messages.
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This conventional explanation for how inoculation confers resistance to influence 
was only an assumption until threat was operationalized and directly measured in more 
recent inoculation research, beginning with Pfau and Burgoon in the late 1980s (Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1988). Subsequent studies confirmed what McGuire assumed: Threat is a 
prerequisite for inoculation (Pfau et al., 1997a, 2000b, 2003). 
Yet threat alone cannot inoculate as effectively as threat with refutational 
preemption (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962). While threat mirrors the body’s recognition 
of a foreign agent in the medical analogy, the refutational preemption component is the 
equivalent of the body’s antibodies. By providing both the counterattitudinal arguments 
and responses to these arguments in the inoculation treatment message, refutational 
preemption “provides specific content that receivers can employ to strengthen attitudes 
against subsequent change” (Pfau, et al., 1997a, p. 188). McGuire saw this part of the 
inoculation equation as the active cognitive process that ultimately conferred resistance 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In one way, it affects utility, acting as the content people can 
use to refute counterattitudinal argumentation. In another, this content serves as training 
in counterarguing, guiding the recipient of the message through the act of bringing up and 
then refuting counterattitudinal arguments (Godbold, 1998; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; 
Wyer, 1974). 
The conventional explanation for how inoculation works—threat motivates a 
process of counterarguing that strengthens attitudes against influence—has received 
considerable empirical support since the processes were operationalized and directly 
assessed (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Compton & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Godbold, 1998; 
Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, 1992; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 1994, 
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1997a, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994; Pfau, Van 
Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Szabo & Pfau, 2001; Wan & Pfau, 2004). Inoculation proved 
useful outside the laboratory as well, with established efficacy in the contexts of 
comparative advertising campaigns (Pfau, 1992), targeted marketing campaigns 
(Compton & Pfau, 2004a), issue advocacy public relations (Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 
1995), crisis communication (Wan & Pfau, 2004), adolescent health campaigns 
(Godbold, 1998; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1993; Pfau et al., 1992; 
Szabo & Pfau, 2001), education (Compton & Pfau, 2004b), and politics (An & Pfau, 
2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 2001b). Inoculation’s application 
in this latter context is explained more thoroughly in the next section.
Inoculation and Politics
Burgoon and Pfau (1988) were the first to extend inoculation theory into the 
domain of politics. They assessed inoculation’s viability in the context of the 1986 
Senatorial campaign in South Dakota between Republican incumbent James Abdnor and 
Democrat Representative Tom Daschle. The researchers found inoculation to be a viable 
strategy in political campaigning. To this point, the three primary campaign strategies 
were attack, refutation, and bolstering (Kaid & Davidson, 1986; Trent & Friendenberg, 
1983), but inoculation’s success in the political domain offered a strategy that could be 
used at any time during the campaign, even against 11th hour attacks, and could preempt 
political attack advertisements. Warning voters of potential challenges to their support for 
a candidate, followed by the presentation of counterattitudinal arguments and refutations, 
conferred resistance to subsequent attempts to influence their support. 
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The next inoculation study in the political domain explored the feasibility of using 
inoculation via direct mail campaigns. Pfau, Kenski, and colleagues (1990) found that 
inoculation could be used in the direct mail campaign channel in the context of the 1988 
presidential campaign. Once again, Pfau and colleagues (1990) found inoculation to be a 
viable strategy, successfully protecting candidates against character and issue attacks, and 
that inoculation worked better than refutation, or post-hoc, strategies. It was more 
effective to preempt the persuasive attempts with inoculation treatments than to restore 
candidate support after attacks had already been launched. 
Pfau, Park, and colleagues (2001b) once again confirmed the efficacy of 
inoculation in politics, this time in the context of the 2000 presidential elections. More 
specifically, the researchers assessed inoculation in the face of party- and PAC-sponsored 
issue advertising, a growing source of political advertising. Not only did inoculation 
protect against attitude slippage, but inoculation also protected against the draconian 
effects of political advertising, such as disinterest and apathy. In the face of attacks, 
inoculated participants manifested greater interest in the campaign and greater likelihood 
of voting, in comparison to those not inoculated. Inoculation may offer “an antidote to the 
system-based consequences of issue advertising” (Pfau, et al., 2001b, p. 2395). For the 
first time, the benefits of inoculation in political campaigns were extended beyond 
personal benefits to candidates to also include system-based benefits. 
The most recent investigations of inoculation and politics focused on the 2002 
mid-term election (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b). In one study, An and Pfau (2004a) found 
inoculation protects against attitude slippage, especially when the source of the 
inoculation treatment message is perceived as having high credibility. Additionally, An 
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and Pfau found inoculation messages bolstered behavioral intentions, such as 
contributing to campaigns, volunteering, proselytizing on behalf of candidates, and 
voting. In another study, An and Pfau (2004b) found inoculation is also a viable strategy 
to use before televised political debates. Attacks are launched against candidates by 
opponents in debates, and An and Pfau found inoculation can shield candidates against 
these arguments, protecting their perceived character and competence. 
Inoculation’s efficacy in the context of politics introduces another option to the 
conventional campaign strategies of bolstering, attacking, and refuting (Pfau & Burgoon, 
1988). With inoculation, candidates have the ability to preempt attacks against their 
perceived credibility and policy positions, protecting attitudes of supporters against 
slippage. In a broader scope, inoculation also enhances political participatory behaviors—
like volunteering for candidate campaigns, seeking additional information, and going to 
the polls to vote—extending benefits to democratic participation as well as advantages 
for individual candidates. Additionally, researchers have found inoculation to be superior 
to a post hoc response to arguments (An & Pfau, 2004a; Pfau et al., 1990). As 
Tannenbaum, Macaulay, and Norris (1966) surmise, “An attempt to restore the belief 
after the attack is akin to ‘locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen’” (p. 237). 
But to date, inoculation research in the context of politics has been limited to 
direct, conventional attacks, like those found in television advertisements and direct mail 
campaigns. While establishing inoculation’s efficacy in the context of such attacks is 
important and beneficial to candidates and democratic participation, some forms of 
political attack are less obvious and less direct, though nonetheless powerful. To date, 
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inoculation’s efficacy in the face of these unconventional attacks has not been assessed, 
including attacks that use political humor.
Inoculating Against Political Humor as Attack
McGuire’s original conception of the inoculation process was that it would be 
effective in the face of “any persuasive message…with or without its conclusions 
explicitly drawn” (1964, p. 192), although McGuire’s early studies looked at situations 
where the counterattitudinal arguments were direct and explicit (e.g., McGuire & 
Papageorgis, 1962). Indeed, although the rationale provided above suggests that 
inoculation’s efficacy in the face of humorous political attacks is consistent with extant 
research and theoretically sound, its effectiveness cannot be assumed. Because many 
variables, like threat, were treated as primitive terms in the earliest inoculation research, 
“it is difficult to specify the precise circumstances (e.g., contexts, topics, message 
approaches, and receivers) in which inoculation is an appropriate approach” (Pfau et al., 
1997a, pp. 190-191). Additionally, very little attention has been paid to the attack 
message in inoculation research, (Lee & Pfau, 1997) as only a few studies have explored 
differences in attack message type (e.g., Pfau, 1992; Pfau et al., 2001a). Researchers 
recognize this void and call for more research into types of attack messages (Compton & 
Pfau, 2004c). 
Thus, while inoculation’s efficacy in the face of political humor attacks is not 
certain, its utility is consistent with theory and has conceptual consistency. For the 
reasons outlined above, this study posits:
H5: For those who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as compared to those who 
do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative influence induced 
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by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and parodies), 
manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitude toward the candidate, 
(c) perceptions of competence, (d) perceptions of character, (e) perceptions of 
sociability, and (f) attitude confidence.
H6: For people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as compared to those 
who do not, inoculation messages enhance the likelihood of reporting intentions 
to a) seek political information, b) contribute time or money to the campaign, and 
c) vote for the candidate, after encountering comic content ridiculing a candidate 
(monologues and parodies).
Recent research has also indicated that those inoculated not only bolster their own 
attitudes and behavioral intentions, but also intend to share the content they learn in the 
inoculation message with their friends and family, potentially spreading the inoculation 
through a social network via word-of-mouth (WOM) (e.g., Compton & Pfau, 2004b, 
2004c). WOM is a powerful communicative phenomenon (Burke, 1996; Herr, Kardes, & 
Kim, 1991; Smith & Vogt, 1995), and information transmitted via WOM initiates higher 
order cognitive processing, resulting in stronger attitudes and beliefs (Lau & Ng, 2001). 
Compton and Pfau’s (2004b) study of inoculation in the context of credit card marketing 
targeting college students found that those inoculated were more likely to express 
intention to talk about the negative aspects of credit cards, and less likely to discuss 
positive aspects of credit cards, than those who did not receive inoculation treatments. 
Inoculation treatments not only initiate a process of attitude bolstering and protection, but 
also motivate discussions with others about the issue, sharing the information contained 
in the inoculation treatment messages.
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Thus, in the context of inoculating against attacks in late night comedy, there 
should be similar effects:
H7: For people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as compared to those 
who do not, inoculation messages increases the likelihood that people will 
proselytize in support of the candidate after encountering late night comedic 
content (monologues and parodies).
However, it is possible that the word-of-mouth effects are not limited to the 
content of the inoculation message, but also include the content of the attack messages. 
Schaefer and Avery’s (1993) analysis of late night talk show viewers, and specifically, 
The Late Show with David Letterman, found that 74.2% reported that the show was the 
frequent topic of conversations with their friends, and 48.4% reported talking about 
issues from the show with their family members. This would be a significant finding, as 
research suggests that interpersonal political discussions can have significant impact on 
peoples’ perceptions of candidates (Chaffee & Choe, 1980; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1991; 
Pfau, et al., 1995; Popkin, 1991; but see Pfau et al., 1997b). Thus, the study predicts that 
viewers who do not receive inoculation treatment messages will not only be influenced 
by the counterattitudinal messages, but also report greater intent to share the political 
jokes about candidates that they hear from the late night talk shows:
H8: Compared to people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, those not 
inoculated are more likely to tell others the jokes about candidates they hear from 
the late night talk shows.
As previously addressed, most late night viewers claim a lower interest in politics 
and are less politically knowledgeable. Zaller (1992) found “the moderately aware [are] 
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the most susceptible to influence: They pay enough attention to be exposed to the 
blandishments of the incumbent but lack the resources to resist” (p. 19). Zaller’s research 
and theoretical model demonstrates that if one does not have arguments, or 
considerations, that can counter discrepant argumentation, the individual will be 
influenced in the direction of the argumentation. Additionally, Young (in press) found 
that late night comedy viewing impacted viewers’ perceptions of Gore, but only for those 
of low-political knowledge. Those inoculated will have the “resources to resist,” but 
those who do not receive an inoculation treatment will not. 
Some inoculation research suggests gender differences when source appeals are 
used in inoculation messages (Burgoon et al., 1995; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Stone, 1969), 
with females more persuadable (McGuire, 1964) and usually affected more by source 
cues in persuasive messages (Eagly, 1987; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988). In contrast, Pfau and 
colleagues (1992) did not find significant differences between males and females. 
However, these researchers were studying young children, and as the authors propose, the 
socialization effects may not have occurred by the time the researchers assessed gender 
differences. 
For the reasons outlined above, late night comedy attacks should be more 
influential with viewers of lower political interest and lower political knowledge. 
Additionally, the late night comedy attacks, focusing on image, should also be more 
influential with female viewers, leading to the following hypotheses:
H9: Inoculation’s effects against late night comedy attacks are more pronounced 
for (a) those higher in political interest when compared to those lower in political 
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interest, (b) those higher in political knowledge when compared to those lower in 
political knowledge, and (c) males when compared to females. 
Finally, although counterarguing plays a pivotal role in conventional explanations for 
how inoculation confers resistance, humor may affect this process. The distraction-humor 
hypothesis, described by Duncan and Nelson (1985), suggests that humor acts to 
circumvent the process of counterarguing. However, in their test of the distraction-humor 
hypothesis, Duncan and Nelson found no difference in counterargument output between 
the humorous and serious persuasion messages. Additionally, Lyttle (2001) found humor 
to undermine counterarguing only when the humor relied on irony, or promoted central 
over peripheral processing. Humor’s distracting effects also form the theoretical 
foundation for Young’s (2004a) Counter-argument Disruption Model of Political Humor 
(CADIMO), which builds on discrepancy models and ELM. 
This extant theory forms the basis for the following hypothesis regarding 
counterarguing and humor:
H10: Counterattitudinal messages that use humor elicit less counterargument 
output than counterattitudinal messages that do not use humor.
In summary, political humor is a common feature of late night entertainment talk 
shows, with comedians’ jokes ridiculing politicians’ and candidates’ images. Research 
has found associations between negative views of politicians and viewership of these 
programs, and this study will assess potential effects of such humor, the viability of 
inoculation strategies to confer resistance to these attacks, and potential differences in 
how inoculation confers resistance and effects on intent to share the information with 
others. The next section looks at the other side of this “double-edged sword,” examining 
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how political humor on late night entertainment talk shows may also be used as a 
defense, with candidate appearances on late night comedy programs serving as boosters 
in the inoculation process. 
Inoculating With Humor: Candidate Appearances on Late Night Comedy Shows
Powell was the first to assess humor’s efficacy in conferring resistance to political 
attack messages. As previously discussed, Powell (1975, 1977) conducted two studies 
that found political satire does not affect attitude change, but does confer resistance to 
conventional, serious attack messages. While this research did not assess threat, a 
requisite for inoculation (Pfau, 1997), the results offer support for humor to confer 
inoculation. 
Based on the extant empirical research on humor’s inoculative effect, and the 
bolstering effects of candidate appears previously described, this study posits:
H11: Candidate appearances confer resistance to conventional political attack 
messages, manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitudes toward the 
candidate, (c) candidate competence, (d) candidate character, (e) candidate 
sociability, (f) attitude confidence, and (g) counterattitudinal message source 
derogation.
While existing empirical evidence and theory suggest candidate appearances 
should confer resistance to political counterattitudinal messages, candidate appearances 
may have greater efficacy in conferring resistance when used in conjunction with 
conventional inoculation treatments. In this way, candidate appearances would function 
as boosters to the inoculative effect.
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Exploring the use of booster sessions is more than clever wordplay in its 
correspondence to the medical analogy of inoculation. Indeed, McGuire invited a close 
scrutiny of the analogy (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962), noting that research findings 
should be expected to parallel how medical inoculations confer resistance (McGuire, 
1964). Medical inoculation will decay with time, especially with killed virus vaccines, 
and as a result, booster sessions are often needed (Stahl & Liljeqvist, 2000). Thus, “[i]f 
the medical analogy holds, booster messages should enhance attitude resistance just as 
they enhance biological inoculation” (Compton & Pfau, 2004c).
Booster session’s efficacy is logical under the conventional explanation for how 
inoculation works. If one treatment message that systematically brings up and then 
refutes counterattitudinal arguments can confer resistance, then additional treatments 
should enhance, or boost, the conferred resistance. Thus, “it makes intuitive sense that 
reinforcement messages should strengthen resistance” (Pfau et al., 1990, p. 216). 
But despite the medical analogy rational and the theoretical consistency, results of 
research exploring the efficacy of booster sessions is mixed, with more inoculation 
studies failing to find reinforcement effects than those that do find support for booster 
session efficacy. Booster sessions can enhance resistance, but only when the same 
counterattitudinal arguments are raised and refuted in the original treatment message and 
the booster session as are found in the attack message (McGuire, 1961b). Other studies 
have found limited impacts, if any, of booster sessions (Pfau et al., 1990, 1992, 1997a, 
2004b; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994; Tannenbaum et al., 1966). However, these research 
findings should not be interpreted as establishing that booster sessions do not work in 
inoculation treatments. Considering the theoretical consistency of booster sessions yet 
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failure to consistently confirm their effectiveness, one thing is clear: The efficacy of 
using booster sessions in inoculation needs much more attention (Pfau, 1995). 
While using candidate appearances on late night comedy shows may at first seem 
to be a radical conceptual leap from conventional inoculation research, closer analysis of 
these appearances suggests the requisite elements are in place. Typical candidate 
appearances on late night talk shows are isomorphic to conventional inoculation 
pretreatments. The interview format is usually a process of the host raising questions and 
the candidate responding, mirroring the process of refutational preemption present in a 
conventional inoculation treatment message. As Sella (2000) points out, when making 
appearances on late night talk shows, candidates not only talk about their strengths, but 
also address their weaknesses “in jovial tones” (p. 72). 
While the presence of explicit threat in these situations, acknowledged as a 
prerequisite for inoculation (Pfau, 1997), is not as obvious as found in a forewarning, it is 
logical that there is inherent threat in the entertainment talk show interview, elicited by 
the host’s questions. This analysis mirrors that provided by Burgoon, Pfau and Birk 
(1995) in their argument that issue advocacy campaigns function as inoculation messages 
by raising criticism and responding to the criticism. Furthermore, threat is a requisite for 
unleashing the process of resistance. With candidate appearances functioning as booster 
sessions, the threat in the conventional treatment message has presumably already done 
its work. 
The innocuous nature of these appearances may be a “safer” method of 
inoculating against future attacks. Wan and Pfau’s (2004) study of preemptive crisis 
communication in the organizational context raises the question that, by raising 
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arguments against a target, an inoculation treatment runs the risk of harming, instead of 
boosting, the target’s image. Szabo and Pfau (2001) found similar risks when inoculating 
against the pressure to initiate smoking during adolescence. However, in the friendly and 
humorous context of a candidate appearance on a talk show, these “boomerangs” seem 
less likely. Any counterattitudinal arguments will likely be “soft ball” questions posed in 
positive contexts.
It is also feasible that these appearances work as a boost to inoculation apart from 
the conventional elements inherent in refutational preemption, and instead, work by 
further enhancing the source credibility of the candidate. Though source credibility has 
been considered a pivotal determinant of persuasion since the days of Aristotle (Solmsen, 
1954) and has received continuing attention in persuasion scholarship (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993), very little attention has been paid to how credibility impacts the process of 
inoculation (Burgoon et al., 1995; Compton & Pfau, 2004c), with the exception of the 
early congruity research of Tannenbaum and his colleagues in the 1960s (Tannenbaum, 
1967; Tannenbaum et al., 1966; Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965). Yet this research and 
other studies (e.g., Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Stone, 1969) were primarily concerned with
derogating the source of the attack message and not the credibility of the inoculation 
treatment’s source. 
Burgoon and colleagues’ (1995) and An and Pfau’s (2004a) more recent 
investigations are notable exceptions. Burgoon and colleagues found that inoculation 
messages (in this case, issue advocacy advertisements) protected against credibility rating 
slippage in the face of an attack message. An and Pfau focused their attention on the 
perceived credibility of the source of the inoculation treatment message and this 
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perception’s effect on inoculation efficacy. As predicted, when the source of the 
inoculation treatment was perceived as having high expertise and trustworthiness, 
inoculation was enhanced. When the source was perceived as having less expertise and 
trustworthiness, inoculation was undermined. 
It is reasonable to assume, then, that enhancing source’s credibility would also 
strengthen the favorable attitude toward that source, enhancing inoculation efficacy. This, 
in conjunction with the raised counterarguments and refutations of the interview format, 
suggest that late night talk show appearances provide unique, and potentially beneficial, 
forums for boosting candidates’ images (Davis & Owen, 1998), and these appearances 
should enhance the inoculation process of resistance to influence. The talk show format 
offers exchanges of counterarguments and refutations, but with the added benefit of 
couching the exchanges in humor and good-natured fun. The interview format seems 
isomorphic to the inoculation process of raising and refuting counterarguments, and the 
appearances should boost candidate image. 
Existing scholarship and theory suggests candidate appearances and conventional 
inoculation treatments enhance one another. Inoculation treatments should amplify the 
benefits incurred by a candidate appearing on a talk show, and conversely, candidate 
appearances should enhance the effects of conventional inoculation treatments, as posited 
in the following hypotheses:
H12: Inoculation treatments boost the inoculative effect of candidate appearances, 
with those participants who receive an inoculation treatment message and 
subsequently viewing a candidate appearance demonstrating the most resistance 
to a political attack message, manifested in a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) 
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attitudes toward the candidate, (c) candidate competence, (d) candidate character, 
(e) candidate sociability, (f) attitude confidence, and (g) counterattitudinal 
message source derogation, when compared to those only viewing candidate
appearances.
H13: Candidate appearances boost the inoculative effect of an inoculation 
treatment, with those participants who receive an inoculation treatment message 
and subsequently viewing a candidate appearance demonstrating the most 
resistance to a political attack message, manifested in a) feelings toward the 
candidate, (b) attitudes toward the candidate, (c) candidate competence, (d) 
candidate character, (e) candidate sociability, (f) attitude confidence, and (g) 
counterattitudinal message source derogation, when compared to those only 
inoculated.
For the same rationale offered for late night comedy’s enhanced effects on those 
with lower political interest, lower political knowledge, and females, this study also 
posits:
H14: Candidate appearances produce the largest boost to the inoculation effect 
with a) less politically interested viewers, b) less politically knowledgeable 
viewers, and (c) female viewers.
Humor as Attack and Defense: Repeated Attacks as Boosters
In a previous essay (Compton & Pfau, 2004c), we speculated that one reason 
inoculation booster sessions fail to find consistent enhanced resistance with boosters is 
that the wrong stimulus is being employed. Instead of subjecting individuals to another 
inoculation treatment message, as is the conventional approach, it may be more effective 
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to subject them to another attack. This would be consistent with medical inoculation; the 
second exposure to the antigen often results in a stronger immune response to the 
offending antigen (Nossal, 1999).
Exposure to comedic political arguments ridiculing candidates, like the content 
found in comedian monologues and parodies, may actually defuse subsequent 
conventional political attacks, when such exposure to political ridicule follows 
inoculation treatments. Hence, when conventional inoculation is followed by an attack 
message of political ridicule, there will be a “double inoculation.” Thus, the final 
prediction related to booster sessions in the context of late night comedy is:
H15: Those inoculated and subjected to comedic content targeting a politician 
(monologues and parodies) are more resistant to subsequent conventional political 
attack messages when compared to those experiencing a counterattitudinal 
message for the first time, manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) 
attitude toward the candidate, (c) perceptions of candidate competence, (d) 
perceptions of candidate character, (e) perceptions of candidate sociability, and (f) 
attitude confidence.
H16: Late night comedic ridicule creates a greater boost of inoculation for (a) 
those with less political interest when compared to those with higher political 
interest, (b) those with less political knowledge when compared to those with 
higher political knowledge, and (c) females when compared to males.
Blanket Resistance
That inoculation can confer resistance to arguments not explicitly refuted in the 
treatment message is not in question. Inoculation’s efficacy in conferring resistance to 
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novel counterattitudinal arguments goes back to McGuire’s earliest studies (McGuire, 
1961a, 1961b, 1962, 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962; Papageorgis & McGuire, 
1961) and continues to be supported in contemporary inoculation scholarship (Pfau, 
1992; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 1997a, 2001a, 2004b; Pfau, Roskos-
Ewoldsen, et al., 2003). Inoculation spreads a “broad blanket of protection against 
specific counterarguments raised in refutational preemption and against those 
counterarguments not raised” (Pfau, 1997, pp. 137-138). Indeed, extant literature 
suggests not only that inoculation confers resistance to novel counterarguments in a 
subsequent attack message, but also that the conferred resistance is as strong, or almost as 
strong, as the resistance conferred when the counterarguments are the same (McGuire & 
Papageorgis, 1961; Pfau, 1992). This is an important characteristic of inoculation. 
Otherwise, an inoculation treatment would have to be prepared for every possible 
counterattitudinal argument (Pfau & Kenski, 1990), rendering the method of resistance 
impractical for most persuasive situations. Papageorgis and McGuire (1961) observe:
In view of the triviality of this difference between resistance to same and to 
alternative counterarguments, there would seem to be little necessity…to guess 
beforehand what counterargument might be used at a future time against a belief 
we wish to immunize: the prior refutation of some counterarguments develops 
almost as much resistance to subsequent strong forms of alternative 
counterarguments as to the same counterarguments. (p. 479)
This power of inoculation to confer protection against novel counterargumentation is 
particularly important in applied contexts like commercial advertising (Pfau, 1992) and 
politics (Pfau & Kenski, 1990), when arguments cannot always be anticipated or are 
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launched so late in a campaign that it is not feasible to respond. It is a feature of 
inoculation that is also consistent with the medical analogy (McGuire & Papageorgis, 
1961). There are medical vaccinations that inject one weakened strain of a virus to confer 
resistance to that strain and other similar strains. 
While the research that inoculation confers a broad “blanket of protection” (Pfau 
et al., 1990) extending beyond the specific counterarguments raised and refuted in the 
treatment message is convincing, the size of this blanket is unknown. For example, can 
an inoculation message confer resistance to an entire channel, such as late night comedy 
television in general?
Existing empirical evidence to affirm this question is scant, but encouraging. Wan 
and Pfau (2004) recently explored the potential of inoculation to confer resistance in 
preemptive crisis communication. Their focus was not specifically focused on this 
“blanket of protection” issue, but instead, on whether inoculation was a superior strategy 
compared to the more conventional bolstering strategy used in crisis management. They 
found comparable effectiveness of both strategies, giving a slight edge to bolstering when 
no crisis actually occurs. 
However, more pertinent to this current investigation, their threat manipulation 
differed from conventional inoculation research. Instead of specifically forewarning 
about a counterattitudinal influence attempt, the researchers warned, “the media always 
tend to exaggerate the negative aspects of a corporation under siege and seldom mention 
the good efforts of the company because they are not considered as ‘newsworthy’” (Wan 
& Pfau, 2004, p. 16). The difference in this type of forewarning compared to others is 
subtle, yet important. In essence, the researchers were warning against a style of 
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coverage, not against specific argumentation or attitude attacks—specifically, the often-
criticized tendency of the media to dramatize stories and accentuate the negative. That 
Wan and Pfau (2004) found inoculation to be a viable strategy suggests that the threat 
manipulation worked (as threat is a prerequisite for inoculation) and that people can be 
inoculated against a style—one of accentuating the negative over the positive in mass 
media coverage.
In summary, inoculation has proven viability in conferring resistance to 
arguments that are not explicitly refuted in the treatment message, and at least one study 
has found that inoculation messages can warn about a style of reporting and not specific 
persuasive attempts. Building on the conceptual logic of inoculation as well as existing 
empirical evidence, the study posits an inoculation message can protect against an entire 
channel of argumentation by explicitly forewarning about the channel and providing 
refutations of its legitimacy to influence attitudes. Instead of warning against a specific 
attempt of influence, as with conventional inoculation treatments, this type of inoculation 
message would warn against an entire channel (generating threat) and providing 
refutations of the channel’s legitimacy (providing preemption refutation). This rationale 
provides the basis for the next hypothesis:
H17: For those who receive an inoculation pretreatment that warns of a specific 
channel’s influence (late night comedy), as compared to those who do not, 
inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative influence induced by 
exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and parodies), 
manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitude toward the candidate, 
54
(c) perceptions of competence, (d) perceptions of character, (e) perceptions of 
sociability, and (f) attitude confidence.
Just as conventional inoculation treatment messages should protect against both 
comedic and conventional attack messages, channel inoculation should also protect 
against both types of messages. Thus, the next hypothesis predicts:
H18: Channel inoculation also protects against conventional political attacks. 
Finally, as previously argued, those with lower political interest, lower political 
knowledge, and females should be influenced more by late night comedic content. This 
rationale provides the basis for the next hypothesis:
H19: Channel inoculation will be most effective with (a) those of lower political 
interest, (b) those of lower political knowledge, and (c) female viewers.
As previously addressed, candidate appearances should work in conjunction with 
conventional inoculation treatments. The same rationale suggests that candidate 
appearances should also work with channel inoculation treatments, as predicted in the 
next hypothesis:
H20: For those who receive an inoculation pretreatment that warns of a specific 
channel’s influence (late night comedy), as compared to those who do not, 
candidate appearances confer resistance to conventional attack messages, 
manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate at Phase 3, (b) attitude toward the 
candidate at Phase 3, (c) perceptions of competence at Phase 3, (d) perceptions of 
character at Phase 3, (e) perceptions of sociability at Phase 3, and (f) attitude 
confidence at Phase 3.
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Irritation
Affect was virtually ignored in the first decades of inoculation research (Compton 
& Pfau, 2004c; Pfau, 1997), echoing a general trend in social influence research to focus 
almost exclusively on cognitive processes (Dillard & Wilson, 1993). Similarly, with the 
exception of the motivational role of threat, the process unleashed by inoculation was 
assumed to be cognitive. It wasn’t until the late 1990s that researchers began specifically 
focusing on the potential impact of affect in the inoculation process, offering a more 
nuanced view of how inoculation confers resistance. As Zuwerink and Devine (1996) 
noted, “A complete theoretical account of persuasion dynamics will need to incorporate 
both affective and cognitive processes” (p. 941). 
The first study to directly assess the impact of affect in inoculation was conducted 
by Lee and Pfau (1997). The researchers looked at two types of inoculation treatment 
messages: those that relied on rational arguments and those that used anecdotes and 
affect-laden language. One affect treatment was designed to elicit a positive emotional 
response, while another was designed to elicit a negative emotional response. Consistent 
with the conventional, cognitive-based explanation for how inoculation confers 
resistance, the researchers predicted that the rational treatment message would be more 
effective in conferring resistance and that between the two affect based messages, the 
negative would be more effective. The rational for predicting that the negative affect 
would confer more resistance was based on findings that negative affect causes more 
systematic information processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Schwarz, 
Bless, & Bohner, 1991), but that positive affect triggers more heuristic processing 
(Bohner, Crow, Erb, & Schwarz, 1992; Schwarz et al., 1991). Results supported the 
56
prediction that cognitive messages would be the most effective strategy, but both positive 
and negative affect-based messages conferred resistance to attack messages as well.
It is important to note that this research, though focusing on affect, still adopts a 
cognitive perspective. The goal was not to assess affect responses unleashed by 
inoculation treatments as much as it was to examine affect’s impact on information 
processing. Indeed, manipulation checks confirmed that none of the affect manipulations 
reached statistical significance. Results, then, are more appropriately interpreted in terms 
of the insight they provide into message strategy and not elicited affect. 
The next study to consider affect in the process of inoculation looked at more 
specific emotions, designing inoculation treatment messages to be cognitive, affective-
happiness, and affective-anger (Pfau et al., 2001a). This time, the researchers designed 
their messages based on Lazarus’ (1991) appraisal theory, an approach that considers 
goal-attainment to be a determinant of affect responses. In brief, an environment that 
facilitates goal-attainment leads to positive affect responses, whereas an environment that 
hinders goal-attainment leads to negative affect responses. The researchers designed the 
treatment messages to either suggest an existing attitude would facilitate the individuals’ 
goals (affective-happiness) or that the potential attack messages would hinder their goals 
(affective-anger). Results indicated that all inoculation treatments conferred resistance, 
with cognitive treatments working via threat and counterarguing and the affect-based 
messages working primarily through elicited emotion. However, the affect-happiness 
message did not actually elicit happiness. Other variables, however, did elicit happiness, 
and happiness undermined resistance. Anger, on the other hand, was elicited by the 
affect-anger message and the cognitive message, and elicited anger enhanced resistance. 
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Though the affect-anger manipulation was successful, elicited affect levels were very 
low. 
Stronger affect manipulations may shed more light on the role of affect, as 
suggested by Nabi’s (2003) research. Nabi (2003) looked at treatment messages and 
attack messages that were on videotape and accompanied by evocative emotional content. 
This manipulation resulted in relatively strong affect manipulations. However, her 
materials were designed to elicit negative emotions only. 
In their research on forewarning, Zuwerink and Devine (1996) and Jacks and 
Devine (2000) found that irritation could play a significant role in conferring resistance. 
Zuwerink and Devine (1996) found that counterattitudinal messages caused the recipient 
to feel irritated, and that this affect response enhanced resistance. While these researchers 
were not the first to propose irritation as a factor of resistance (see Abelson & Miller, 
1967), their operationalizations of the affect responses provides a useful tool for 
discerning the affect responses that may play roles in resistance. Zuwerink and Devine 
(1996) call for research that explores forewarnings impact on irritation and irritation’s 
subsequent impact on resistance to counterattitudinal messages. 
Similarly, Jacks and Devine (2000) found that irritation, coupled with negative 
thought generation, plays a prominent role in resistance. As in the previous study, Jacks 
and Devine were not assessing the efficacy of inoculation; instead, their focus was on 
forewarning of persuasive intent. Important to the context of this study, Jacks and Devine 
suggest that one implication of their research is that “if it is unavoidable that the audience 
is aware of the content and position of one’s message, the persuasion practitioner may be 
well advised to distract the audience (perhaps with a few good jokes that might also 
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diffuse potential feelings of irritation) prior to delivering the message” (p. 29). Reducing 
the elicited irritation, they argue, may also undermine resistance. 
Duncan and Nelson’s (1985) research on humor and advertising found that 
irritation was negatively correlated with attention paid to the advertisement, recalled 
information from the advertisement, and liking of both the advertisement and the product 
being advertised. 
While elicited irritation may be the same as elicited anger (Compton & Pfau, 
2004c), this has not yet been tested, and previous affect research also made a distinction 
between the two affective responses (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). Clearly, there is still 
much to learn about the potential role of irritation in the inoculation process. Jacks and 
Devine’s (2000) findings suggest that irritation is a potentially revealing emotion to 
explore in inoculation research. Based on previous findings of irritation’s role in 
resistance to counterattitudinal argumentation conferred by forewarning, this study posits:
H21: For people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as compared to those 
who do not, inoculation messages elicit greater irritation upon encountering a 
counterattitudinal message.
Irritation should not play as great a role, however, when the attacks come in the 
form of political humor. Duncan and Nelson (1985) found that the use of humor 
alleviates feelings of irritation in humorous advertisements. Their research assessed 
participants’ reactions to fictional radio advertisements for a men’s hair care product and 
found that those who found the ad most humorous also experienced the least amount of 
irritation. The next hypothesis predicts that the same will occur in the context of late 
night talk shows:
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H22: For those inoculated, counterattitudinal messages with humor elicit less 
irritation than counterattitudinal messages without humor.  
While inoculation prepares people for counterattitudinal attacks, those who use 
humor often have a more positive image (Nilsen, 1990; Schutz, 1977). Thus, the final 
hypothesis of this chapter predicts:
H23: For those inoculated, sources of counterattitudinal messages who use humor 
are perceived more positively than sources who do not use humor.
While inoculation has already been established as a viable, and in many cases, 
superior campaign strategy when compared to bolstering, attacks, and refutations, much 
less is known about whether and how inoculation strategies function in the context of 
more indirect political attacks, like those found in political humor and specifically in late 
night comedy shows. Additionally, although political humor can function as an attack, 
political humor may also complement a conventional inoculation message, functioning as 
a booster to the conferred resistance. 
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Chapter 4
Inoculating against Conventional Attacks: 
Adding More Nuance to the Inoculation Process
Up to this point, this study has focused on effects of late night comedic content on 
political attitudes and inoculation’s efficacy in protecting against, or with, this humorous 
content. This next chapter focuses on inoculating against conventional political attacks in
the context of the primary campaigns, and also assesses the impacts of forewarning on 
threat and influences of inoculation on perceived self-efficacy.
Inoculating against Conventional Attacks
Several studies have confirmed inoculation’s efficacy in political campaigns, 
beginning with the first political campaign study conducted in October 1986 during a 
U. S. Senatorial campaign. Pfau and Burgoon (1988) confirmed inoculation’s efficacy in 
political campaigning, adding a strategic option for candidates to the conventional 
strategies of bolstering, attacking, and refuting. Two years later, Pfau and his colleagues 
turned their attention to the efficacy of inoculation in the context of direct mail political 
messages during the later phase of the 1988 presidential campaign. Results indicated that 
inoculation was effective in deflecting the influence of candidate attacks (Pfau et al., 
1990). Additionally, the researchers compared the inoculation strategy with a post-hoc 
refutational strategy and found inoculation to be more effective. Thus, inoculation’s 
efficacy was not only re-confirmed, but its superiority over post-hoc refutation was also 
supported.
The next study of inoculation in political campaigns was conducted during the last 
week of the 2000 election cycle and included campaigns for President, House of 
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Representatives, and the Wisconsin State Senate. Pfau and colleagues (2001a) assessed 
whether inoculation could reduce system-based consequences of party- and PAC-
sponsored issue advertising, focusing on such political behaviors as voting and 
maintaining interest in politics. Results indicated that inoculation is not only effective in 
bolstering attitudes, but also promotes political behavioral intentions against the 
potentially draconian effects of party-sponsored advertisements, and for Republicans, 
against both party-sponsored and the PAC-sponsored advertisements. 
The most recent political inoculation studies took place during the 2002 mid-term 
election. An and Pfau (2004a) examined inoculation’s efficacy and also explored the 
impact of perceived source credibility. An and Pfau found that when the source of the 
inoculation message is perceived as highly credible, inoculation confers more resistance 
to attack messages, manifested in both attitudes and participatory behaviors. In another 
study, An and Pfau (2004b) assessed inoculation’s efficacy in the face of attacks 
launched in televised debates. The researchers found inoculation to be a viable strategy in 
this context as well.
Inoculation has been confirmed as a viable strategy in U. S. Senatorial campaigns, 
House of Representative campaigns, gubernatorial campaigns, and presidential 
campaigns. As Szabo and Pfau (2002) observed, the results of these political inoculation 
studies are particularly remarkable, in that a single inoculation message, in the midst of 
communication-intense campaigns, protected attitudes. However, inoculation’s efficacy 
has not yet been assessed in the context of the presidential primary season. Based on the 
existing empirical evidence and theory outlined above, this study posits that, in the 
context of presidential primaries:
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H24: For those who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as compared to those 
who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to political attack messages, 
manifested in (a) feelings toward the candidate, (b) attitude toward the candidate, 
(c) perceptions of candidate competence, (d) perceptions of candidate character, 
(e) perceptions of candidate sociability, and (f) attitude confidence toward the 
candidate.
H25: Inoculation treatments enhance the likelihood of political participatory 
behaviors, including a) seeking political information, b) contributing time or 
money to the campaign, and c) voting for the candidate, after encountering 
political attack messages, when compared to controls.
Impacts of Forewarning on Threat
The construct of threat has played a pivotal role in inoculation research since the 
first inoculation studies conducted by McGuire and his colleagues. McGuire (1964) 
deduced that something must motivate the process that instills resistance to a subsequent 
persuasive attempt, and that this motivator was the realization that an attitude may be 
vulnerable. He also reasoned “any extrinsic threat…presented to the believer before the 
defense material…should increase his motivation to assimilate the material and hence 
enhance its immunizing effectiveness” (p. 210). Empirical evidence confirms this idea, 
with McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) finding that the addition of an explicit 
forewarning, prior to encountering the counterattitudinal arguments and refutations of the 
counterarguments contained in the inoculation treatment message, enhances inoculation’s 
effectiveness. McGuire (1964) posited this explicit forewarning works by strengthening 
the individual’s motivation to “assimilate the material” that follows the explicit 
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forewarning in the treatment message (p. 210). In other words, the forewarning signals to 
the individual that an existing attitude is vulnerable, and the following material may 
prove useful in protecting against the upcoming attitudinal assault.
However, the motivational element of threat is posited to also be influential 
during the interim between the treatment and subsequent attack (Pfau, 1997), when those 
inoculated “continue to accumulate additional material for a considerable time after being 
exposed to the threatening defense” (McGuire, 1964, p. 222). The importance of this 
continued motivation to generate internal thinking about the topic is consistent with 
cognitive processing research (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), as well as early (Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961) and 
more recent (Burgoon, Burgoon, et al., 1976; Pfau et al., 1997a) inoculation research. 
Threat persists in motivating those who are inoculated beyond attending to the content in 
the treatment message, continuing to motivate counterarguing during the interim between 
the pretreatment and the attack (McGuire, 1961b, 1962, 1964; Pfau et al., 1997a). 
It stands to reason, then, that the use of an explicit forewarning prior to 
encountering the defense-stimulating material in an inoculation message should increase 
the motivation to attend to this material, but after attending to refutations, this elicited 
threat would likely diminish. Indeed, research has found an immediate increase in attitude 
confidence (e.g., Compton & Pfau, 2004a; but see Pfau et al., 1997a) and belief strength 
(Papageorgis & McGuire, 1962) immediately after inoculation, with the refutations 
alleviating some of the negative affect generated by threat (Pfau et al., 2001a). While 
threat motivates close attention to the content of inoculation messages, it is alleviated by 
the refutational content of inoculation treatment messages. 
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This alleviation of threat may actually come too soon for optimum resistance. 
Though participants need attitude confidence to resist the persuasive attempt, confidence 
should continue to grow as refutational preemption builds during the interim between the 
treatment and the attack. As Pfau and his colleagues (2004a) offered, “refutational 
preemption should reestablish confidence over time” (p. 26, italics added). Sustaining the 
elicited threat would motivate individuals even more to continue the counterarguing 
process in the time following the treatment, as “the more vulnerable the subject perceives 
[himself or herself]…the more likely [he or she] may be to perform cognitive work 
necessary to counterargue the subsequent attack effectively, and thus the more resistant to 
persuasion [he or she] may become” (Wyer, 1974, p. 206). Pfau and colleagues (1997a) 
found a positive correlation between elicited threat and conferred resistance, whereas 
greater threat elicited stronger resistance. Anderson and McGuire’s (1965) finding that 
reassurance hinders conferred resistance also suggests that threat plays a powerful role in 
the inoculation process. 
In summary, inoculation treatment messages elicit threat, a consistent finding in 
inoculation research since the construct of threat was directly measured. Yet the elicited 
threat levels are almost always low or moderate. The analysis presented here argues that 
the low and moderate levels of threat may be the result of the timing of the explicit 
forewarning. The conventional placement of forewarning is prior to the refutational 
preemption material (the raised and refuted counterarguments), and we can assume that 
seeing the counterarguments refuted will alleviate much of the generated threat at the 
time it is measured. Consequently, adding an explicit forewarning to an inoculation 
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message after counterarguments have been raised and refuted should enhance 
inoculation’s effectiveness, as posited in the next hypothesis:
H26: Inoculation pretreatment messages that contain another forewarning after 
the refutations of counterarguments (double forewarning) elicit and maintain 
greater threat levels than inoculation pretreatment messages that contain only one 
forewarning prior to the refutations (single forewarning). 
Consequently, consistent with previous research dating back to original studies 
where the role of threat was assumed and the later studies where threat was directly 
measured, this study predicts that there will be a direct correlation between elicited threat 
and conferred resistance.
H27: There is a positive correlation between elicited threat and conferred 
resistance, such that double-forewarning messages confer more resistance than 
single-forewarning inoculation treatment messages. 
Influences of Inoculation on Perceived Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy also warrants further investigation as it relates to the inoculation 
process. McGuire’s (1964) review of resistance literature found ample evidence that an 
increase in self-esteem enhances resistance to influence attempts. Subsequently, several 
inoculation studies have explored the mediating role of self-esteem in the inoculation 
process. Pfau and colleagues (1992) assessed the effectiveness of inoculation strategies to 
confer resistance to smoking initiation of children in the transitory phase from elementary
to junior high school. The researchers found that inoculation was only effective with 
those of low self-esteem. This was an important finding, as smoking prevention literature 
suggests that children of low self-esteem are at the greatest risk of smoking initiation.
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Self-esteem is a complex construct, involving whether one feels “capable, 
significant, successful and worthy” (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 5). It is a concept that is 
related to self-efficacy, or feeling like one has control in a situation. Schwarzer (1992) 
describes generalized perceived self-efficacy as the belief that one can overcome 
obstacles and respond to problems. He notes that the construct of generalized perceived 
self-efficacy relates to how one feels he or she can relate to challenges.
Self-efficacy has received some attention in inoculation scholarship, which is 
appropriate considering Bandura’s (1983) finding that perceived self-efficacy affects how 
one responds to threats. Pfau and his colleagues (2001a) found that self-efficacy did play
a role in resistance, but not as they had predicted. Efficacy had no impact on elicited 
threat, and higher self-efficacy resulted in a stronger emotional response to the 
inoculation treatment messages. 
The way self-efficacy has been treated in previous inoculation research is similar 
to the way involvement has been assessed. Evidence suggests that involvement is a 
prerequisite for optimal resistance via inoculation (Pfau, 1992; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; 
Pfau et al., 1990). Pfau and his colleagues (1997a) confirmed that involvement serves as 
a prerequisite for inoculation, and that inoculation was particularly effective when 
involvement levels were moderate. With very low involvement, it is difficult to get 
people to care enough to initiate the active process of counterarguing and subsequent 
resistance. But with very high levels of involvement, participants do not feel threatened, 
and thus, are not motivated to strengthen the attitude. These findings tell us much more 
about the boundaries of inoculation; however, Pfau and his colleagues (1997a) treated 
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involvement as a covariate and did not examine whether inoculation treatments have 
direct effects on involvement. 
Indeed, recent research has uncovered a more dynamic role of involvement levels 
in the process of inoculation. Pfau, and his colleagues (2004a) found that inoculation 
treatment messages actually enhance involvement levels, working through threat, which 
in turn elicits counterarguing. Thus, involvement is not only a requisite for inoculation, 
but also plays an active role, interacting with the other elements in the inoculation 
process. In this research, a single inoculation treatment messaged was enough to boost 
involvement levels.
Similarly, the inoculation process should enhance self-efficacy, as inoculation 
equips the individual with a storehouse of reasons for holding an attitude, even in the face 
of attack. Based on the rationale provided above, this study will assess whether the role 
of perceived self-efficacy is also enhanced by the inoculation treatment message and 
plays a more active role in the inoculation process. In operational terms, this study treats 
self-efficacy as a dependent variable, or product, of the inoculation pretreatment message.
H28: Inoculation enhances participants’ perceptions of generalized perceived self-
efficacy.
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Chapter 5
Methods
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma, and all 
were of legal voting age. A total of 458 participants completed Phase 1, 390 completed 
Phase 2, and 367 completed Phase 3. There were no evident differences in those who 
completed all three phases and those who did not in reference to attitudes toward 
candidates, political interest or political knowledge. Participants were told they were 
taking part in a study of political information processing.
Materials
Late Night Comedy
Three types of late night political content were used in this investigation: late 
night comedian monologues, late night political parodies, and candidate appearances on 
late night talk shows. All of the late night segments were edited to 30 minute segments 
and referenced or featured at least one of the following Democratic presidential 
candidates: John Kerry, John Edwards, or Howard Dean. The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno was used for the monologue and candidate appearances condition, and Saturday 
Night Live was used for the political parody condition.  
The late night television shows The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Saturday 
Night Live were selected as the two late night comedy programs because, of the late night 
comedy shows on network television, Jay Leno and Saturday Night Live are among the 
most political in their content. Niven and colleagues (2003) found that Leno told an 
average of 1,275 political jokes per year. Additionally, Niven and colleagues found, 
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“rather than being idiosyncratic, the major late night shows exhibit quite similar patterns 
in choice of targets, the partisan ratio of targets, and the subject matter of their jokes” (p. 
130). Also, Saturday Night Live was used as the late night variety show because of its 
popularity and reputation for featuring influential political humor (Downey & Earle, 
2000; Holloway, 2001; Pfau, 2002; Strope, 2001). 
Inoculation Messages
To elicit threat (a prerequisite for the inoculation process), the first paragraph of 
inoculation messages was designed to warn participants that their existing attitudes 
toward a candidate would be under attack. Inoculation messages raised and then refuted 
arguments against the candidate. Inoculation messages were written to have similar style 
to one another and checked for equivalence using Becker, Bavelas, and Braden’s (1961) 
Index of Contingency (See Table 1).
There were two main types of inoculation messages used in this study. 
Conventional inoculation treatment messages brought up counterattitudinal arguments 
and then offered refutations. Two sub-types of conventional inoculation treatments were 
used: single forewarning and double forewarning. Single forewarning messages included 
a forewarning at the beginning of the message that an attitude toward a candidate would 
be attacked, while double forewarning messages included the initial forewarning and 
another forewarning at the end of the message. (See Appendix A for messages.) 
The other main type of inoculation message was a channel inoculation message. 
The channel inoculation message warned of the influence of a particular channel—late 
night comedy—in influencing political attitudes. (See Appendix B for message text.)
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Attack Messages
Attack messages were prepared against each of the candidates. These messages 
contained arguments that attacked candidate image, and were labeled as coming from the 
fictional “Citizens for an Informed Electorate.” (See Appendix C for message text.) As 
with inoculation messages, attack messages were written to have similar style to one 
another and checked for equivalence using Becker, Bavelas, and Braden’s (1961) Index 
of Contingency. (See Table 1.)
Manipulation Check
Threat was assessed as a manipulation check. As in previous political inoculation 
research, threat was operationalized as “a warning of impending, and potentially 
persuasive, attacks against the candidate supported by the receiver” (Pfau et al., 1990, p. 
31). Threat was assessed using five bipolar adjective pairs (e.g., Pfau et al., 1990) of: 
nonthreatening/threatening, not harmful/harmful, unintimidating/intimidating, not 
risky/risky, and safe/dangerous. Reliability for threat was .95 at Phases 1, 2, and 3.
Design and Independent Variables
The primary independent variables in this study were treatment condition
(inoculation and control/no inoculation), gender (male or female), and type of late night 
comedy content (monologue, parody, candidate appearance, or control/no late night 
comedy). Initial attitude toward candidates, as well as political interest and political 
knowledge (Fiske et al., 1990), functioned as covariates. 
There were two primary covariates in this investigation: political interest and 
political knowledge. Political interest was assessed using a scale composed of two 
questions. Participants indicated how much they followed politics (0 = hardly at all, 1 = 
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only now and then, 2 = some of the time, 3 = most of the time) and their interest in the 
campaign (0 = not much interested, 1 = somewhat interested, 2 = very much interested), 
and answers were added to form a 6-point scale, where 0 indicates minimum and 5 
indicates maximum interest in politics (Baum, 2003b, 2002c). Political knowledge was 
assessed using a 7-question multiple-choice test assessing knowledge of basic 
information about the presidential candidates. (See Appendix D for items.) 
Because attitudinal and behavioral reactions to the attack message are the ultimate 
means of assessing the efficacy of inoculation treatments and boosters (Pfau et al., 1990), 
attack type plays a pivotal role in this study. Three types of attack messages were 
employed: monologue-attack, parody-attack, and conventional-attack. Participants in the 
monologue-attack condition viewed a 30-minute segment of a late night talk show that 
included the host’s monologue containing comedic material about a candidate. 
Participants in the parody-attack condition watched a 30-minute segment of a late night 
variety show that included comedic material parodying the candidate. Participants in the 
conventional-attack condition read a conventional attack message containing 
counterattitudinal content against a candidate—attacking their preferred candidate. All 
participants read a conventional-attack message during the final phase of the study.
Procedures
As consistent with past inoculation studies, this study took place in three phases. 
The study spanned five weeks, beginning the second week of February 2004. 
In Phase 1, all participants first completed a questionnaire collecting basic 
demographic information and assessing their attitudes toward three Democrat presidential 
primary candidates. Also, this questionnaire assessed political interest and political 
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knowledge. Participants returned completed questionnaires, and then, based on their
attitudes toward the candidates, were randomly assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions. 
Participants received a questionnaire that assessed their attitude toward the 
candidate they indicated they perceived as most favorable. Participants in the inoculation 
conditions also received an inoculation message. After completing this second 
questionnaire, all participants were dismissed until Phase 2.
Phase 2 occurred one week after Phase 1. During Phase 2, participants either 
viewed comedic monologue content, parody content, or a candidate appearance at an 
individual viewing station, or they received a written conventional attack message. All 
participants completed another questionnaire assessing attitudes and political behavioral 
intentions, as well as efficacy scales. Those in the control condition received only this 
questionnaire. 
During Phase 3, occurring approximately one week after Phase 2, all participants 
in all conditions read a conventional political attack message. Those participants who had 
read a conventional attack message at Phase 2 read a different attack message against that 
candidate at Phase 3. After reading the message, all participants completed a final 
questionnaire that assessed attitudes and other attitudinal measures, as well as political 
behavioral intentions and efficacy levels. 
Dependent Measures
Feeling toward the candidate was assessed using a feeling thermometer ranging 
from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating strongest favorable feelings toward the candidate. This 
measure is commonly used in inoculation research (e.g., An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b).
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General attitude toward the candidate was assessed using bipolar adjective pairs 
first developed by Burgoon and colleagues (1978) and commonly used in inoculation 
research (e.g., An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Burgoon, Cohen, 
Miller, & Montgomery, 1978; Miller & Burgoon, 1979). General attitude was assessed 
using two bipolar adjective pairs of negative/positive and unfavorable/favorable. 
Reliability was .95 at Phase 2 and .97 at Phase 3. 
Perceptions of competence, character and sociability of the candidates and 
sources of attack messages were assessed using adjective pairs. The measure was 
developed by McCroskey, Holdridge, and Toomb (1974) and McCroskey and Jenson 
(1973) and has previously been used in political inoculation research (e.g., An & Pfau, 
2003a, 2004b; Pfau et al., 1990). Pairs used to assess competence were: 
unintelligent/intelligent, incompetent/competent, and unqualified/qualified. Pairs used to 
assess character were: dishonest/honest, bad/good, and untrustworthy/trustworthy. Pairs 
used to assess sociability were: unsociable/sociable, gloomy/cheerful, and irritable/good-
natured. Reliabilities for perceived competence of the candidate were .92 at Phases 2 and 
3, and reliabilities for perceived competence of the source of the attack message were .87 
at Phase 2 and .90 at Phase 3. Reliabilities for perceived character of the candidate were 
.94 at Phase 2 and .95 at Phase 3, and reliabilities for perceived character of the source of 
the attack message were .86 at Phase 2 and .88 at Phase 3. Reliabilities for perceived 
sociability of the candidate were .91 at Phase 2 and .94 at Phase 3, and reliabilities for 
perceived sociability of the source of the attack message were .85 at Phase 2 and .83 at 
Phase 3. 
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Attitude confidence toward the candidate was assessed using a 0-100 point 
probability continuum. Participants were asked to estimate their attitude confidence 
toward the candidate, where 0 indicates “no confidence” and 100 indicates “complete 
confidence.” This measure has been employed in recent inoculation research to assess 
how confident individuals feel about their attitudes toward issues or candidates (e.g., An 
& Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Compton & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau et al., 2004a, 2004b). 
Likelihood of a series of behaviors was assessed using single-item, 0 to 100 point 
scales answering the following question: On a scale from 0 (no probability) to 100 
(certain probability), what is the likelihood you will:
Actively seek additional information about (candidates’ names) and/or their 
positions?
Engage in conversations with other people about the candidates or their positions?
Contribute time or money on behalf of candidates in the campaign?
Go to the polls and vote for the candidate?
This measure has been employed in recent inoculation research to assess behavioral 
intentions (e.g., An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Compton & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau et al., 
1990, 2001a). 
Generalized perceived self-efficacy was assessed using a 10-point scale developed 
by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995). Participants indicated their responses to a series of 
statements, where 1 = not at all true, 2 = hardly true, 3 = moderately true, and 4 = exactly 
true. Sample items include, “If someone opposes me, I can find the means to get what I 
want” and “When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find solutions.” 
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Reliability for generalized perceived self-efficacy was .86 at Phase 2 and .88 at Phase 3. 
(See Appendix E for items.)
Elicited irritation was assessed using a 7-point differential scale, asking 
respondents to indicate how they felt after reading the message or watching the video, 
with 0 = does not apply at all and 6 = applies very much on a series of positive and 
negative affect items, including happy, agitated, optimistic, angry, uncertain, annoyed, 
sad, bothered, confused, disgusted, uncomfortable, irritated, and good. An Irritation 
Index was formed from the average of the six items agitated, angry, annoyed, bothered, 
disgusted, and irritated (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996; Jacks & Devine, 2000). Reliability 
was .93 at Phase 2 and .93 at Phase 3. 
The number of counterarguments and responses to counterarguments was 
assessed using a checklist procedure, similar to that used by Pfau et al. (2004a, 2004b). 
Participants read 20 statements reflecting major arguments for and against the candidate 
(See Appendix F for items). Participants were asked to focus on arguments contrary to 
their initial attitudes and instructed to check any “arguments other people might have for 
opposing your position . . . that had entered your mind.” Next, participants were asked to 
reexamine the list, this time checking any arguments that entered their mind that were 
“reasons that you thought of as to why opposing arguments were wrong.” The total 
number of counterarguments the participants checked was counted, as were the total 
number of responses. 
Intent to proselytize positive and information about candidates to others and share 
jokes about candidates were measured using a 0-100 likelihood of acting scale, as utilized 
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by Pfau (1990) and Pfau et al. (2001). The following questions were posed: On a scale 
from 0 (no probability) to 100 (certain probability), what is the likelihood you will: 
Tell someone positive things about (candidate’s name)?
Tell someone the jokes you heard on the late night talk show?
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Chapter 6
Results
Manipulation Check
Because threat is a prerequisite for inoculation, a one-way ANOVA was 
computed to assess elicited threat for those inoculated and those not inoculated (control). 
Omnibus results revealed that those inoculated indicated significantly higher threat levels 
than those in the control condition, F (1, 455) = 17.96, p < .01, R2 = .04. The 
manipulation check confirmed significantly more elicited threat for those receiving an 
inoculation treatment message (M = 2.95, SD = 1.29) than those who did not receive an 
inoculation treatment message (M = 2.44, SD = 1.24). 
Assumptions
Random assignment to experimental conditions assured independence. With the 
exception of intentions to contribute time or money at Phase 2 and Phase 3, normality 
was achieved for dependent variables. Intentions to contribute time or money were 
slightly past the range suggested by Hoyle (1995); however, the F-test is robust to this 
assumption (Cohen, 1988). To assess homogeneity of error variance, error variances 
across cells were compared, and the resulting ratio of high to low error was within the 
acceptable 4:1 range, with the exceptions of intentions to seek more information at Phase 
3 (4.55:1) and intentions to vote at Phase 2 (5.02:1). 
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypotheses 1-4 
To assess effects of viewing late night comedic content, a 4 (viewing condition: 
candidate appearance, monologue, parody, or no late night comedy) X 2 (gender: female 
and male) MANCOVA was computed on 6 dependent variables: feelings toward 
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candidates, attitudes toward candidates, perceived competence, perceived character, 
perceived sociability, and attitude confidence. Initial attitudes toward candidates, political 
interest, and political knowledge were treated as covariates. Results indicated a 
significant effect for the covariate of initial attitudes toward candidates, F (6,95) = 16.96, 
p < .01, R2 = .52, and a nearly significant effect for the covariate of political interest, F
(6,95) = 2.07, p < .07, R2 = .12. There were also significant omnibus effects for viewing 
condition, F (18,269) = 1.97, p < .05, R2 = .11, and gender, F (6,95) = 2.26, p < .05, R2 = 
.12. 
Subsequent analyses revealed significant univariate results for the covariate of 
initial attitude on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F (1,100) = 
63.51, p < .01, eta2 = .34, attitudes toward candidates, F (1,100) = 53.58, p < .01, eta2 = 
.31, perceived competence, F (1,100) = 29.30, p < .01, eta2 = .20, perceived character, F
(1, 111) = 41.97, p < .01, eta2 = .25, perceived sociability, F (1,100) = 8.37, p < .01, eta2
= .06, and attitude confidence, F (1,100) = 34.58, p < .01, eta2 = .20; for the covariate of 
political interest on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F (1,100) = 
5.07, p < .05, eta2 = .03, perceived character, F (1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2 = .02, 
perceived sociability, F (1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2 = .04, and attitude confidence, F
(1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2 = .04; for experimental condition on the dependent 
variables of attitude toward candidate, F (3,100) = 3.12, p < .05, eta2 = .05, perceived 
competence, F (3,100) = 6.32, p < .01, eta2 = .13, perceived character, F (3,100) = 5.55, p
< .01, eta2 = .10, perceived sociability, F (3,100) = 5.03, p < .01, eta2 = .11, and attitude 
confidence, F (3,100) = 8.07, p < .01, eta2 = .14; and for gender on the dependent 
variable of perceived sociability, F (1,100) = 4.37, p < .05, eta2 = .03. There was a nearly 
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significant effect for viewing condition on the dependent variable of feelings toward 
candidates, F (3,100) = 2.36, p < .08, eta2 = .04. Next, planned comparisons were 
conducted on significant omnibus results, or Scheffe’s post hoc tests depending on 
whether results were theoretically based or not.
Hypotheses 1-4: Effects of Late Night Political Comedy
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 posited that participants who view late night comedic content 
targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) manifest more negative perceptions of 
that politician.
Hypothesis 1(a) posited that participants who view late night comedic content 
targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) manifest more negative perceptions of 
politicians in terms of feelings toward candidates. Planned comparisons comparing 
monologue and parody conditions versus controls failed to support this hypothesis, F
(1,100) = 0.24. However, post hoc tests revealed a significant effect of the monologue 
condition on candidate feelings, with the pattern of means revealing that those viewing a 
monologue with jokes ridiculing candidates expressed more negative feelings toward 
candidates, t (59) = 2.31, p < .05, (monologue condition: M = 58.17, SD = 16.72; control 
condition: M = 62.37, SD = 18.09). Hypothesis 1(a) was supported, but only for 
monologues. 
Hypotheses 1(b), 1(c), 1(d), and 1(e) posited that participants who view late night 
comedic content targeting politicians (monologues and parodies) manifest more negative: 
attitudes toward candidates, perceived candidate competence, perceived candidate 
character, and perceived candidate sociability. Planned comparisons examining 
80
monologue and parody conditions against controls failed to support predicted effects on 
attitudes toward candidates, F (1,100) = 0.69, p > .10, perceived candidate competence, F
(1,100) = 0.41, p > .10, perceived candidate character, F (1,100) = 1.86, p > .10, and 
perceived candidate sociability, F (1,100) = 0.16, p > .10. However, post hoc tests 
revealed significant effects on these dependent variables, but contrary to prediction, those 
viewing political parodies indicated more positive attitudes toward candidates, t (61) = 
2.54, p < .05, (parody: M = 5.07, SD = 0.75; control: M = 4.74, SD = 1.53), more positive 
perceptions of candidate competence, t (60) = 2.77, p < .01, (parody: M = 5.54, SD = 
0.84; control: M = 5.18, SD = 1.39), more positive perceptions of candidate character, t
(61) = 3.92, p < .01, (parody: M = 5.40, SD = 0.74; control: M = 4.93, SD = 1.34), and 
more positive perceptions of sociability, t (61) = 2.00, p < .05, (parody: M = 5.25, SD = 
0.93; control: M = 4.97, SD = 1.36). Hypotheses 1(b), 1(c), 1(d), and 1(e) were not 
supported. 
Overall, monologues functioned as predicted in terms of derogating feelings 
toward candidates. However, monologue content failed to have significant impacts on 
other perceptions, including general attitudes and perceptions of competence, character, 
and sociability. Parodies functioned in the opposite direction than predicted. Instead of 
derogating perceptions of candidates, parodies enhanced global attitudes and perceptions 
of candidate competence, character, and sociability. (See Table 2). 
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that candidate appearances on late night talk shows 
enhance perceptions of candidates. Hypothesis 2(a) posited that candidate appearances on 
late night talk shows enhance perceptions of candidates in terms of feelings toward 
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candidates. Planned comparisons failed to support this prediction, F (1,100) = 0.02, p > 
.10. Hypothesis 2(a) was not supported.
Hypothesis 2(b) predicted that candidate appearances on late night talk shows 
enhance perceptions of candidates in terms of general attitudes toward candidates. While 
planned comparisons failed to reveal significance, F (1,100) = 1.13, p > .10, a subsequent 
post hoc test indicated a significant effect, t (55) = 2.15, p < .05, with those viewing a 
candidate appearance also indicating more positive general attitudes toward candidates 
(appearance: M = 5.02, SD = 1.41; control: M = 4.74, SD = 1.53). 
Hypotheses 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) predicted that candidate appearances on late night 
talk shows enhance perceptions of candidates in terms of general attitudes toward 
candidates and their perceived competence, character, and sociability. Results of planned 
comparisons indicated support for these predictions: candidate competence, F (1,100) = 
7.22, p < .01, eta2 = .06, with those viewing candidate appearances on late night comedy 
talk shows indicating more positive perceptions of candidate competence, (appearance:  
M = 5.88, SD = 0.90; control: M = 5.18, SD = 1.39); candidate character, F (1,100) = 
4.25, p < .01, eta2 = .02, with those viewing candidate appearances on late night comedy 
talk shows indicating more positive perceptions of candidate character, (appearance: M = 
5.43, SD = 1.27; control: M = 4.93, SD = 1.34); and candidate sociability, F (1,100) = 
6.78, p < .01, eta2 = .05, with those viewing candidate appearances on late night comedy 
talk shows indicating more positive perceptions of candidate sociability, (appearance: M
= 5.74, SD = 1.29; control: M = 4.97, SD = 1.36). Hypothesis 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) were 
supported.
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For the most part, candidate appearances functioned as predicted, generating more 
positive general attitudes toward candidates and enhancing perceptions of candidate 
competence, character and sociability. (See Table 2). 
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted candidate appearances on late night talk shows strengthen 
attitude confidence. Planned comparisons revealed support for this hypothesis, F (1,100) 
= 6.35, p < .01, eta2 = .04, with those viewing candidate appearances on late night 
comedy talk shows indicating stronger attitude confidence, (appearance: M = 69.50, SD = 
17.65; control: M = 56.00, SD = 25.13). Hypothesis 3 was supported. Viewing candidate 
appearances bolster the strength of attitude confidence toward candidates. (See Table 2). 
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 posited that political late night comedic content exerts the greatest 
influence on (a) viewers with lower political knowledge, (b) viewers who have lower 
political interest, and (c) female viewers. 
Hypothesis 4(a) was not supported, as there was no significant omnibus result for 
the covariate of political knowledge, F (6, 95) = 0.84, p > .10. 
Hypothesis 4(b) posited that political late night comedic content exerts the 
greatest influence on viewers with lower political interest. As previously reported, there 
was a nearly significant omnibus effect on the covariate of political interest, F (6,95) = 
2.07, p < .07, R2 = .12, and significant univariate effects on the dependent variables of 
feelings toward candidates, F (1,100) = 5.07, p < .05, eta2 = .05, perceived character, F
(1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2 = .04, perceived sociability, F (1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2
= .05, and attitude confidence, F (1,100) = 63.51, p < .05, eta2 = .06. There were positive 
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valences for each of these effects, indicating that, contrary to prediction, those with 
higher political interest were more influenced by late night political comedy. Hypothesis 
4(b) was not supported.
Hypothesis 4(c) predicted that political late night comedic content exerts the 
greatest influence on female viewers. As previously reported, there was evidence of 
significant omnibus effects of gender, F (6,95) = 2.26, p < .05, R2 = .12, and significant 
univariate effects on the dependent variable of perceived sociability, F (1,100) = 4.37, p
< .05, eta2 = .04. However, there was no significant interaction between gender and late 
night comedy condition. While females perceived candidates with higher sociability, 
there was no evidence that late night comedy was responsible for the effect. 
In sum, political knowledge does not significantly influence the effects of late 
night political comedy. There were significant effects of political interest, but in the 
opposite direction than predicted, with those of higher political interest more influenced 
by the late night content. Gender affects perceived candidate sociability, with female 
viewers having higher perceptions of candidate sociability, but there was no evidence for 
late night comedy condition effects. 
Omnibus and Univariate Analysis for Hypotheses 5-9 
To assess effects of inoculation on late night comedic content that ridicules 
candidates, a 2 (experimental condition: inoculated or not inoculated) X 2 (comedic form: 
monologue or parody) X 2 (gender: female and male) MANCOVA was computed on 11 
dependent variables: feelings toward candidates, attitudes toward candidates, perceived 
candidate competence, perceived candidate character, perceived candidate sociability, 
attitude confidence, intentions to seek more information about candidates, intentions to 
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contribute time or money to candidates’ campaigns, intentions to vote for candidates, 
intentions to tell people positive things about candidates, and intentions to tell people 
televised content about candidates. Initial attitudes toward candidates, political interest, 
and political knowledge were treated as covariates. Results indicated a significant effect 
for the covariate of initial attitude toward candidates, F (11,92) = 8.84, p < .01, R2 = .51, 
the covariate of political interest, F (11,92) = 3.99, p < .01, R2 = .32, and type of late 
night comedic content, F (11,92) = 2.47, p < .01, eta2 = .23. 
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitude toward candidates on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F
(1,102) = 55.97, p < .01, eta2 = .30, attitudes toward candidates, F (1,102) = 66.05, p < 
.01, eta2 = .34, perceived candidate competence, F (1,102) = 32.69, p < .01, eta2 = .22, 
perceived candidate character, F (1,102) = 80.03, p < .01, eta2 = .39, perceived candidate 
sociability, F (1,102) = 23.21, p < .01, eta2 = .17, attitude confidence, F (1,102) = 24.90, 
p < .01, eta2 = .17, intentions to seek more information about candidates, F (1,102) = 
23.84, p < .01, eta2 = .18, intentions to vote for candidates, F (1,102) = 43.72, p < .01, 
eta2 = .27, and intentions to tell positive things about candidates, F (1,102) = 30.73, p < 
.01, eta2 = .20; for the covariate of political interest on the dependent variables of attitude 
confidence, F (1,102) = 4.15, p < .05, eta2 = .03, intentions to tell positive things about 
candidates, F (1,102) = 10.38, p < .01, eta2 = .07, and intentions to tell others televised 
content, F (1,102) = 16.62, p < .01, eta2 = .12, and nearly significant effects on intentions 
to vote for candidates, F (1,102) = 2.99, p < .09, eta2 = .02; and nearly significant effects 
for gender on the dependent measures of feelings toward candidates, F (1,102) = 2.77, p
< .10, eta2 = .01, general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,102) = 3.34, p < .08, eta2 = 
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.02, and perceived candidate sociability, F (1,102) = 3.48, p < .07, eta2 = .02. Univariate 
tests also indicated significant effects for late night comedic content on the dependent 
measures of feelings toward candidates, F (1,102) = 7.98, p < .01, eta2 = .04, general 
attitudes toward candidates, F (1,102) = 4.89, p < .05, eta2 = .02, perceived candidate 
competence, F (1,102) = 7.26, p < .01, eta2 = .05, perceived candidate character, F
(1,102) = 10.90, p < .01, eta2 = .05, and intentions to tell other televised content, F
(1,102) = 8.06, p < .01, eta2 = .06, and nearly significant effects on perceived candidate 
sociability, F (1,102) = 3.64, p < .06, eta2 = .03, and attitude confidence, F (1,102) = 
3.33, p < .08, eta2 = .02. There was a nearly significant univariate effect for experimental 
condition on intentions to tell others televised content, F (1,102) = 3.53, p < .07, eta2 = 
.06. 
Not all predicted omnibus results supported the proposed hypotheses. However, 
because extant theory warranted further examination of the means, planned comparisons 
were conducted to assess the predictions offered in the hypotheses. This procedure is 
advocated when theory supports predictions, regardless of significant omnibus results 
(Huberty & Morris, 1989).
Hypotheses 5-9: Inoculating Against Late Night Comedy
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 posited that, for people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as 
compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative 
influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and 
parodies).
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Hypotheses 5(a) and 5(b) predicted that, for people who receive an inoculation 
pretreatment, as compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to 
the negative influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate 
(monologues and parodies), manifested in feelings toward candidates and general 
attitudes toward candidates. Planned comparisons revealed significant effects for both 
dependent variables: feelings toward candidates, F (1,102) = 3.66, p < .01, eta2 = .02, and 
general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,102) = 4.58, p < .01, eta2 = .02. However, 
contrary to prediction, those inoculated against monologue and parodies indicated more 
negative feelings toward candidates after exposure to late night comedic content when 
compared to controls, (treatment: M = 55.45, SD = 19.53; control: M = 60.91, SD = 
16.52), and more negative general attitudes toward candidates after exposure to late night 
comedic content when compared to controls, (treatment: M = 4.52, SD = 1.35; control: M
= 4.91, SD = 1.00). (See Table 3). Subsequent post hoc tests revealed no significance for 
monologues, but did reveal significance for parodies on the dependent measure of 
feelings toward candidates, with those inoculated indicating more negative feelings than 
those in the control condition after exposure to late night political parody, t (59) = 4.02, p
< .01, (treatment: M = 56.17, SD = 22.94; parody control: M  = 63.65, SD = 16.14), and 
on the dependent measure of attitudes toward candidates, with those inoculated indicating 
more negative attitudes than those in the control condition after exposure to late night 
political parody, t (59) = 4.92, p < .01, (treatment: M = 4.48, SD = 1.51; parody control: 
M = 5.07, SD = 0.75). (See Table 4). Results of Hypotheses 5(a) and 5(b) indicated that 
inoculation not only failed to confer resistance to comic content, but instead, actually 
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backfired in the parody condition, in terms of feelings and general attitudes toward 
candidates.
Hypotheses 5(c) posited that, for people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, 
as compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative 
influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and 
parodies), manifested in perceptions of candidate competence. Planned comparisons 
revealed a nearly significant effect, F (1,102) = 2.16, p < .10, eta2 = .01, but contrary to 
prediction, those inoculated against monologue and parodies expressed more negative 
perceptions of candidate competence after exposure to the late night comedic content 
when compared to controls (treatment: M = 5.01, SD = 1.32; control: M = 5.32, SD = 
1.04). (See Table 3). Post hoc tests revealed no significance for monologues, but did 
reveal significance for parodies on perceived candidate competence, with those 
inoculated indicating more negative perceptions of candidate competence than those in 
the control condition after exposure to late night political parody, t (59) = 3.07, p < .01,  
(treatment: M = 5.11, SD = 1.49; parody control: M = 5.54, SD = 0.84). (See Table 4). 
Results of Hypothesis 5(c) indicated that inoculation failed to confer resistance in terms 
of perceptions of candidate competence, and instead, backfired with parody content.
Hypothesis 5(d) posited, for people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as 
compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative 
influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and 
parodies), manifested in perceived candidate character. Planned comparisons revealed 
significance, F (1,102) = 4.69, p < .01, eta2 = .02, but those inoculated against monologue 
and parodies indicated more negative perceptions of candidate character after exposure to 
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the late night comedic content when compared to controls (treatment: M = 4.87, SD = 
1.12; control: M = 5.20, SD = 0.92). (See Table 3). Post hoc tests revealed no significance 
for monologues, but did reveal significance for parodies on attitudes toward candidates, 
with those inoculated indicating more negative perceptions of candidate character than 
those in the control condition after exposure to late night political parody, t (59) = 4.92, p
< .01, (treatment: M = 4.92, SD = 1.29; parody control: M = 5.40, SD = 0.74). (See Table 
4). Results for Hypothesis 5(d) indicated that inoculation failed to confer resistance to 
comedic content in terms of perceived candidate character, and with the parody 
condition, inoculation treatments backfired.
Hypothesis 5(e) predicted that, for people who receive an inoculation 
pretreatment, as compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to 
the negative influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate 
(monologues and parodies), manifested in perceived candidate character. Planned 
comparisons revealed no evidence for significance, F (1,102) = 0.20, p > .10. Post hoc 
tests revealed no significance for monologues, but did reveal significance for parodies on 
attitudes toward candidates, with those inoculated indicating more negative perceptions 
of candidate sociability than those in the control condition after exposure to late night 
political parody, t (59) = 4.92, p < .05, (treatment: M = 4.97, SD = 1.10; control: M = 
5.25, SD = 0.93). (See Table 4). Results of Hypothesis 5(e) indicated that inoculation 
failed to confer resistance to neither monologues nor parodies, and with parodies, the 
treatments backfired.
Hypothesis 5(f) posited that, for people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, 
as compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative 
89
influence induced by exposure to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and 
parodies), manifested in attitude confidence. Planned comparisons revealed no evidence 
for significance, F (1,102) = 0.37, p > .10. Post hoc tests revealed no significance for 
monologues, but did reveal significance for parodies on attitude confidence, with those 
inoculated indicating weaker attitudes than those in the control condition after exposure 
to late night political parody, t (59) = 2.23, p < .05, (treatment: M = 52.33, SD = 28.24; 
parody control: M = 59.20, SD = 24.62). (See Table 4). Results for Hypothesis 5(f) 
indicated that inoculation failed to confer resistance to comic content, and with parodies, 
the treatments backfired.
In sum, results for Hypothesis 5 indicated that inoculation failed to confer 
resistance to both parody and monologue content. While planned comparisons revealed 
significant effects, the directions were opposite than predicted. Subsequent post hoc tests 
indicated that inoculation treatments not only failed to confer resistance to parody 
content, but actually backfired, with the dependent variables of feelings toward 
candidates, general attitudes toward candidates, perceived candidate competence, 
perceived candidate character, perceived candidate character, and attitude confidence. 
Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 predicted that inoculation treatments enhance the likelihood of 
participatory behaviors after exposure to comedic attacks, when compared to controls.
Specifically, Hypothesis 6(a) posited that inoculation treatments enhance the 
likelihood of seeking political information, and Hypothesis 6(b) predicted that 
inoculation enhances the likelihood of contributing time or money to campaigns, after 
exposure to comedic content. Planned comparisons failed to support either prediction: no 
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greater likelihood of seeking political information, F (1,102) = 0.37, p > .10, and no more 
likelihood of contributing time or money to campaigns, F (1,102) = 0.81, p > .10. 
Hypothesis 6(c) posited that inoculation treatments enhance the likelihood of voting for 
candidates. Planned comparisons failed to support this hypothesis, F (1,102) = 0.80, p > 
.10. Post hoc tests revealed a significant effect on intentions to vote with political 
parodies, with those inoculated and subjected to parody content expressing lower 
intentions to vote for candidates, t (59) = 2.44, p < .05, (treatment: M = 26.67, SD = 
35.09; parody control: M = 36.00, SD = 32.70). (See Table 4). 
Results for Hypothesis 6 failed to reveal effects on behavioral intentions to seek 
more political information or contribute time or money after exposure to comedic attacks. 
Resulted indicated significant effects on intentions to vote for candidates in the parody 
condition, but the direction of effects was opposite than predicted. Instead of increasing 
intentions to vote for candidates, those inoculated indicated lower intentions to vote for 
candidates after exposure to parody content.
Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 7 predicted that those inoculated are more likely to proselytize in 
support of candidates after encountering late night comedic content (monologues and 
parodies). Planned comparisons indicated significance, F (1,102) = 2.38, p < .05, eta2 = 
.01, however, the direction of effects was opposite than predicted, with those inoculated 
expressing less intention to share positive things about candidates after exposure to comic 
material, (treatment: M = 29.28, SD = 30.45; control: M = 37.78, SD = 33.16). (See Table 
3). Post hoc tests revealed significant effects of both monologue content, with those 
inoculated and subjected to monologue content expressing lower intentions to share 
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positive things about candidates, t (55) = 2.31, p < .05, (treatment: M = 30.27, SD = 
30.70; monologue control: M = 38.83, SD = 35.26), and with parody content, with those 
inoculated and subjected to monologue content expressing lower intentions to share 
positive things about candidates, t (59) = 2.32, p < .05, (treatment: M = 28.43, SD = 
30.74; parody control: M = 36.77, SD = 31.58). (See Table 4). 
Hypothesis 7 was not supported. Though results indicated significant effects, 
those inoculated and then experiencing comic content ridiculing candidates were less 
likely to share positive things about candidates. 
Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 predicted that those inoculated are less likely to tell others jokes 
they hear from late night shows when compared to those inoculated. Planned 
comparisons failed to reveal significance for the conditions of parodies and monologues 
when compared to controls, F (1,102) = 1.28, p > .10. Post hoc tests revealed no 
significant effect of parodies, but revealed significance for monologues, with those 
inoculated and subjected to monologue content expressing lower intentions to share jokes 
about candidates, t (55) = 4.59, p < .01, (treatment: M = 18.54, SD = 23.30; monologue 
control: M = 36.90, SD = 32.83). (See Table 4). Hypothesis 8 was partially supported. 
Inoculation treatments decrease the likelihood that late night jokes about candidates from 
monologues will be shared with others.
Hypothesis 9
Hypothesis 9 posited that inoculation’s effects against late night comedic content 
(monologues and parodies) are more pronounced for (a) those higher in political interest 
when compared to those lower in political interest, (b) those higher in political 
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knowledge when compared to those lower in political knowledge, and (c) males when 
compared to females. 
As previously reported, there was a significant omnibus effect for political 
interest, F (11, 92) = 3.99, p < .01, R2 = .32, and significant univariate effects on the 
dependent variables of attitude confidence, F (1,102) = 4.15, p < .05, eta2 = .04, 
intentions to tell positive things about candidates, F (1,102) = 10.38, p < .01, eta2 = .09, 
and intentions to tell others televised content, F (1,102) = 16.62, p < .01, eta2 = .14, and 
nearly significant effects on intentions to vote for candidates, F (1,102) = 2.99, p < .09, 
eta2 = .03. The valences on each of these variables were positive, supporting Hypothesis 
9(a). Those with higher political interest were more affected by the inoculation 
treatments.  
Hypothesis 9(b) was not supported, as there was no evidence for significant 
omnibus results for political knowledge, F (11,92) = 0.57, p = 0.85. Hypothesis 9(c) was 
not supported, with no evidence for significance omnibus effects of gender, F (11,92) = 
1.30, p = 0.24. 
Hypothesis 9 was only partially supported, with those of higher political interest 
more influenced by inoculation treatments, but no significant effects for political 
knowledge or gender.
Omnibus and Univariate Analysis for Hypothesis 10
To assess comedic content and counterarguing, a MANCOVA with a fixed factor 
of type of attack (comedic or conventional) was computed on two dependent variables: 
generated counterarguments and generated refutations, for all inoculated participants. 
There was no evidence for significant omnibus effects, F (2,63) = 0.61, p = .55. Because 
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theory warranted the prediction, planned comparisons were computed to further assess 
the means (Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
Hypothesis 10: Counterarguments and Refutations
Hypothesis 10
Hypothesis 10 predicted that counterattitudinal messages with humor elicit less 
counterarguing output than counterattitudinal messages without humor. Results of 
planned comparisons did not support Hypothesis 10 for counterarguments, F (1,64) = 
0.01, p > .10, or refutations, F (1,64) = 1.04, p > .10. (See Table 5). 
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypothesis 11-14
To assess effects of viewing candidate appearances on conventional political 
attacks, a 2 (experimental condition at Phase 1: inoculation or no inoculation) X 2 
(comedic content condition at Phase 2: candidate appearance or no comedic content) X 2 
(gender: female and male) MANCOVA was computed on 15 dependent variables: 
feelings toward candidates at Phase 2 and Phase 3; attitudes toward candidates at Phase 2 
and Phase 3; perceived candidate competence, character, and sociability at Phase 2 and 
Phase 3; attitude confidence at Phase 2 and Phase 3, and perceived competence, 
character, and sociability of sources of counterattitudinal messages at Phase 3. Initial 
attitudes toward candidates, political interest, and political knowledge were treated as 
covariates. Results indicated a significant omnibus effect for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates, F (15,75) = 5.89, p < .01, R2 = .54, and for exposure to 
candidate appearances at Phase 2, F (15,75) = 2.67, p < .01, R2 = .35.
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates at 
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Phase 2, F (1,89) = 70.90, p < .01, eta2 = .40, attitudes toward candidates at Phase 2, F
(1,89) = 55.37, p < .01, eta2 = .35, perceived candidate competence at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 
37.09, p < .01, eta2 = .26, perceived candidate sociability at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 21.92, p
< .01, eta2 = .16, attitude confidence at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 15.90, p < .01, eta2 = .12, 
feelings toward candidates at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 46.16, p < .01, eta2 = .31, attitudes 
toward candidates at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 49.23, p < .01, eta2 = .32, perceived candidate 
competence at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 39.34, p < .01, eta2 = .28, perceived candidate 
sociability at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 24.01, p < .01, eta2 = .19, attitude confidence at Phase 3, 
F (1,89) = 15.84, p < .01, eta2 = .13, perceived counterattitudinal source competence at 
Phase 3, F (1,89) = 19.08, p < .01, eta2 = .15, perceived counterattitudinal source 
character at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 17.29, p < .01, eta2 = .15, and perceived 
counterattitudinal source sociability at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 11.10, p < .01, eta2 = .10. 
There were also significant univariate effects for the covariate of candidate appearances 
at Phase 2 on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 
5.62, p < .05, eta2 = .03, attitudes toward candidates at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 5.86, p < .05, 
eta2 = .04, perceived candidate competence at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 11.95, p < .01, eta2 = 
.08, perceived candidate character at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 11.92, p < .01, eta2 = .07, 
perceived candidate sociability at Phase 2, F (1,89) = 22.34, p < .01, eta2 = .16, attitude 
confidence, F (1,89) = 19.40, p < .01, eta2 = .15, perceived candidate character at Phase 
3, F (1,89) = 5.24, p < .05, eta2 = .03, perceived candidate sociability at Phase 3, F (1,89) 
= 5.13, p < .05, eta2 = .04, and attitude confidence at Phase 3, F (1,89) = 4.32, p < .05, 
eta2 = .03. Next, planned comparisons were conducted on significant omnibus results, or 
Scheffe’s post hoc tests depending on whether results were theoretically based or not.
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Hypotheses 11-14: Inoculating With Candidate Appearances
Hypothesis 11
Hypothesis 11 posited that candidate appearances confer resistance to 
conventional political attack messages, manifested in (a) feelings toward candidates, (b) 
general attitudes toward candidates, (c) candidate competence, (d) candidate character, 
(e) candidate sociability, (f) attitude confidence, and (g) counterattitudinal message 
source derogation. 
Hypothesis 11(a) was not supported. While a planned comparison failed to reveal 
significance, F (1,89) = 1.67, p > .10, a post hoc test revealed significance, but in the 
opposite direction than predicted. Those who viewed candidate appearances and then 
encountered conventional attack messages indicated lower feelings toward candidates, t
(55) = 2.53, p < .05, (appearance: M = 48.28, SD = 25.97; control: M = 54.04, SD = 
19.95). (See Table 6).
Planned comparisons failed to reveal significance for (b) attitudes toward 
candidates, F (1,89) = 0.32, p > .10, (c) perceived candidate competence, F (1,89) = 0.78, 
p > .10, (d) perceived candidate character, F (1,89) = 0.24, p > .10, (e) perceived 
candidate sociability, F (1,89) = 0.07, p > .10, and (f) attitude confidence, F (1,89) = 
0.00, p > .10. There was evidence for significance on counterattitudinal message source 
derogation in terms of competence, F (1,89) = 2.46, p < .05, eta2 = .02, with those 
viewing a candidate appearance indicating more negative perceptions of 
counterattitudinal message source competence, (appearances: M = 4.69, SD = 1.43; 
control: M = 4.94, SD = 1.35). (See Table 6). There was no evidence for significance on 
counterattitudinal message source character, F (1,89) = 0.43, p > .10. Planned 
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comparisons failed to indicate significance for counterattitudinal message source 
sociability, F (1,89) = 1.27, p > .10, but a post hoc test revealed significance, with those 
viewing candidate appearances before encountering conventional attack messages 
indicating lower perceptions of the sociability of sources of counterattitudinal messages, t
(56) = 2.25, p < .05, (appearance: M = 3.78, SD = 0.89; control: M = 4.05, SD = 1.39). 
(See Table 6).
In sum, Hypotheses 11(g) was the only prediction supported of Hypotheses 11(a) 
– (g), with candidate appearances leading to more negative perceptions of 
counterattitudinal message sources’ competence and sociability. Otherwise, there was no 
evidence that candidate appearances conferred resistance to conventional attack 
messages, and in the case of feelings toward candidates, the effect of viewing candidate 
appearances prior to conventional attack messages resulted in lower feelings toward 
candidates.
Hypothesis 12
Hypothesis 12 predicted that inoculation treatments boost inoculative effects of 
candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages.
Hypothesis 12(a) predicted that inoculation treatments boost the inoculative effect 
of candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to subsequent political attack messages, manifested in feelings toward 
candidates. While planned comparisons failed to indicate significance, F (1,89) = 1.69, p
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> .10, a post hoc test revealed a significant effect on candidate feelings, with those 
inoculated and then viewing candidate appearances indicating more favorable feelings 
toward candidates when compared to those who only view candidate appearances, t (52) 
= 2.49, p < .05, (appearance plus inoculation: M = 54.08, SD = 18.24; appearance only: M
= 48.28, SD = 25.97). (See Table 7). Hypothesis 12(a) was supported, with candidate 
appearances boosting the efficacy of inoculation treatments against conventional attacks 
measured by feelings toward candidates. 
Hypotheses 12(b) and 12(c) posited that inoculation treatments boost the 
inoculative effect of candidate appearances, with those participants who receive 
inoculation treatment messages and subsequently view candidate appearances 
demonstrating the most resistance to political attack messages, manifested in general 
attitudes toward candidates and perceived candidate competence, when compared to 
those viewing only candidate appearances. Planned comparisons failed to support any of 
these predictions: attitudes toward candidates, F (1,89) = 0.32, p > .10, and perceived 
candidate competence, F (1,89) = 0.80, p > .10. Hypotheses 12(b) and 12(c) were not 
supported, as there was no evidence of a boost to inoculation in terms of general attitudes 
toward candidates or perceived candidate competence.
Hypothesis 12(d) posited that inoculation treatments boost the inoculative effect 
of candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages, manifested in perceived candidate character. 
While planned comparisons failed to reveal significance, F (1,89) = 1.19, p > .10, a post 
hoc test indicated a significant difference, with those inoculated and then viewing 
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candidate appearances indicating more favorable perceptions of candidate character than 
those only viewing candidate appearances, t (52) = 2.07, p < .05, (appearance plus 
inoculation: M = 4.75, SD = 1.08; appearance only: M = 4.46, SD = 1.38). (See Table 7). 
Hypothesis 12(d) was supported, with evidence of a boost to inoculation in terms of 
perceived candidate character.
Hypothesis 12(e) predicted that inoculation treatments boost inoculative effects of 
candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages, manifested in perceptions of candidate sociability, 
when compared to those viewing only candidate appearances. Planned comparisons 
indicated a nearly significant effect, F (1,89) = 2.13, p < .10, eta2 = .02, with those 
viewing candidate appearances after inoculation perceiving candidates with more positive 
sociability, (appearance plus inoculation: M = 5.28, SD = 0.92; appearance only: M = 
4.81, SD = 1.52). (See Table 7). Results for Hypothesis 12(e) approached significance, 
with a boost to inoculation in terms of perceived candidate sociability.
Hypothesis 12(f) posited that inoculation treatments boost inoculative effects of 
candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages, manifested in attitude confidence, when compared 
to those only viewing candidate appearances. Planned comparisons failed to indicate 
support for this prediction, F (1,89) = 0.55, p > .10.
Hypothesis 12(g) predicted that inoculation treatments boost inoculative effects of 
candidate appearances, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
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messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages, manifested in counterattitudinal message source 
derogation, when compared to those viewing only candidate appearances. Planned 
comparisons failed to support this hypothesis in terms of competence, F (1,89) = 0.55, p
> .10, character, F (1,89) = 0.55, p > .10, or sociability, F (1,89) = 0.63, p > .10. 
Overall, Hypothesis 12 was supported on the dependent variables of feelings 
toward candidates and perceptions of candidate competence. There was a nearly 
significant effect in terms of perceived sociability of candidates, but no other evidence for 
significant effects on the other dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 13
Hypothesis 13 predicted that candidate appearances boost inoculative effects of 
inoculation treatments, with those participants who receive inoculation treatment 
messages and subsequently view candidate appearances demonstrating the most 
resistance to political attack messages, manifested in a) feelings toward candidates, (b) 
attitudes toward candidates, (c) candidate competence, (d) candidate character, (e) 
candidate sociability, (f) attitude confidence, and (g) counterattitudinal message source 
derogation, when compared to those only inoculated.
Hypotheses 13(a), 13(b), and 13(c), were not supported. Candidate appearances 
failed to boost inoculation treatment efficacy in terms of feelings toward candidates, F
(1,89) = 0.00, p > .10, attitudes toward candidates, F (1,89) = 0.00, p > .10, or perceived 
candidate competence, F (1,89) = 0.00, p > .10. 
Hypothesis 13(d) predicted that candidate appearances boost the efficacy of 
inoculation treatments in terms of perceived candidate character. While planned 
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comparisons failed to reveal significance, F (1,89) = 1.26, p > .10, a post hoc test 
indicated a significant effect on perceived candidate character, with those inoculated and 
viewing candidate appearances indicating more positive perceptions of candidate 
character than those only inoculated, t (55) = 2.23, p < .05, (appearance plus inoculation: 
M = 4.75, SD = 1.08; appearance only: M = 4.46, SD = 1.14). (See Table 8). Hypothesis 
13(d) was supported. There was evidence of a booster to inoculation in terms of 
perceived candidate character.
Hypothesis 13(e) predicted that candidate appearances boost the efficacy of 
inoculation treatments in terms of perceived candidate sociability. Hypothesis 13(e) was 
supported, F (1,89) = 2.92, p < .05, eta2 = .02, with those inoculated and then viewing 
candidate appearances demonstrating more positive perceived candidate sociability than 
those only inoculated (appearance plus inoculation: M = 5.28, SD = 0.92; appearance 
only: M = 4.79, SD = 1.18). (See Table 8). There was evidence of a booster to inoculation 
in terms of perceived candidate sociability.
Hypothesis 13(f) predicted that candidate appearances boost the efficacy of 
inoculation treatments in terms of attitude confidence. Results indicated a nearly 
significant effect, F (1,89) = 2.07, p < .10, eta2 = .02, with those inoculated and then 
viewing candidate appearances demonstrating stronger attitude confidence than those 
only inoculated (appearance plus inoculation: M = 57.79, SD = 21.76; appearance only: 
M = 49.26, SD = 25.85). (See Table 8). Results for Hypothesis 13(f) approached 
significance of a booster effect in terms of attitude confidence.
Hypothesis 13(g) predicted that candidate appearances boost the efficacy of 
inoculation treatments in terms of counterattitudinal message source derogation. Results 
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indicated support for this hypothesis in terms of source competence, F (1,89) = 3.28, p < 
.01, eta2 = .03, with those inoculated and then viewing candidate appearances viewing 
sources of counterattitudinal messages as less competent, (appearance plus inoculation: 
M = 3.74, SD = 0.73; appearance only: M = 4.19, SD = 0.82), and a nearly significant 
effect in terms of source character, F (1,89) = 2.05, p < .10, eta2 = .02, with those 
inoculated and then viewing candidate appearances viewing sources of counterattitudinal 
messages as having less character, (appearance plus inoculation: M = 3.75, SD = 0.53; 
appearance only: M = 4.07, SD = 0.69). (See Table 8). There was no evidence for effects 
on perceived source sociability, F (1,89) = 0.26, p  > .10. Hypothesis 13(g) was supported, 
with increased derogation of the sources of counterattitudinal messages in terms of 
perceived source competence and character.
In sum, Hypothesis 13 was partly supported. While there were no significant 
effects of candidate appearances on inoculation treatments in terms of feelings toward 
candidates, general attitudes toward candidates, or perceptions of candidate competence, 
candidate appearances did offer boosts to perceptions of candidate character and 
sociability, attitude confidence, and enhanced derogation of the sources of 
counterattitudinal messages. 
Hypothesis 14
Hypothesis 14 predicted candidate appearances produce the largest boost to the 
inoculation effect with (a) less politically interested viewers, (b) less politically 
knowledgeable viewers, and (c) female viewers. Hypothesis 14 was not supported, with 
no significant omnibus effects for (a) political interest, F (15,75) = 0.33, p > .10; (b) 
political knowledge, F (15,75) = .92, p > .10; or (c) gender, F (15,75) = .94, p > .10. 
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Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypotheses 15 and 16
To assess viewing late night comedic content on effects of conventional political 
attacks on those inoculated, a 2 (late night comedy condition: exposure to late night 
comedic content or no exposure to late night comedic content at Phase 2) X 2 (gender: 
female and male) MANCOVA was computed on 6 dependent variables: feelings toward 
candidates at Phase 3; attitudes toward candidates at Phase 3; perceived candidate 
competence, character, and sociability at Phase 3; and attitude confidence at Phase 3. 
Initial attitudes toward candidates, political interest, and political knowledge were treated 
as covariates. Results indicated a significant omnibus effect for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates, F (6, 68) = 9.63, p < .01, R2 = .46, and for the covariate of 
political interest, F (6, 68) = 2.31, p < .05, R2 = .17. There was a nearly significant effect 
for late night comedy condition, F (6, 68) = 1.89, p < .10, R2 = .09. 
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates at 
Phase 3, F (1,73) = 41.49, p < .01, eta2 = .30, general attitudes toward candidates at Phase 
3, F (1,73) = 44.80, p < .01, eta2 = .31, perceived candidate competence at Phase 3, F
(1,73) = 46.88, p < .01, eta2 = .34, perceived candidate character at Phase 3, F (1,73) = 
51.79, p < .01, eta2 = .35, perceived candidate sociability at Phase 3, F (1,73) = 26.76, p
< .01, eta2 = .24, and attitude confidence, F (1,73) = 13.38, p < .01, eta2 = .14; and for 
late night comedy condition on the dependent variable of feelings toward candidates, F
(1,73) = 4.37, p < .05, eta2 = .03.  
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Though omnibus results fell just short of significance for late night comedy 
condition, because theory warrants the predictions, planned comparisons were computed 
to further assess the means (Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
Hypotheses 15-16: Repeated Attacks
Hypothesis 15
Hypothesis 15 predicted that those inoculated and subjected to comedic content 
targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) are more resistant to subsequent 
conventional political attack messages when compared to those experiencing 
counterattitudinal messages for the first time. 
Hypothesis 15(a) predicted that those inoculated and subjected to comedic content 
targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) are more resistant to subsequent 
conventional political attack messages when compared to those encountering 
counterattitudinal messages for the first time, manifested in terms of feelings toward 
candidates. Results of planned comparisons indicated significant effects, F (1,73) = 6.26, 
p < .01, eta2 = .04, but the direction was opposite than predicted. Those encountering 
comedic content and then encountering a conventional attack message had more negative 
feelings towards candidates than those experiencing the conventional attacks for the first 
time, (comedic attack: M = 45.40, SD = 22.50; no attack: M = 54.43, SD = 17.95). 
Hypotheses 15(b) and 15(c) were not supported by planned comparisons: on 
general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,73) = 0.75, p > .10, or perceived candidate 
competence, F (1,73) = 0.90, p > .10. Post hoc tests revealed no significance for 
monologues, but did reveal significance for parodies on the dependent variables of 
attitudes toward candidates and perceived candidate competence, with those viewing a 
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parody and later encountering conventional attacks indicating less positive general 
attitudes toward candidates, t (56) = 5.75, p < .01, (parody attack: M = 3.82, SD = 1.63; 
no attack: M = 4.32, SD = 1.03), and lower perceptions of candidate competence, t (57) = 
2.77, p < .01, (parody attack: M = 4.55, SD = 1.64; no attack: M = 4.91, SD = 1.19). (See 
Table 9). These effects were opposite than predicted. Instead of enhancing resistance, 
encountering the comedic content prior to encountering conventional attacks derogated 
perceptions of candidate image.
Hypotheses 15(d) and 15(e) predicted that those inoculated and subjected to 
comedic content targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) are more resistant to 
subsequent conventional political attack messages when compared to those encountering 
counterattitudinal messages for the first time, manifested in terms of: perceived candidate 
character and perceived candidate sociability. Results of planned comparisons did not 
support these predictions: candidate character, F (1,73) = 0.02, p > .10, or candidate 
sociability, F (1,73) = 0.18, p > .10. Post hoc tests revealed no significance for parodies, 
but did indicate significance for monologues on perceived candidate character, with those 
encountering a monologue attack before encountering a conventional attack indicating 
more favorable perceptions of candidate character, t (55) = 2.23, p < .05, (monologue 
attack: M = 4.70, SD = 1.13; no attack: M = 4.46, SD = 1.14), and more favorable 
perceptions of candidate sociability, t (55) = 2.08, p < .05, (monologue attack: M = 5.06, 
SD = 1.00; no attack: M = 4.79, SD = 1.18). (See Table 9). Hypotheses 15(d) and 15(e) 
were partially supported, with the monologue condition functioning as predicted.
Hypothesis 15(f) predicted that those inoculated and subjected to comedic content 
targeting a politician (monologues and parodies) are more resistant to subsequent 
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conventional political attack messages when compared to those experiencing 
counterattitudinal messages for the first time, manifested in terms of attitude confidence. 
Results of planned comparisons did not support this prediction, F (1,73) = 0.10, p > .10. 
Overall, Hypothesis 15 was supported on the dependent variables of perceived 
candidate character and perceived candidate sociability, but only with monologues. 
Otherwise, exposure to comic content ridiculing candidates failed to enhance resistance 
to conventional attack messages for those inoculated, and in some cases, particularly with 
parodies, the comedic content further derogated candidates’ images.
Hypothesis 16
Hypothesis 16 posited that late night comedic ridicule creates a greater boost of 
inoculation for (a) those with lower political interest when compared to those with higher 
political interest, (b) those with lower political knowledge when compared to those with 
higher political knowledge, and (c) females when compared to males. 
Hypothesis 16(a) was not supported. Results indicated significant omnibus results 
for political interest, F (6,68) = 2.31, p < .05, eta2 = .17, but no significant univariate 
effects (though effects on attitude confidence approached significance, p = .11.) 
Hypotheses 16(b) and 16(c) were not supported, as there was no evidence for significant 
omnibus results for political knowledge, F (6,68) = 1.14, p = .35, or for gender, F (6,68) 
= 0.82, p = .56. Hypothesis 16 was not supported for any of its predictions.
Omnibus Results for Hypotheses 17-19
To assess the extent of blanket inoculation conferred by inoculation treatments, a 
3 (experimental treatment condition: inoculation, channel inoculation, and no 
inoculation) X 2 (type of attack: comedic and conventional) X 2 (gender: male and 
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female) MANCOVA was computed on 6 dependent variables: feelings toward 
candidates; attitudes toward candidates; perceived competence, character, and sociability; 
and attitude confidence. Initial attitudes toward candidates, political interest, and political 
knowledge were treated as covariates. Results indicated a significant omnibus effect for 
the covariate of initial attitudes toward candidates, F (6,208) = 28.01, p < .01, R2 = .45; 
for the covariate of political interest, F (6,208) = 6.47, p < .01, R2 = .16; and for type of 
attack, F (6,208) = 5.32, p < .01, R2 = .13. 
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F
(1,207) = 98.20, p < .01, eta2 = .28, general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,207) = 
137.86, p < .01, eta2 = .35, perceived candidate competence, F (1,207) = 63.04, p < .01, 
eta2 = .21, perceived candidate character, F (1,207) = 139.57, p < .01, eta2 = .35, 
perceived candidate sociability, F (1,207) = 48.93, p < .01, eta2 = .17, and attitude 
confidence, F (1,207) = 16.46, p < .01, eta2 = .06; for the covariate of political interest on 
the dependent variables of perceived candidate sociability, F (1,207) = 5.22, p < .05, eta2
= .02, and attitude confidence, F (1,207) = 18.56, p < .01, eta2 = .07; and for type of 
attack on the dependent variables of general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,207) = 
5.83, p < .05, eta2 = .01, perceived candidate competence, F (1,207) = 5.40, p < .05, eta2
= .02, and perceived candidate character, F (1,207) = 13.96, p < .01, eta2 = .03. 
Not all predicted omnibus results supported the proposed hypotheses. However, 
extant theory warranted further assessment of the pattern of means (Huberty & Morris, 
1989). Planned comparisons were conducted to assess the following hypotheses, with 
post hoc tests to examine means for results that are not theoretically based.
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Hypotheses 17-19: Blanket Resistance
Hypothesis 17
Hypothesis 17 posited that, for those who receive inoculation pretreatments that 
warn of a specific channel’s influence (late night comedy), as compared to those who do 
not, inoculation messages confer resistance to the negative influence induced by exposure 
to comic content ridiculing a candidate (monologues and parodies), manifested in terms 
of (a) feelings toward candidates, (b) general attitudes toward candidates, (c) perceived 
candidate competence, (d) perceived candidate character, (e) perceived candidate 
sociability, and (f) attitude confidence. 
Results of planned comparisons indicated significance for Hypotheses 17(a), 
17(b), 17(c), 17(d), and 17(e): feelings toward candidates, F (1,207) = 2.68, p < .05, eta2
= .01; attitudes toward candidates, F (1,207) = 4.36, p < .01, eta2 = .01; perceived 
candidate competence, F (1,207) = 3.00, p < .05, eta2 = .01; perceived candidate 
character, F (1,207) = 3.97, p < .01, eta2 = .01; and perceived candidate sociability, F
(1,207) = 2.66, p < .05, eta2 = .01. However, the directions were opposite than predicted, 
with those receiving channel inoculation treatments indicating more negative feelings 
toward candidates (channel inoculation: M = 55.10, SD = 20.02; control: M = 60.91, SD = 
16.52), more negative attitudes toward candidates (channel inoculation: M = 4.45, SD = 
1.16; control: M = 4.91, SD = 1.00), more negative perceptions of candidate competence 
(channel inoculation: M = 4.91, SD = 1.36; control: M = 5.32, SD = 1.04), more negative 
perceptions of candidate character (channel inoculation: M = 4.83, SD = 1.08; control: M
= 5.20, SD = 0.92), and more negative perceptions of candidate sociability (channel 
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inoculation: M = 4.70, SD = 1.30; control: M = 5.07, SD = 1.09). (See Table 10). There 
was no evidence for significance on attitude confidence, F (1,207) = 0.29, p > .10. 
Post hoc tests revealed that channel inoculations were successful in the face of 
monologue attacks in terms of attitude confidence, t (43) = 2.35, p < .05, (channel 
inoculation: M = 59.25, SD = 25.35; control: M = 50.79, SD = 28.63), but did not indicate 
significance on any other dependent variable. (See Table 11). Post hoc tests indicated 
significance for all dependent variables in the face of parody attacks, but in opposite 
directions than predicted: feelings toward candidates, t (42) = 6.18, p < .01, (channel 
inoculation: M = 48.93, SD = 19.53; control: M = 58.17, SD = 16.72); attitudes toward 
candidates, t (43) = 6.47, p < .01, (channel inoculation: M = 4.10, SD = 1.12; control: M = 
5.07, SD = 0.75); perceived candidate competence, t (43) = 6.44, p < .01, (channel 
inoculation: M = 4.51, SD = 1.51; control: M = 5.54, SD = 0.84); perceived candidate 
character, t (43) = 7.08, p < .01, (channel inoculation: M = 4.55, SD = 1.17; control: M = 
5.40, SD = 0.74); perceived candidate sociability, t (43) = 6.13, p < .01, (channel 
inoculation: M = 4.33, SD = 1.41; control: M = 5.25, SD = 0.93); and attitude confidence, 
t (43) = 4.05, p < .01, (channel inoculation: M = 44.67, SD = 23.94; control: M = 59.20, 
SD = 24.62). 
Hypothesis 17 was supported for only one dependent variable, attitude 
confidence, and only for the monologue condition. Not only did channel inoculation 
treatments fail to confer resistance to comedic attacks on other variables, but also there is 
evidence that channel inoculation treatments backfired in the face of parody attacks.
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Hypothesis 18
Hypothesis 18 predicted that channel inoculation treatments would also protect 
against conventional political attacks. Results of planned comparisons failed to support 
this hypothesis, in terms of: feelings toward candidates, F (1,207) = 0.38, p > .10; 
perceived candidate competence, F (1,207) = 0.05, p > .10; perceived candidate 
character, F (1,207) = 1.42, p > .10; and perceived candidate sociability, F (1,207) = 
0.76, p > .10. However, there were two nearly significant results for channel inoculation 
against conventional attacks: on general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,207) = 2.06, p
< .10, eta2 = .01, and on attitude confidence, F (1,207) = 2.10, p < .10, eta2 = .01. 
Direction of effects on general attitudes toward candidates was as predicted, with channel 
inoculation resulting in more positive general attitudes toward candidates after attack, 
(channel inoculation: M = 4.24, SD = 1.32; control: M = 3.84, SD = 1.56). But the effect 
on attitude confidence was in the opposite direction than predicted, with channel 
inoculation resulting in less attitude confidence after attack, (channel inoculation: M = 
46.86, SD = 22.66; control: M = 56.68, SD = 30.86). (See Table 12). 
Hypothesis 18 was supported only in terms of general attitudes toward candidates, 
with channel inoculation treatments protecting against conventional attacks. However, 
channel inoculation treatments failed to confer resistance in terms of feelings toward 
candidates, perceptions of candidate competence, character or sociability, or attitude 
confidence. With attitude confidence, channel inoculation treatments backfired, resulting 
in weaker confidence than controls.
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Hypothesis 19
Hypothesis 19 posited that channel inoculation would be most effective with (a) 
those of lower political interest, (b) those of lower political knowledge, and (c) female 
viewers. 
As previously reported, there was a significant omnibus effect for political 
interest, F (6,208) = 6.47, p < .01, R2 = .16, and subsequent significant univariate results 
on the dependent variables of perceived candidate sociability, F (1,207) = 5.22, p < .05, 
eta2 = .02, and attitude confidence, F (1,207) = 18.56, p < .01, eta2 = .07. However, 
valences of these two effects were positive, indicating those with higher political interest 
were more influenced. Hypothesis 19(a) was not supported. 
Hypotheses 19(b) and 19(c) were not supported, with no significant omnibus 
effects of political knowledge, F (6,208) = 0.47, p = .83, p > .10, or gender, F (6,208) = 
1.19, p = .31, p > .10. 
Overall, Hypothesis 19 was not supported. Channel inoculation was most 
effective for those with higher, instead of lower, political interest. Political knowledge 
and gender did not affect channel inoculation effects.
Omnibus and Univariate Analysis for Hypothesis 20
To assess booster effects of candidate appearances on channel inoculation 
treatments, a 2 (experimental treatment condition: channel inoculation and no 
inoculation) X 2 (gender: male and female) MANCOVA was computed on 6 dependent 
variables: feelings toward candidates at Phase 3, general attitudes toward candidates at 
Phase 3, perceived candidate competence, character and sociability at Phase 3, and 
attitude confidence at Phase 3. Initial attitudes toward candidates, political interest, and 
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political knowledge functioned as covariates. Results indicated significant omnibus effect 
for the covariate of initial attitudes toward candidates, F (6,31) = 3.80, p < .01, R2 = .42, 
and a significant omnibus effect for the interaction between experimental condition and 
gender, F (6,31) = 2.74, p < .05, R2 = .35. 
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitudes toward candidates on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F
(1,36) = 21.06, p < .01, eta2 = .29, general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,36) = 12.90, 
p < .01, eta2 = .20, perceived candidate competence, F (1,36) = 13.13, p < .01, eta2 = .22, 
perceived candidate character, F (1,36) = 19.56, p < .01, eta2 = .24, perceived candidate 
sociability, F (1,36) = 5.00, p < .05, eta2 = .10, and attitude confidence, F (1,36) = 9.70, p
< .01, eta2 = .15; of an interaction between experimental condition and gender on the 
dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F (1,36) = 10.39, p < .01, eta2 = .14, 
general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,36) = 5.58, p < .05, eta2 = .09, perceived 
candidate competence, F (1,36) = 6.45, p < .05, eta2 = .11, perceived candidate character, 
F (1,36) = 12.76, p < .01, eta2 = .16, perceived candidate sociability, F (1,36) = 5.01, p < 
.05, eta2 = .10, and attitude confidence, F (1,36) = 11.90, p < .01, eta2 = .18. Planned 
comparisons were computed to further assess the pattern of means.
Hypothesis 20: Candidate Appearances as Boosters 
Hypothesis 20
Hypothesis 20 predicted that, for those who receive an inoculation pretreatment 
that warns of a specific channel’s influence (late night comedy), as compared to those 
who do not, candidate appearances confer resistance to conventional attack messages.
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More specifically, Hypotheses 20(a) predicted that channel inoculation treatments 
and candidate appearances confer resistance in terms of feelings toward candidates. 
Results of planned comparisons supported this prediction, with those receiving a channel 
inoculation treatment and then viewing candidate appearances indicating more positive 
feelings toward candidates when compared to those only viewing candidate appearances, 
F (1,36) = 3.18, p < .01, eta2 = .04, (channel inoculation plus appearance: M = 59.23, SD
= 27.22; channel only: M = 48.28, SD = 25.97). 
Hypothesis 20(b) predicted that channel inoculation treatments and candidate 
appearances confer resistance in terms of general attitudes toward candidates. While 
planned comparisons failed to reveal significance, F (1,36) = 1.52, p > .10, a post hoc test 
indicated significant effects, whereas those receiving channel inoculation treatments and 
candidate appearances indicating higher general attitudes toward candidates than those 
receiving only a channel inoculation, t (45) = 2.50, p < .05, (channel inoculation plus 
appearance: M = 4.65, SD = 1.77; channel only: M = 4.20, SD = 1.36). (See Table 13).
Hypothesis 20(c) posited that channel inoculation treatments and candidate 
appearances confer resistance in terms of perceptions of candidate competence. Planned 
comparisons failed to reveal support for this prediction, F (1,36) = 0.02, p > .10. 
Hypothesis 20(d) predicted that channel inoculation treatments and candidate 
appearances confer resistance in terms of perceptions of candidate character. While a 
planned comparison failed to reveal significance, F (1,36) = 1.06, p > .10, a post hoc test 
revealed a significant effect, such that those who received channel inoculation treatments 
and viewed candidate appearances indicated more positive perceptions of candidate 
character than those receiving only channel inoculation treatments, t (45) = 2.12, p < .05, 
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(channel inoculation plus inoculation: M = 4.80, SD = 1.76; channel only: M = 4.46, SD = 
1.38). (See Table 13).
Hypotheses 20(e) and 20(f) posited that channel inoculation treatments and 
candidate appearances confer resistance in terms of perceived candidate sociability and 
attitude confidence. Results of planned comparisons failed to support these predictions: 
perceived sociability, F (1,36) = 0.45, p > .10, and attitude confidence, F (1,36) = 0.00, p
> .10. 
Hypothesis 20 was supported in terms of feelings toward candidates, general 
attitudes toward candidates, and perceptions of candidate character, with channel 
inoculation enhancing the inoculative effect of candidate appearances when compared to 
those only viewing candidate appearances. 
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypotheses 21-23
To assess effects of inoculation treatments on elicited irritation, a 2 (experimental 
treatment condition: inoculation and no inoculation) X 2 (source of attack: comedy or no 
comedy) X 2 (gender: male and female) MANCOVA was computed on 4 dependent 
variables: elicited irritation at Phase 2, and perceptions of competence, character and 
sociability of the source of a counterattitudinal message at Phase 2. Results failed to 
indicate significant omnibus effects, but because theory warranted the predictions, 
planned comparisons were computed to further assess the means (Huberty & Morris, 
1989). 
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Hypotheses 21-23: Irritation
Hypothesis 21
Hypothesis 21 posited that, for people who receive an inoculation pretreatment, as 
compared to those who do not, inoculation messages elicit greater irritation upon 
encountering counterattitudinal messages. Results did not support this prediction, F
(1,185) = 0.39, p > .10. (See Table 14). 
Hypothesis 22
Hypothesis 22 predicted that, for those inoculated, counterattitudinal messages 
with humor elicit less irritation than counterattitudinal messages without humor. Results 
of planned comparisons failed to support this prediction, F (1,185) = 1.82, p > .10. Post 
hoc tests failed to indicate significant effects for monologues, but indicated significant 
effects for parodies, t (65) = 3.39, p < .01, (parody: M = 1.98, SD = 1.74; conventional 
attack: M = 2.59, SD = 1.28). (See Table 15). Hypothesis 22 was partially supported, with 
parodies eliciting less irritation than humorless attack messages for those inoculated.
Hypothesis 23
Hypothesis 23 posited that, for those inoculated, sources of counterattitudinal 
messages who use humor are perceived more positively than sources who do not use 
humor. Results of planned comparisons failed to reveal significant effects on perceived 
competence, F (1,185) = 0.33, p > .10, perceived character, F (1,185) = 0.02, p > .10, or 
perceived sociability, F (1,185) = 1.50, p > .10. Post hoc tests failed to indicate 
significant effects for parodies, but revealed significant effects for monologues on 
perceived competence, t (64) = 3.45, p < .01, (monologue: M = 4.55, SD = 0.96; 
conventional attack: M = 4.17, SD = 1.08), and on perceived sociability, t (64) = 4.36, p < 
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.01, (monologue: M = 4.50, SD = 0.97; conventional attack: M = 4.02, SD = 0.89). (See 
Table 16). Hypothesis 23 was partially supported, with sources of attack messages that 
use humor perceived more positively than sources of attack messages that do not, but 
only in the monologue condition.
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypotheses 24-25
To assess effects of inoculation treatments on conventional attack messages, a 
MANCOVA with experimental condition (inoculation and no inoculation) as the 
between-subjects factor was computed on 10 dependent variables: feelings toward 
candidates, general attitudes toward candidates, perceived candidate competence, 
perceived candidate character, perceived candidate sociability, attitude confidence, 
intentions to seek more information, intentions to talk to others about candidates, 
intentions to contribute time or money, and intentions to vote for candidates. Initial 
attitudes toward candidates functioned as a covariate. Results indicated a significant 
omnibus effect for the covariate of initial attitude, F (10,54) = 7.20, p < .01, R2 = .57. 
Subsequent univariate tests revealed significant effects for the covariate of initial 
attitude on the dependent variables of feelings toward candidates, F (1,63) = 36.49, p < 
.01, eta2 = .34, general attitude toward candidates, F (1,63) = 56.14, p < .01, eta2 = .45, 
perceived candidate competence, F (1,63) = 14.51, p < .01, eta2 = .18, perceived 
candidate character, F (1,63) = 47.88, p < .01, eta2 = .42, perceived candidate sociability, 
F (1,63) = 10.28, p < .01, eta2 = .14, and intentions to vote for candidates, F (1,63) = 
12.48, p < .01, eta2 = .15. 
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Though omnibus results failed to indicate significance for experimental condition, 
because theory warranted the predictions, planned comparisons were computed to further 
assess the pattern of means (Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
Hypotheses 24-25: Inoculating against Conventional Attacks
Hypothesis 24
Hypothesis 24 posited that, for those who receive inoculation pretreatments, as 
compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance to political attack 
messages. 
More specifically, Hypotheses 24(a), 24(b), 24(c), and 24(d) predicted that, for 
those who receive inoculation pretreatments, as compared to those who do not, 
inoculation messages confer resistance to political attack messages, manifested in 
feelings toward candidates, general attitudes toward candidates, perceptions of candidate 
competence, and perceptions of candidate sociability. Results of planned comparisons 
supported these predictions. Those inoculated and then encountering political attack 
messages indicated more positive feelings toward candidates, F (1,63) = 5.35, p < .01, 
eta2 = .05, (treatment: M = 57.06, SD = 20.35; control: M = 47.14, SD = 23.07), more 
positive general attitudes toward candidates, F (1,63) = 5.50, p < .01, eta2 = .04, 
(treatment: M = 4.44, SD = 1.24; control: M = 3.84, SD = 1.56), more positive 
perceptions of candidate competence, F (1,63) = 2.91, p < .05, eta2 = .03, (treatment: M = 
4.88, SD = 1.12; control: M = 4.43, SD = 1.25), and more positive perceptions of 
candidate character, F (1,63) = 4.08, p < .01, eta2 = .03, (treatment: M = 4.64, SD = 1.09; 
control: M = 4.20, SD = 1.21). (See Table 17). 
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Hypothesis 24(e) and 24(f) posited that, for those who receive inoculation 
pretreatments, as compared to those who do not, inoculation messages confer resistance 
to political attack messages, manifested in perceived candidate sociability and attitude 
confidence. Results failed to support these predictions: perceived candidate sociability, F
(1,63) = 0.44, p > .10, and attitude confidence, F (1,63) = 0.38 p > .10.
Overall, with exceptions of perceived candidate sociability and attitude 
confidence, Hypothesis 24 was supported. Inoculation conferred resistance to 
conventional political attack messages, manifested in feelings toward candidates, general 
attitudes toward candidates, and perceived candidate competence and character.
Hypothesis 25
Hypothesis 25 predicted that inoculation treatments enhance the likelihood of 
political participatory behaviors.
More specifically, Hypothesis 25(a) and 25(b) predicted that inoculation 
treatments enhance the likelihood of seeking more information about candidates and 
talking to others about candidates. Results failed to offer support for these predictions: 
seeking more information about candidates, F (1,63) = 0.84, p > .10, and talking to others 
about candidates, F (1,63) = 0.12, p > .10. 
Hypothesis 25(c) and 25(d) posited that inoculation treatments enhance the 
likelihood of contributing time or money to candidates and voting for candidates. Results 
supported these predictions. Those inoculated and encountering political attack messages 
indicating higher intentions of contributing time or money to candidates, F (1,63) = 3.04, 
p < .01, eta2 = .04, (treatment: M = 7.16, SD = 14.84; control: M = 2.00, SD = 7.19), and 
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higher intentions of voting for candidates, F (1,63) = 3.47, p < .01, eta2 = .04, (treatment: 
M = 29.24, SD = 34.05; control: M = 16.00, SD = 27.75). (See Table 17). 
In sum, Hypothesis 25 was partially supported. Inoculation treatments had no 
significant effects on intentions to seek more information or talk to others about 
candidates, but did enhance behavioral intentions in the face of political attack messages 
in terms of contributing time or money and voting for candidates. 
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypothesis 26
To assess effects of forewarnings on elicited threat, a MANCOVA was computed 
with the between-subjects factor of type of inoculation treatment (single forewarning and 
double forewarning) for those participants encountering conventional attack messages at 
Phases 2 and 3 on 3 dependent variables: elicited threat at Phase 1, elicited threat at Phase 
2, and elicited threat at Phase 3. There was a significant omnibus effect of experimental 
condition, F (3,29) = 4.19, p < .05, R2 = .30. Subsequent univariate tests revealed 
significant effects of experimental condition on the dependent variables of elicited threat 
at Phase 1, F (1,31) = 5.38, p < .05, R2 = .15, elicited threat at Phase 2, F (1,31) = 8.06, p
< .01, R2 = .21, and elicited threat at Phase 3, F (1,31) = 8.78, p < .01, R2 = .22. Planned 
comparisons were computed on these significant omnibus and univariate results to further 
assess the pattern of means.
Hypotheses 26-27: Forewarning and Threat
Hypothesis 26
Hypothesis 26 predicted that inoculation pretreatment messages that contain 
another forewarning after the refutations of counterarguments (double forewarning) elicit 
and maintain greater threat than those inoculation pretreatment messages that contain 
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only one forewarning prior to the refutations (single forewarning). Results of planned 
comparisons supported this prediction. Double forewarning inoculation treatment 
messages immediately elicited more threat directly following the message, F  (1,31) = 
7.79, p < .01, eta2 = .21, (double: M = 3.17, SD = 1.08; single: M = 2.24, SD = 0.94), 
more threat after encountering a conventional political attack message, F (1,33) = 6.57, p
< .01, eta2 = .17 (double: M = 3.14, SD = 1.19; single: M = 2.22, SD = 1.14), and more 
threat after encountering a second conventional political attack message, F (1,33) = 
11.59, p < .01, eta2 = .29, (double: M = 3.15, SD = 1.27; single: M = 1.95, SD = 0.69). 
(See Table 18). Overall, Hypothesis 26 was supported. Inoculation messages with double 
forewarnings elicit and maintain more threat. 
Hypothesis 27
Hypothesis 27 predicted a positive correlation between elicited threat and 
conferred resistance, such that double-forewarning messages confer more resistance than 
single-forewarning inoculation treatment messages. Correlation results failed to indicate 
any significant correlations between elicited threat and conferred resistance.
Omnibus and Univariate Analyses for Hypothesis 28
To assess effects of inoculation on perceived generalized self-efficacy, a 
MANCOVA was computed with the between-subjects factor of experimental condition 
(inoculation and no inoculation) on 2 dependent variables: perceived self-efficacy at 
Phase 1 and perceived self-efficacy at Phase 2. Results failed to indicate significant 
omnibus effects for experimental condition, but because theory warranted the predictions, 
planned comparisons were computed to further assess means (Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
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Hypothesis 28: Perceived Generalized Self-Efficacy
Hypothesis 28
Hypothesis 28 posited that inoculation enhances participants’ perceptions of 
generalized perceived self-efficacy. Results failed to indicated significant effects on 
perceived self-efficacy immediately following inoculation treatments, F (1,69) = 0.51, p
> .10. Results revealed significant effects on perceived self-efficacy following a 
conventional political attack, F (1,72) = 2.51, p < .05, eta2 = .03, but the direction was 
opposite than predicted (treatment: M = 3.28, SD = 0.44; control: M = 3.44, SD = 0.39). 
(See Table 19). 
Hypothesis 28 was not supported. Not only did results fail to reveal significant 
differences in perceived generalized self-efficacy immediately following inoculation 
treatments, but perceived self-efficacy was significantly lower for those inoculated 
following a conventional attack. 
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Chapter 7
Discussion
While campaign managers, staffers and journalists have long maintained that late 
night comedy impacts political image (e.g., Kurtz, 1999; Sella, 2000, Weintraub, 2000), 
evidence for late night comedy’s effects has been largely anecdotal, leading researchers 
to call for scholarship addressing impacts of late night comedy (Cooper & Bates, 2003; 
Niven et al., 2003; Pfau et al., 2001; Young, 2003a, 2003b). Conventional wisdom 
suggests that monologues and parodies are assumed to hurt candidates, and candidate 
appearances are thought to help them. But as Kathleen Hall Jamieson, political 
communication scholar and director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, observed: 
“It's very tricky to figure out the hidden inferences, whether someone is helped or hurt 
[by late night political comedy]” (as cited in Rainey, 2004). 
This investigation examined effects of late night monologue content, political 
parodies, and candidate appearances on attitudes toward candidates and political 
behavioral intentions. This investigation also examined the efficacy of inoculation 
treatments both against and with late night comedy content. Multivariate analyses and 
planned comparisons confirmed political late night comedy’s power to influence 
attitudes, demonstrated that distinct types of late night comedy have different effects, and 
revealed important implications of using conventional inoculation treatments both 
against late night ridicule (monologues and parodies) or with late night comedy 
(candidate appearances). Results of this investigation also underscore Jamieson’s 
observation: effects of late night comedy on political attitudes and behavioral intentions 
sometimes contrast conventional wisdom. One of the most important overall findings of 
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this study is that politicians are both helped and hurt by late night political humor, 
depending on type of comedy and interactions with conventional inoculation treatment 
messages.
Effects of Late Night Comedy on Political Attitudes
One of the most important findings of this study is the confirmation that political 
late night comedic content influences political attitudes. As politicians, consultants, and 
media observers have speculated, political late night comedy influences images of 
political candidates, whether the politicians are the targets of (e.g., monologue jokes and 
parodies), or participants in (candidate appearances), the late night ridicule. However, 
some effects are in opposite directions than many have speculated.
It was predicted that monologue and political parody content would have 
detrimental effects on feelings and attitudes toward candidates and their images, whereas 
candidate appearances would enhance feelings and attitudes toward candidates. 
Multivariate analyses and subsequent planned comparisons revealed that 
monologues and candidate appearances functioned as predicted. Monologues derogated 
feelings toward candidates, and candidate appearances bolstered attitudes, attitude 
confidence, and perceptions of candidate competence, character, and sociability. 
Monologues functioned as predicted in regard to their effects on feelings toward 
candidates, exemplifying Speier’s (1998) observation: “The political joke as a weapon is 
pragmatic: it inflicts wounds” (Speier, 1998, p. 1358).  Monologues often contain sharp 
political barbs (Berke, 2000; Davis & Owen, 1998), and focus on candidate image over 
issues (Amundson & Lichter, 1988; Dye et al., 1992; Niven, et al., 2003). The results of 
this study support Jamieson and Waldman’s (2003) argument that late night comedic 
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content can derogate political image. In terms of feelings toward politicians, late night 
comedy monologue jokes damage political image.
While monologue content damages feelings toward candidates, there were no 
observed impacts of monologue jokes on general attitudes toward candidates, or on 
perceptions of candidate competence, character, or sociability. While it is possible that 
monologue attacks only derogate feelings toward candidates, another explanation is the 
timing of this investigation. Political observers note that it takes time for late night 
comedy to “catch up” to front-runners and for late night television comedians to hone 
their jokes toward specific attributes. In late May of 2004, long after John Kerry became 
the presumptive Democratic party nominee, Rob Burnett, executive producer for Late 
Night with David Letterman, lamented that Kerry had provided “no great material yet. It 
will happen; it just hasn’t happened yet” (as cited in Rainey, 2004). Jay Leno offered a 
similar observation about John Kerry, noting that his late night comedy caricature had yet 
to be solidified (Rainey, 2004). Future investigations may reveal stronger effects for 
monologue ridicule later in campaigns, when jokes become more barbed. Nevertheless, 
that this study found significant derogation of feelings toward candidates, even in the 
early stages of primary elections, suggests that monologue ridicule is quite powerful.
In summary, late night monologue political content derogates feelings toward 
candidates, but there is no evidence of impacts on general attitudes or perceptions of 
candidate competence, character or sociability. Whether similar results would be revealed 
later in a campaign, when late night monologue jokes become more frequent and more 
abrasive, is unknown and should be the focus of future investigations. 
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As predicted, and consistent with speculation of campaign managers, candidate 
appearances were effective means of enhancing perceptions of candidate image. 
Contrasting the ancient political philosophy of Emperor Louis the Pious, who “never … 
allowed his white teeth to be bared in laughter” (as cited in Innes, 2002, p. 133), and 
more recently, Senator Thomas Corwin’s advice to “never make people laugh,” (as cited 
in Schutz, 1977, p. 24), participating in political humor has both immediate and longer-
term benefits for politicians (Moy et al., 2004). 
More specifically, the study revealed that candidate appearances had immediate 
positive impacts on general attitudes toward candidates and on all three levels of 
candidate image: competence, character and sociability. These benefits reflect the 
observation that politicians using humor are perceived as more personable (Nilsen, 1990), 
and sociable (Schutz, 1977), and complement Lyttle’s (2001) experimental research that 
found sources of humor to be perceived as more competent and trustworthy. Results of 
this study suggest that appearing on late night comedy programming has immediate 
benefits for candidate image, and candidates would be wise to take advantage of such 
opportunities.
However, while monologues and candidate appearances functioned largely as 
predicted, with minimal negative impacts of monologue content and widespread positive 
effects of candidate appearance, multivariate analyses and subsequent planned 
comparisons revealed that late night parody content functioned opposite than predicted. 
There were significant effects of late night political parody content, but instead of 
derogating candidate image, parodies bolstered general attitudes toward candidates, and 
parodies enhanced perceptions of candidate competence, character, and sociability.
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Parodies were expected to harm candidates’ images. Employing a mixture of 
satire, parody and mimicry, the ridicule of late night comedy variety shows were 
predicted to derogate viewers’ feelings and attitudes toward candidates. One journalist 
called SNL’s political parodies “devastating” (Peyser, 2000), and viewers have admitted 
learning information about politics from such programming (“Cable and Internet loom 
large,” 2004), including becoming aware of politicians’ faults (Downey & Earle, 2000). 
However, the results of this investigation indicate that political parodies actually enhance, 
instead of derogate, candidate image. Instead of having devastating effects, late night 
political parody content has enhancing effects. 
One explanation for why political parodies failed to derogate candidate image is 
the nature of the comedic material itself. Saturday Night Live does not typically contain 
political attacks as harsh as those found in monologue jokes (Smith & Voth, 2002), and 
SNL producer Lorne Michaels, referring to the work of one of SNL’s political parody 
writers, called the parodies “gentle, not vicious” (cited in Peyser, 2000, p. 38). Viewers 
may have viewed the parody material as good-natured, innocent humor, instead of serious 
political argumentation. However, while this explanation is consistent with why parody 
content failed to derogate candidate image, it does not address why parody content 
enhanced candidate image. 
The explanation for parody’s positive effects may instead by found in the nature 
of humorous messages. Though the candidates themselves were not appearing in the 
parodies used in this investigation, and instead, were being portrayed by other actors, 
candidates may have benefited from the deprecating humor (Schutz, 1977). Instead of 
self-deprecating humor, political late night comedy parodies may instead offer pseudo-
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self-deprecating humor. While personal appearances on late night comedy talk shows 
have been lauded for their ability to help candidate images (Smith & Voth, 2002), results 
of this investigation suggest that the candidates themselves do not even need to show up, 
but instead, can reap benefits from being parodied.
Additionally, it was predicted that late night comedy’s effects would be more 
pronounced for those of lower political knowledge, lower political interest, or female 
viewers. However, multivariate analyses did not support these predictions. There were no 
differences between those with lower and higher political knowledge or male and female 
viewers related to the late night comedy content. While there were differences between 
those with lower and higher political interest, but the direction was opposite than 
predicted. Those with higher political interest were more impacted by the late night 
political content. These results suggest that while late night comedy may be more 
entertaining to lower political interest viewers when compared to other types of political 
messages (West & Orman, 2003), those with higher political interest are more impacted 
by political content. 
Results reveal that late night comedy affects political attitudes, offering a more 
nuanced understanding of effects on candidate image. Though research reveals effects of 
late night comedy regardless of political affiliation (Baum, 2002b), future research should 
examine late night comedy effects with candidates of other political affiliations as well. 
Inoculating Against Late Night Comedy
Aware of late night comedy’s popularity and increasingly political content, 
contemporary campaign managers have expressed dismay and hopelessness in protecting 
against comical, unconventional late night attacks. David Ginsberg, research director for 
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Al Gore’s 2000 bid for the presidency, bemoaned late night comedy’s perceived impacts: 
“Once something makes the leap from news to the late night shows, it’s completely out of 
your hands” (as cited in Jamieson & Waldman, 2003, p. 48). This investigation assessed 
inoculation’s efficacy in the face of late night comedy attacks as a way to preempt 
ridicule. While inoculation had not been assessed in the face of such unconventional 
political attack, McGuire (1964) and others purported that inoculation could work against 
“any persuasive message…with or without its conclusions explicitly drawn” (p. 192). 
Additionally, inoculation has been found to effectively protect candidate image in 
political contexts against written messages (e.g., Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 2001) 
television advertisements (An & Pfau, 2004a), and political debates (An & Pfau, 2004b). 
Thus, it was predicted that inoculation treatments could also successfully confer 
resistance to late night political content. However, multivariate analyses and planned 
comparisons indicate that inoculation is not very successful against late night political 
attacks. Not only did inoculation fail to confer resistance to comedic attacks on all but 
one indicator, but also in some respects, post hoc tests revealed that inoculation actually 
backfired. These results clarify an observation offered by Pfau and colleagues (1997a): 
“[I]t is difficult to specify the precise circumstances (e.g., contexts, topics, message 
approaches, and receivers) in which inoculation is an appropriate approach,” (p. 190-
191). In this study, late night comedic political attacks thwarted resistance conferred by 
inoculation against conventional political messages.
Against parody and monologue content, inoculation failed to confer resistance 
nearly across the board. However, there was one exception. Planned comparisons 
revealed a significant effect of inoculation against monologue content in terms of 
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intentions to share with other people the monologue jokes they heard about candidates. 
While this finding may at first appear insignificant in the context of absence of effects on 
the other measures of resistance, diminishing intentions to repeat late night monologue 
jokes should not be underestimated. Nearly eight out of ten people report talking about 
things they hear on the Late Show with David Letterman with their friends, and one out of 
two reveal that they talk to family members about late night content (Schaefer & Avery, 
1993). Research indicates that word-of-mouth communication affects attitudes toward 
candidates (Chaffee & Cho, 1980; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1991; Pfau, Diedrich, Larson, & 
Van Winkle, 1995; Popkin, 1991), with people particularly motivated to spread negative 
information (Lau & Ng, 2001; Smith & Vogt, 1995). That inoculation decreases 
intentions to share jokes ridiculing candidates may help contain the potential damage of 
monologue ridicule, particularly considering the negative effects of monologue content 
on feelings toward candidates.
With parody content, inoculation not only failed, but also backfired. Post hoc tests 
indicated that inoculating against parody content boomeranged in terms of feelings 
toward candidates; general attitudes toward candidates; perceptions of candidate 
competence, character, and sociability; and attitude confidence. Inoculation also 
backfired against parody content in terms of two behavioral intentions: voting for 
candidates and telling others positive things about candidates. Not only did inoculation 
fail to confer resistance to parody ridicule, but the combination of inoculation and parody 
content damaged candidate image and behavioral support for candidates more than 
parody content alone.
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Why would inoculation fail to confer resistance, and instead, backfire, with late 
night comedic ridicule, and specifically, parody content? Although it was predicted that 
counterarguing output would be diminished for those encountering late night comedy 
when compared to those encountering conventional attack messages, multivariate results 
and subsequent planned comparisons failed to support this prediction. Those 
encountering comedic attacks generate the same number of counterarguments and 
refutations as those encountering conventional attacks. The explanation for this 
boomerang effect must lie elsewhere.
Inoculation’s failure to confer resistance, and even backfire, may instead be 
explained by the contrasting effect of serious and humorous treatments of the same topic. 
Powell (1975, 1977) found that exposure to parody content about a candidate protected 
against subsequent conventional, non-humorous political argumentation. He posited that 
the reason for the inoculative effect of parody was the contrast between humorous and 
non-humorous treatments of the candidates. When a non-humorous message follows a 
humorous message, the response may be to reject the non-humorous source because it 
fails to entertain and instead, seems to treat the issue too seriously. A similar effect may 
be responsible for inoculation’s inefficacy against comedic material, but in a different 
chronological order than that studied by Powell. In this current investigation, individuals 
received a conventional inoculation treatment (non-humorous) and later, encountered a 
comedic attack. The contrast between the two may have caused individuals to reject the 
argumentation from the inoculation treatment message, post hoc, after encountering a 
humorous treatment. 
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Another explanation for inoculation’s failure to confer resistance, and in some 
respects, boomerang, may be found in the perceptions of the attack message. Wan and 
Pfau (2004) investigated the use of inoculation to preempt public relations crises, 
comparing an inoculation strategy, an image-promotion strategy, and a combination 
strategy that employed both inoculation and image-promotion. In an image-promotion 
strategy, a company’s positive attributes are emphasized to create a “reservoir of 
goodwill” before a crisis occurs. Wan and Pfau’s investigation confirmed the efficacy of 
all three approaches, but also revealed that if a crisis does not occur, an image-promotion 
strategy is superior. Wan and Pfau’s results may be helpful in understanding why 
inoculation backfired when used against parody content. Individuals may not have 
considered the parody content to be a serious attack against the candidate. Political humor 
cloaks arguments in the veneer of acceptable, entertaining messages (Combs & Nimmo, 
1996; Whaley & Holloway, 1997), and people often fail to defend against humorous 
argumentation (Speier, 1998). It is possible that those encountering parody content did 
not perceive the messages as strong attacks, and as a result, image was derogated. 
At this point, there can be only speculation as to why inoculation failed to confer 
resistance to comedic argumentation, and with parodies, boomeranged. Future research 
should assess how individuals process and interpret late night comedic material to better 
understand how to preempt its potential damage. Nevertheless, results of this study 
suggest that candidates should not “make a big deal” out of the ridicule found in late 
night comedy television, like Saturday Night Live, in efforts to preempt its damage. 
Finally, it was predicted that inoculation’s effects would be more pronounced 
with those of higher political interest, higher political knowledge, and males. Multivariate 
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analyses indicated that inoculation effects were more pronounced with those of higher 
political interest, but there were no significant differences with political knowledge or 
gender. With political knowledge, the measurement instrument may have been at least 
partly responsible for the null findings. 
While the differences between those with higher and lower political interest were 
predicted, the rationale underscoring the prediction was not supported. It was reasoned 
that because late night comedy would be more influential on those with lower political 
interest, inoculation would be more successful with those with higher political interest. 
However, as previously reported, late night comedy had greater impacts on those with 
higher political interest. It is feasible that just as higher political interest motivated 
individuals to attend more closely to the political content of late night comedy, political 
interest also motivated individuals to attend more closely to the content of the inoculation 
treatment messages. Further research should investigate both how and why political 
interest moderates effects of inoculation treatments.
Inoculating With Late Night Comedy
If conventional inoculation treatments fail to confer resistance, and with parody 
content, run the risk of backfiring, what options do candidates have against late night 
ridicule? One option proposed in this investigation was to use late night comedy itself. To 
paraphrase a familiar refrain, perhaps candidates can fight funny with funny. Extant 
evidence suggests that humorous treatments of politicians can effectively inoculate 
against non-humorous attacks (Powell, 1975, 1977). 
It was predicted that candidate appearances on late night television talk shows 
would inoculate against conventional attacks. However, while candidate appearances on 
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late night talk shows were effective in enhancing candidate image, multivariate analyses 
and subsequent planned comparisons indicated that candidate appearances were less 
effective in protecting against subsequent conventional attacks. There were no effects on 
general attitudes or perceptions of candidate competence, character or sociability. In 
terms of feelings toward candidates, those who viewed candidate appearances before 
being subjected to conventional attacks actually indicated less positive feelings toward 
candidates after the attack. 
However, planned comparisons revealed that candidate appearances were 
successful in derogating sources of counterattitudinal messages. Source derogation 
enhances resistance to attack messages (e.g., Stone, 1969; Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965). 
Consistent with Powell’s (1975, 1977) reasoning, after encountering humorous 
treatments of issues, messages that do not use humor may be perceived as less credible. 
Encountering serious, non-humorous attack messages against candidates, after seeing the 
candidate in the positive atmosphere of late night comedy, causes viewers to derogate the 
sources of counterattitudinal messages.
In summary, while candidate appearances have immediate impacts on candidate 
image, the image boost does not fare as well against conventional political attacks. 
However, viewing candidate appearances does derogate sources of counterattitudinal 
messages after encountering a conventional attack message. Candidates who appear on 
late night television comedy programs gain both an immediate image boost and more 
derogation of sources of subsequent attack messages.
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Inoculating with Late Night Comedy: Candidate Appearances as Booster Sessions
It was predicted that candidate appearances would be more successful in 
inoculating against subsequent attack messages when used in conjunction with 
conventional inoculation messages, compared to either treatment alone. 
While candidate appearances alone were only mildly effective in conferring 
resistance to conventional attacks by derogating sources of counterattitudinal messages, 
multivariate analyses and planned comparisons revealed that candidate appearances in 
conjunction with conventional inoculation treatments were superior to either method 
alone. The combination of candidate appearances and inoculation were superior to 
appearances alone in terms of feelings toward candidates, perceived candidate character 
and perceived candidate sociability. Thus, for optimal effects on candidate images, 
candidate appearances should be preceded with conventional inoculation messages. 
When used after conventional inoculation treatments, candidate appearances 
acted as “boosters,” an effect consistent with the medical analogy on which attitudinal 
inoculation is based. Just as medical inoculations often require additional treatments as 
the inoculative effect decays over time (Stahl & Liljeqvist, 2000), attitudinal inoculations 
should also be enhanced with boosters (Compton & Pfau, 2004c; Pfau et al., 1990). 
While extant findings on booster efficacy have been mixed, indicating limited, if any, 
effects (McGuire, 1961b; Pfau et al., 1990, 1992, 1997a, 2004b; Pfau & Van Bockern, 
1994; Tannenbaum et al., 1966), Pfau (1995) cautioned that these results should not be 
interpreted as disproving booster sessions’ efficacy. 
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Additionally, though it was predicted that candidate appearances would provide 
more of a booster for those with lower political interest, lower political knowledge, and 
females, multivariate analyses did not support this prediction. 
Results of this study are consistent with Pfau’s speculation that booster sessions 
may enhance inoculation more than presently realized. Candidate appearances acted as 
effective boosters to conventional inoculation treatment messages. The combination 
approach of inoculation followed by candidate appearances was superior to inoculation 
alone in terms of perceived candidate character, perceived sociability, attitude 
confidence, and derogating the sources of counterattitudinal messages in terms of their 
perceived competence or character. There were no differences in candidate appearances’ 
booster effects in terms of political knowledge, political interest, or gender.
These results offer intriguing implications for future inoculation research. Those 
studying the inoculation process of resistance have often expressed disappointment in the 
lack of evidence for booster effects (Pfau et al., 1990, 1992, 1997a; Pfau & Van Bockern, 
1994). This study reveals that employing unconventional boosters, instead of repeating 
another conventional inoculation message, holds particular promise. 
Inoculating with Late Night Comedy: Comedic Attacks Prior to Conventional Attacks
This investigation also assessed whether exposure to comedic attacks after 
conventional inoculation boosts inoculation against subsequent conventional attacks. 
Might there be a “double inoculation effect,” conferring resistance to comedic attacks and 
then conventional attacks? In the medical context, exposure to repeated viral or other 
offending agents often strengthens the body’s immunity (Nossal, 1999). Would similar 
effects occur with attitudinal inoculation?
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Multivariate analyses and subsequent planned comparisons and post hoc tests 
suggest that double inoculation can occur, but only against monologue content. Those 
inoculated, exposed to monologue content, and then exposed to a conventional attack 
indicated more positive perceptions of candidate character and candidate sociability. 
However, with feelings toward candidates, the opposite occurred, with those 
encountering monologue content before conventional attacks indicating less positive 
feelings toward candidates. 
Exposure to parody content before encountering conventional attack messages 
weakened the inoculative effects in terms of feelings toward candidates, general attitudes 
toward candidates, and perceptions of candidate competence. Instead of a “double 
inoculation” effect, encountering parody ridicule before conventional attacks weakens 
resistance.
Contrary to prediction, multivariate analyses indicated that effects of encountering 
comedic content prior to the conventional attack were not more pronounced with those of 
lower political interest, lower political knowledge, or female viewers. There were no 
differences in terms of political knowledge or gender, and the direction with political 
interest was opposite than predicted. Those higher in political interest were more 
influenced by the late night comedic content; this is consistent with findings reported 
earlier that those with higher political interest are more affected by political content. 
In sum, there is support for using multiple attacks to booster inoculative efficacy, 
but not without risk. In this investigation, exposure to monologue attacks prior to 
conventional attacks boosted inoculation on some variables, but exposure to parody 
attacks prior to conventional attacks weakened inoculation. It is likely that exposure to 
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parodies failed to boost inoculation for the same reasons inoculation failed to confer 
resistance to parody content. Parodies’ failures to boost inoculative effects against 
conventional attacks, in conjunction with earlier findings of inoculations’ failure to 
confer resistance to parody ridicule, suggests one clear and simple message: Inoculation 
and political parody don’t mix.
Channel Inoculation Treatments: Assessing the Size of the Blanket of Protection
Inoculation has proven effective in protecting against novel counterarguments—
arguments that are not specifically refuted in the treatment messages—in both early 
research (McGuire, 1961a, 1961b, 1962, 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962; 
Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961) and more contemporary research (Pfau, 1992; Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 1997a, 2001a, 2004b; Pfau et al., 2003). Pfau et al. 
(1990) termed this power of inoculation its “broad blanket of protection” (Pfau et al., 
1990). Yet, to date, the size of this blanket of protection is unclear. Inoculation can confer 
resistance to novel counterarguments, but how far does the protection spread?
To address this issue, our investigation was the first to assess inoculation 
messages designed to confer resistance to an entire channel—in this study, late night 
comedy television programming. Instead of warning of specific counterarguments and 
providing refutations as in conventional inoculation pretreatment messages, this study 
assessed the viability of a channel inoculation treatment. Channel inoculation messages 
warned of the potential effects of late night comedy, in general, to affect support for 
political candidates.
However, planned comparisons revealed that against comedic content 
(monologue and parody content combined), channel inoculation treatments not only 
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failed, but also backfired. Planned comparisons revealed that those receiving channel 
inoculation treatments and then encountering comedic content expressed lower feelings 
toward candidates, more negative general attitudes, and more negative perceptions of 
candidate competence, character and sociability. Just as conventional inoculation 
treatments failed to confer resistance, and instead, boomeranged against comedic content, 
channel inoculation treatments had similar effects. Presumably, channel inoculation 
treatments failed for the same reasons conventional inoculation treatments failed. 
Furthermore, closer examination of the effects of channel inoculation reveal 
indicative differences between channel inoculation’s efficacy against monologues and its 
efficacy against parody content. Post hoc tests revealed that against monologue content, 
channel inoculation worked as predicted to bolster attitude confidence. It was only 
against parody content that the channel inoculation treatments boomeranged. Notably, 
channel inoculation backfired against parody content on all six measured dependent 
variables: feelings; general attitudes; perceptions of competence, character, sociability; 
and attitude confidence. These results underscore previous findings that monologue and 
parody content function differently—both in terms of immediate effects on candidate 
image and in inoculation’s efficacy. Parody thwarts both conventional inoculation and
channel inoculation. 
Multivariate analyses revealed no differences in channel inoculations’ efficacy 
when comparing those with lower and higher political knowledge and female and male 
viewers. There were significant differences with political interest, but the direction was 
opposite than predicted. Those with higher political interest were more affected; this is 
138
consistent with findings reported earlier that political content is more influential with 
those of higher political interest. 
Because candidate appearances were able to boost conventional inoculation’s 
efficacy, the study also assessed whether candidate appearances could boost channel 
inoculation. Planned comparisons indicated that candidate appearances amplified channel 
inoculation in terms of feelings, general attitudes, and perceived candidate character. 
These results further highlight the viability of booster treatments working in conjunction 
with conventional inoculation treatments. 
Finally, as another test of the size of the blanket of resistance conferred by 
inoculation treatments, the study assessed whether channel inoculation treatments could 
confer resistance to conventional attacks. Inoculation treatments have established efficacy 
in conferring resistance to novel counterarguments, but could a treatment designed to 
undermine the channel of late night comedy television also confer resistance to another 
mode of attack? Results of planned comparisons indicated that they could, but only in 
terms of general attitudes toward candidates. On the variables of feelings and perceptions 
of competence, character and sociability, there were no effects, and the channel 
inoculation treatments diminished attitude confidence after exposure to conventional 
attacks. 
These results offer a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the size of the 
blanket of resistance conferred by inoculation treatments, answering calls by researchers 
to test the limits of inoculation’s conferred resistance (e.g., Compton & Pfau, 2004c). 
There was evidence of some success in using channel inoculation treatments—
inoculation messages designed to confer resistance to genres of attack instead of specific 
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argumentation. However, against comedic attacks, channel inoculation had similar effects 
to conventional inoculation: Limited efficacy against monologue content, and boomerang 
effects against parody content. Channel inoculation was most effective when used in 
conjunction with candidate appearances before exposure to the conventional attack. 
Interestingly, channel inoculation also conferred resistance to conventional attacks in 
terms of general attitudes toward candidates, reconfirming that inoculation’s conferred 
resistance is beyond the specific content refuted in the treatment message. As Pfau and 
Kenski (1990) noted, inoculation’s usefulness would be limited if it could only refute 
those attacks explicitly refuted in the treatment messages. If this were the case, one 
wanting to use inoculation would have to predict the arguments of the opposition, each 
and every time and with accuracy. However, results of this study reveal that inoculation’s 
power to confer resistance expands well beyond not only the arguments employed in the 
messages. Channel inoculation treatments did not raise or refute any of the arguments 
that were in the conventional attack, and the conventional attack was not of the genre 
warned about in the channel inoculation message. Yet, in spite of a lack of specific 
argumentation and a different mode of attack, these inoculation treatments conferred 
some resistance to the attack message. 
Inoculation, Elicited Irritation, and Comedic Material
Early inoculation research focused almost exclusively on cognitive processes 
involved in resistance (Compton & Pfau, 2004c; Pfau, 1997), mirroring a trend in social 
influence research (Dillard & Wilson, 1993). However, as Zuwerink and Devine (1996) 
observe, a nuanced understanding of persuasive dynamics requires assessments of 
affective as well as cognitive processes. More recent inoculation research has ventured 
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into the domain of affect, examining potential impacts of general positive and negative 
affect (Lee & Pfau, 1997), happiness and anger (Pfau et al., 2001a), and visually-invoked 
affect responses (Nabi, 2003). This study focused on another type of affect: irritation. 
While irritation may resemble anger (Compton & Pfau, 2004c), research suggests that 
irritation may be a distinct emotion that enhances resistance (Jacks & Devine, 2000; 
Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) and derogates sources of messages (Duncan & Nelson, 1985).   
In regard to irritation, multivariate analyses and subsequent planned comparisons 
failed to indicate any differences in those inoculated and those not inoculated upon 
encountering counterattitudinal messages. While Jacks and Devine (2000) and Zuwerink 
and Devine (1996) studied forewarning and not the inoculation process, their research 
suggests that elicited irritation enhances resistance. The absence of elicited irritation upon 
encountering counterattitudinal messages may help explain the failure of inoculation to 
confer resistance to the comedic argumentation of parodies and monologues. Indeed,
Jacks and Devine (2000) speculated this very conclusion, noting that “a few good jokes” 
(p. 29) may reduce irritation and hence, undermine resistance. 
When examining the separate conditions of conventional, monologue and parody 
attacks, significant differences emerge. Post hoc tests revealed that viewers of parody 
content indicated significantly lower irritation upon encountering counterattitudinal 
messages than those encountering a conventional political attack message. It is possible 
that inoculation failed to confer resistance to parody content because the humor lessened 
irritation (Jacks & Devine, 2000). 
Finally, post hoc tests also revealed that sources that use humor enhance both the 
perceived competence and sociability of sources of counterattitudinal messages. This 
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finding reflects earlier research that indicated an image boost for those using humor 
(Duncan & Nelson, 1985). 
In summary, humorous political content failed to elicit irritation, an affective 
response that enhances resistance to counterattitudinal messages. These findings may 
shed light on inoculation’s failure to confer resistance to humorous late night comedic 
messages. Further research should assess to what extent humor thwarts the inoculation 
process of resistance.
Inoculation’s Efficacy against Conventional Attacks: More Nuances of Inoculation
Inoculation has established efficacy in United States senatorial (Pfau & Burgoon, 
1988) and House of Representatives campaigns (Pfau et al., 2001a), presidential 
campaigns (Pfau et al., 1990, 2001a), state senatorial campaigns (Pfau et al., 2001a), and 
gubernatorial campaigns (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b). This study assessed inoculation’s 
efficacy during presidential primaries.
Planned comparisons revealed that, consistent with earlier inoculation research in 
political contexts, inoculation conferred resistance against conventional attacks during the 
primary campaigns. Inoculation was most effective in terms of attitudinal measures of 
resistance, with those inoculated indicating more positive feelings toward candidates, 
more positive general attitudes toward candidates, and more positive perceptions of 
candidate competence and character, after encountering a counterattitudinal message. 
Inoculation was also successful on two behavioral dimensions: intentions to donate time 
or money to campaigns and intentions to vote for candidates.
This study, in addition to inoculation research in the political realm spanning the 
last fifteen years (An & Pfau, 2004a, 2004b; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990, 
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2001a), suggests that politicians have another option beyond the conventional campaign 
strategies of bolstering, attacking, and refuting (Kaid & Davidson, 1986; Trent & 
Friedenberg, 1983) and can also inoculate, in a preemptive tactic, against political
attacks. 
This study also examined effects of forewarnings on elicited threat throughout the 
inoculation process of resistance. The use of forewarnings in conventional inoculation 
treatment messages is not new. McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) first incorporated an 
explicit forewarning into their inoculation messages and found that the addition of 
forewarning enhanced resistance. McGuire (1964) speculated that forewarning further 
motivates the individual to process the content included in the inoculation treatment 
message. Thus, with McGuire’s reasoning, the forewarning influences resistance during 
processing of the inoculation treatment message. 
However, threat is also assumed to play a role during the interim between the 
inoculation treatment and the subsequent attack (Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al., 2004a), 
continuing to motivate inoculated individuals to generate their own counterarguments and 
refutations. This explanatory suggests that forewarning continues to impact resistance 
beyond the initial reading of the inoculation message. 
Until this study, explicit forewarnings have been used at the beginning of 
inoculation messages, consistent with McGuire’s (1964) explanation that forewarnings 
motivate the processing of message. However, with this placement of forewarnings, 
reading refutations of counterarguments would seemingly assuage the motivating nature. 
Some research has found an immediate boost to attitude confidence (Compton & Pfau, 
2004a) and belief strength (Papageorgis & McGuire, 1962) immediately following 
143
inoculation treatment. Thus, this study assessed the use of double forewarning 
inoculation messages. These treatment messages included an initial forewarning and a 
concluding forewarning. Multivariate analyses and subsequent planned comparisons 
indicated that double forewarning messages elicited significantly more threat than single 
inoculation messages, including immediate elicited threat, elicited threat after a first 
attack, and elicited threat after a second attack. Remarkably, even weeks after the 
inoculation treatment, the double forewarning message continued to elicit more threat 
than the single forewarning message. This finding supports the idea that threat continues 
throughout the inoculation process, beyond initial processing of the inoculation treatment 
message (Pfau, 1997). However, there was no correlation between elicited threat and 
conferred resistance. While double forewarning messages elicited more threat, the 
increased threat did not affect resistance. Results of this study indicate that more threat 
does not necessarily mean more resistance. 
In summary, this study offers a more refined understanding of what elicits threat 
in an inoculation message and threat’s duration during resistance. Threat has played a 
pivotal role in the conventional explanation for how inoculation confers resistance, 
beginning with McGuire’s speculation in the early 1960s (McGuire, 1962; McGuire & 
Papageorgis, 1961) and continuing through contemporary inoculation research that has 
measured threat (e.g., Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 1992; Pfau et 
al., 1997a). Future research should continue to explore this component of inoculation, an 
element that may be “the most distinguishing feature of inoculation” (Pfau, 1997, p. 137).
This study also assessed impacts of inoculation on perceived generalized self-
efficacy. Contrary to prediction, inoculation treatments did not enhance perceived 
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generalized self-efficacy. Multivariate analyses and subsequent planned comparisons 
failed to support the predicted effects on self-efficacy. There was no significant 
difference in perceived self-efficacy immediately following inoculation. Furthermore, 
after the attitude attack, those inoculated indicated significantly lower levels of perceived 
generalized self-efficacy. If inoculation had failed to confer resistance to the attack 
messages, this effect on generalized self-efficacy would be more explicable. However, 
inoculation was successful against these messages. Why would effective inoculation 
treatment messages lessen perceived generalized self-efficacy after an attitude attack?
Elicited threat may account for this effect on self-efficacy. McGuire considered 
threat to be “shock value” (McGuire, 1961a), or the recognition that an attitude is 
vulnerable after encountering counterarguments in the inoculation message. Forewarning 
elicits even more threat than the implicit threat generated by counterarguments alone 
(McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962). Thus, irrespective of the effectiveness of an inoculation 
treatment, inoculation treatment messages elicit threat, or recognition of vulnerability. 
Elicited threat may be responsible for the dip in perceived generalized self-efficacy. 
Future research should examine whether this diminishment of perceived generalized self-
efficacy persists throughout time, or if, as elicited threat diminishes, perceived 
generalized self-efficacy increases. Additionally, future inoculation studies should 
examine effects of inoculation treatments on other types of perceived efficacy, such as 
coping efficacy, communication efficacy, and target efficacy (see Afifi & Weiner, 2004). 
Limitations
The first limitation concerns the sample. Participants were undergraduate 
students, and their attitudes may be “more unstable, changeable, weak, and inconsistent” 
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(Sears, 1986, p. 522). Students’ political schemas are often undeveloped or even 
nonexistent, making them more susceptible to experimental materials than older, more 
experienced voters (An & Pfau, 2004a), and inoculation is most effective with strong 
party identifiers (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988). However, a sample of undergraduates for this 
study is particularly relevant to assess the proposed hypotheses. Most late night comedy 
viewers are young (Hamilton, 2003) and politically inattentive (Baum, 2003b; Davis & 
Owen, 1998). Additionally, control and randomization afforded by student samples yield 
significant benefits (Pfau et al., 2002). Nevertheless, future research should examine 
similar predictions with non-student samples. Furthermore, increased cell sizes in future 
late night comedy research would enhance power.
The second caveat of this study is the nature of late night comedy content across 
conditions. While care was taken to ensure similarity among the written inoculation 
treatment messages and attack messages using Becker, Bavelas, and Braden’s (1961) 
Index of Contingency, similarity among the late night comedy conditions was limited to 
television programs and time. Though Niven, Lichter and Amundson (2003) found, 
“rather than being idiosyncratic, the major late night shows exhibit quite similar patterns 
in choice of targets, the partisan ratio of targets, and the subject matter of their jokes” (p. 
130), future research should use additional assessments of late night comedy materials to 
further refine similarity, including such factors as the severity of ridicule and tone.
While there were some large effect sizes, others were rather small. However, in 
the political context, even small changes can be profoundly influential (Jeffries, 1986). 
Furthermore, results of this study are likely conservative and probably underestimate 
effects for three main reasons. First, most of the study took place near the end of the 
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primaries, and during the final days of the study, one contender, John Kerry, took and 
maintained a solid lead over other candidates. Had the race remained unsettled during the 
duration of the study, results would likely have been more robust. Second, primary races 
generally do not command much interest or attention for many, if not most, Americans 
(Popkin, 1991), and are instead a get-to-know-you period (Pfau et al., 1993).  Results of 
this study are likely conservative if compared to a study taking place either during the 
apex of the primary campaign or a study conducted just before or during the general 
election campaign. Additionally, late night comedic content during primaries is tame 
when compared to late night comedic content emerging during general election 
campaigns (Rainey, 2004). In this study, the contested primary campaign was for the 
party currently out of power and featured candidates who were relatively unknown (e.g., 
no former vice presidents). Thus, both the citizenry and comedians were getting to know 
the candidates (Rainey, 2004). For these reasons, results of this study are probably 
conservative. 
Conclusion
Late night political comedy influences viewers’ attitudes and behavioral 
intentions. Yet results of this study reveal that effects are more nuanced than 
conventional political wisdom may suggest. Further, while this study reveals limitations 
of an inoculation strategy in the face of late night comedic messages, it also indicates that 
a combination of late night content and conventional inoculation demonstrates promise 
against subsequent attacks. Finally, the study offers more nuance into the process of 
inoculation, further explicating elicited threat and irritation and assessing impacts on 
perceived generalized self-efficacy. 
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